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	<title>Stock Market News &#38; Stocks to Watch from StraightStocks &#187; Tallinn</title>
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		<title>Russia&#8217;s Imperial Blowback</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-in-russia-stocks/russias-imperial-blowback/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-in-russia-stocks/russias-imperial-blowback/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2009 17:06:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Robert Amsterdam</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[constant search]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Yesterday on Foreign Policy Christian Caryl published one of those "Russia-more-isolated-now-than-ever-thanks-to-their-own-policies-of-confrontation" type of articles.&#160; We are beginning to see this topic come around and around ever since the Ukraine smackdown, but the trend has been building over the past number...]]></description>
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		<title>RA&#8217;s Daily Russian News Blast &#8211; May 26, 2009</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-in-russia-stocks/ras-daily-russian-news-blast-may-26-2009/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-in-russia-stocks/ras-daily-russian-news-blast-may-26-2009/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2009 08:10:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Robert Amsterdam</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[TODAY: Russia condemns North Korea 'Hiroshima' size bomb test; Lavrov says election result in Lebanon must be respected; Medvedev believes influence in CIS states should be extended; streamlining the military provokes discontentA spokesman for President Medvedev has said that 'North...]]></description>
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		<title>Russia Has Not Changed its Foreign Policy Goals</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-in-russia-stocks/russia-has-not-changed-its-foreign-policy-goals/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-in-russia-stocks/russia-has-not-changed-its-foreign-policy-goals/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Apr 2009 17:19:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Robert Amsterdam</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Market Commentary]]></category>
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Studies;]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[I came across this translation from the Latvian press on TOL about whether or not the global financial crisis is changing Russia's foreign policy ambitions in its near abroad.&#160; The short answer: no.You would think that given this increasingly complex...]]></description>
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		<title>Devaluation, Euro Membership And Loan Defaults &#8211; Some Thoughts For My Critics</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/global-economics/devaluation-euro-membership-and-loan-defaults-some-thoughts-for-my-critics/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/global-economics/devaluation-euro-membership-and-loan-defaults-some-thoughts-for-my-critics/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Mar 2009 14:59:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Edward Hugh</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8991369883287712098.post-4821694980746956465</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[by Edward Hugh: Barcelonabr /br /blockquoteJoke - How do you know when a country is in crisis? Well, on the buses on the way to work, and in the bars and cafes during the mid morning break, everyone is reading the economy rather than the sports section in the local newspaper./blockquoteSeveral pieces of news out over the last week are relevant to the whole debate we are having about how to drag the Estonian economy (kicking and screaming it would seem) out of its current slump. In the first place the Estonian parliament passed a supplementary 2009 budget at the start of the week, in an attempt to address the ongoing crisis in the economy and the dramatic decline in revenues. The cuts were approved by 61 votes to 35 against in what was also an effective vote of confidence in the present government. So at least it is clear that the majority of Estonia's politicians back the present course, and the degree of public support for the current path is greater than it would seem to be in, say, Latvia. That is, naturally a very positive point.br /br /The supplementary budget lowers the amount of revenues in the annual budget by EUR 615.5 mln and of expenditure by EUR 419.9 mln. According to the revised budget, state revenue this year is now anticipated to be EUR 5,635 mln and expenditures EUR 5,871 mln. Both these numbers are of course conditional on the economic contraction for 2009 only being the forecast one (on which the budget is based) of 9.5%.br /br /The second piece of news is that the Estonian Finance Mininistry have sent an official loan application today to the European Investment Bank, with a request to borrow Eur 550 million for 5 years. And this point is important, since obviously, as I will argue below, Estonia's private sector (households and companies) is now basically very overleveraged (in too much debt) and the government is being forced to step in and assume greater responsibility for the collective debt as the correction continues.br /br /The third relevant piece of news is that the number of unemployed registered with the Estonian Labour Board was up again last week, and reached 50,527, which means 2418 more people signed on with the board during the week, following the 3,019 who joined the list in the previous week. Meanwhile the Estonian Parliament has been having a debate about what kind of labour market reforms the country needs to handle the present crisis. Since one witty soul appropriately baptised me in my most recent post the "excel economist" I would just like to add-in my own little chart-based contribution. People are leaving Estonia. How do I know that, well just take a look at the spike at the end of the time series shown in the grphic below, the volume of income transfers to Estonia (largely worker remittances) has been on the increase ever since the crisis started in 2007, and during the last quarter of 2008 they really spiked up, just (coincidentally?) as the economy spiked sharply downwards.br /br /pa href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb6NiNp1gzI/AAAAAAAANFs/iMfXHUF0QqY/s1600-h/estonia+remittances.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5313840229263967026" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 241px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb6NiNp1gzI/AAAAAAAANFs/iMfXHUF0QqY/s400/estonia+remittances.png" border="0" //abr /We don't know too much about the murky topic of out-migration in the Baltics, since no one seems to consider it a particularly pressing issue. In fact, migrant labour flows could be considered to be a leading indicator for a modern (open) economy (in both directions), but surprisingly little attention is paid to the matter. We do have an old "estimate" that around a href="http://www.epl.ee/?artikkel=260683"one third of those working abroad are working in Finland/a, and now somewhat dated reports of a href="http://www.ap3.ee/Default2.aspx?PaperArticle=1amp;code=3655/uud_uudidx_365506"young people working in Finland repairing motorway crash barriers for 150 kroon an hour/a, but that's all we seem to have, anecdotal evidence. Maybe one of the reforms all those very busy parliamentarians could think about agreeing to would be the introduction of a question in the labour force survey about whether or not the interviewee currently has (or has had in the recent past) a family member working abroad. /ppThe sudden apparent deterioration in labour market condidtions is all the more worrying since up to now, and despite the fact that growth in the Estonian economy started to slow early 2007, the labour market did not show signs of any severe impact until Q3 2008. On the contrary, according to official statistics, unemployment continued to decrease and bottomed out at 4.0% in the second quarter of 2008. Since then the unemployment rate has jumped to 6.2% in Q3 followed by 7.6% Q4. Thus we now have the highest rate effective rate since the middle of 2005, and things are only getting started. /ppAccording to the statistics office, nearly half of those signing on have become unemployed due to layoffs, closures or bankruptcies. On the other hand total employment has so far help up reasonably well, with the total number of employed persons in the 3rd quarter running at 652,600, only 0.2% less than in the same period a year earlier (656,500).br /br /Lastly, statistics Estonia reported last week that in January 2009 there was a year on year drop of 29% for exports and 37% for import 37%, meaning that the current account deficit is closing (more on this below). But first let me try to address some of the questions that have come up in the debate about devaluation.br /br /strongIn The Event Of Devaluation What Happpens To Euro Denominated Debts?/strongbr //ppBasically this seems to be the big theme in the forefront of everybody's minds, but there seems to be some kind of large misunderstanding here. Essentially we are only talking about two different forms of devaluation (one internal via deflation, and the other external, by changing the exchange rate of the kroon with the euro). I think everyone is agreed that the Estonian economy - due to severe overheating, a massive housing bubble, and rampant inflation, all of which were the effect of faulty monetary and fiscal policy inside Estonia - is now hopelessly uncompetitive by international standards, hence a substantial downward correction in prices is agreed by all parties to be essential./pSo the impact of this price downward price adjustment (which should be equal in either case) will be the same on the relative cost of maintaining non kroon loans. Let me put it this way, if you are one of the people in the unfortunate position of having such a loan it will make little difference to you whether your salary is reduced in kroon by 20% and your mortgage payment stays unchanged, or whether your salary in kroon remains unchanged and the currency drops 20% against the euro. Thus most of the argumentation about this topic seems to be highly emotional.br /br /Of course, in both cases there will be loan defaults, but much more than the 20% drop in real salary (since it is unit hourly labour costs that matter here) will be the fall in earnings as the economy enters deep recession and people lose overtime, bonuses, or even their jobs themselves. This is what puts the default rate up, and prolonging the length of the slump long enough for people savings to run out, and for the normal unemployment benefit (of one year's duration) to run out, and people to be forced to try and live on the 59 euros a month social security allowance.br /br /This, in my view, is the strongest argument in favour of the "short sharp shock" of the devaluation route (the so called V shaped recovery), rather than the more protracted "U shaped" one of internal deflation. On the second path you will almost certainly have more unemployment for longer, and with this the risk of loan default will increase. To counterbalance against that is the Estonian's national pride in their currency board, and their desire not to be seen to fail. But sometimes it is a good policy to stand and hold your ground, and others it is the more intelligent policy to retreat, and live to fight another day. All withdrawal is not an act of cowardice, nor is renegotiation a sign of unreliability. To make mistakes is to be human, and I doubt that the word of the United States has been put especially in doubt by the sub prime mortgage fiasco. In market economies "stuff happens", and when it happens normally it is better to take the corrective measures and put the issue behind you.br /br /br /br /pOf course, there are no guarantees here, and success or failure with devaluation (as with any measure) depends on the rest of the policy mix you put together to accompany the move. I don't think that there is any doubt that Estonia's position is very difficult, so there is no panacea, or easy way out of all this. It would have been better not to get into the mess, but it is a bit late for that now./ppWhat I do think is that devaluation gives you a chance to fight back, and in any even you should feel better fighting, than simply waiting, and sitting and taking it on the cheek. With a current account deficit to reduce and falling government tax revenue there is little the government can do in the way of economic stimulus. Devaluation gives you a kind of indirect stimulus, that is the strongest argument in favour of it. It also places future output on a higher level and thus (arguably) reduces the unemployment and default risk./ppBasically 2 years sitting around at home waiting can be very demoralising for anyone, and especially if you are trying to live for the second year on 59 euros a month. I am saying categorically and absolutely clearly here that I see no possibility of any kind of recovery in 2010 (especially given the global environment), and much less so if you just there and wait for it all to happen./ppNow, if you devalue, you recover monetary policy, and you then need to keep a tight reign on inflation, but frankly, and again if we look at Hungary, they have devalued 25% and they still only have 3% inflation (and falling) so this may not be such a massive problem. The thing is you need a better monetary policy once the recovery starts, so you don't simply get the inflation again./ppBut basically, you should be able to foster domestic industries as an alternative to exporst in some things - I know, Estonia is so small it is hard to see how to do this, you obviously need to be very open as an economy, and practice good old Ricardian comparative advantage.So you need to specialise to some extent in new activities, and this is really up to the ministry of industry, or whatever, to formulate projects. Then you need to sell Estonia to some new investors. Price is only part of this, but it is part. Remember, with the present crisis there are plenty of people offering, and few people wanting to invest in new productive activities, but potential investors do exist, and you have to find them. That is the job your politicians should be up to now./pIf you have the structure is right, and you can provide a base for some sort of exporting activity, then so much the better when it comes to persuading people to come. So devalution is just a kind of stimulus, it is like a large subsidy to exporters, socialising the costs. It isn't perfect, nothing in this world is, but it is better than nothing. You can keep more people in work this way, and those people create wealth, rather than simply consuming government benefits.br /br /br /But going back to the loans and the default problem, what about the banks. Well my main point in this regard is that the last thing in the world the banks want to do is to start becoming estate agents, so they are in fact reasonably reluctant to start mass reposessions of property. It is that old story, if you owe them a little money and you can't pay, then you have a problem. But if you owe a lot of money, and you can't pay, they THEY have a problem, and normally they are going to be quite reasonable and down to earth when it comes to finding solutions, which they need as much as you do.br /br /Banks basically prefer to stay in the business of banking, which is what they know about, in the same way that governments really don't want to nationalise banks, even though from time to time they may have to. Governments really don't know that much about running banks, any more than banks know about being estate agents, and holding a lot of property in a country in deep recession is hardly a plus for them, or their international credit rating.br /br /When just a few householders have to throw in the towel and hand their home over to the bank, then banks may try to practise a "hold to maturity" rather than "mark to market" policy, and and profit from any hypothetical rise in property values in the future. But this credit and housing crisis isn't like previous ones in recent history. House prices in boom/bust economies like the Estonian one are unlikely to recover for many many years, and bank balance sheets simply won't let them hold on to dubious assets for such an extended period of time.br /br /Banks want to manage mortgages, not houses, since mortgages pay a stream of income, while houses are only non performing loans, with no income.The same thing has been happening in Spain since the bubble burst, but now banks are swifty moving towards "fire sales" as they can hold out no longer, but even selling at rock bottom prices they are having trouble finding buyers. So what they would really prefer is to keep people in their homes.br /br /This process will also happen in the Baltics, and the best policy for the banks will be to recognise reality, accept their share of the loses, and negotiate with householders while they are still in their homes and still in work, and with the government.Thus I think that those who have the most immediate interest in debt restructuring and devaluation - even though they don't seem to realise it going by their pronouncements - are those very Nordic banks who have been pressing to avoid it. As I say, 100,000 houses with people living in them and working and paying something are worth a lot more than 100,000 empty houses whose owners have long gone to work in Finland (or wherever) and which have been left to rot.br /br /br /strongJoining The Eurozone/strongbr /br /Now at this point I would like to be clear, I am not arguing for a unilateral devaluation by the Estonian authorities, but rather an acceptance of that as an objective on their part, and a negotiation of such devaluation with the EU authorities (the EU Commission and te ECB). Actually, what is rather to be lamented in this regard is that they themselves are not doing the reposible thing and taking the initiative here.br /br /In fact the Estonian Finance Ministry has estimated that Estonia may well comply with the Maastricht criteria before the end of this year. Prime Minister Andrus Ansip is reported to be considering following the 2006 Lithuanian example and formally requesting an assesment of the fitness of Estonia for Eurozone membership: "We are entitled to request from the European Commission and from the European Central Bank that they would assess the compliance with the Maastricht criteria outside the regular approximation reports cycle," with the Finance Ministry adding that "Although thus far all the countries have adopted the Euro in the beginning of a year, the dates of the transition to the single currency is not so strictly regulated,".br /br /Prime Minister Ansip estimates that Estonia may well comply with the inflation criterion by October, and that an evaluation at that point could lead to Eurozone membership as early as July 2010. Yet one more time I beg to differ.br /br /I differ basically not because I doubt the assertion that Estonia's inflation rate will meet Eurozone criteria later this year, but becuase I doubt the interpretation of how such an application would be considered. You see, complying with the minimal criteria is only a first step in the process, the EU institutions then have to make an evaluation of the sustainability of the path your economy is on, and of the realism of the exchange rate at which you seek to enter, and since Estonia's economy, far from being clearly settled on a sustainable path is right in the middle of a boom-bust correction, and there is widespread agreement that your currency is, as of the present time, pretty overvalued. In have gone into all of this on an earlier occasion in the case of a href="http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/economics-and-demography/slovakias-euro-membership-bid/"the review of the Slovakian situation/a, but it is clear that they will be unlikely to be sympathetic to any special pleading about your crisis in Estonia (all of Eastern Europe is in crisis), and (especially over at the ECB) will more than likely take the view that while financial support should be offered the best approach is to let you work out your own "imbalances" before you enter, since experience with those countries who entered in Southern Europe has not exactly been positive, and they may even already be having second thoughts as to whether they made the right decision a href="http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/economics-and-demography/sovenias-economy-falls-off-the-roof-while-slovakia-slides-into-recession/"in giving the go ahead to Slovakia and Slovenia/a.br /br /My own view, which is pretty much the same as that held by Wolfgang Munchau, is that the countries of the East are playing a self defeating game at the present time, and that a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9261b13c-1187-11de-87b1-0000779fd2ac.html"Collective Action On The Crisis Is Our Best Hope/a. What would be a better idea would be for you all to emphasise what you have in common at this point, rather than clinging to what differentiates you one from the other.br /br /Paul Krugman, a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/opinion/16krugman.html?_r=1amp;blamp;ex=1237348800amp;en=7a630fdbc88be4e6amp;ei=5087%0A"writing in the New York Times from Madrid /a(where he was meeting with Prime Minister Zapatero today) had this to say:br /br /blockquoteIn the past, Spain would have sought improved competitiveness by devaluing its currency. But now it’s on the euro — and the only way forward seems to be a grinding process of wage cuts. This process would have been difficult in the best of times; it will be almost inconceivably painful if, as seems all too likely, the European economy as a whole is depressed and tending toward deflation for years to come. Does all this mean that Europe was wrong to let itself become so tightly integrated? Does it mean, in particular, that the creation of the euro was a mistake? Maybe. But Europe can still prove the skeptics wrong, if its politicians start showing more leadership. Will they? /blockquotestrongCurrent Account Deficit/strongbr /br /Well, now let's take a brief look at the current account deficit issue. The first problem Estonia has is that she has been running one.br /br /a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb7IVGqYxgI/AAAAAAAANF0/yNib7WNl0ZM/s1600-h/estonia+ca+deficit.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5313904875234969090" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 251px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb7IVGqYxgI/AAAAAAAANF0/yNib7WNl0ZM/s400/estonia+ca+deficit.png" border="0" //abr /br /And the second problem is that now that the capital flows which were supporting it have dried up, you need to get rid of it. Which isn't as easy as it sounds. The ideal way to straighten out a current account balance is to increase exports and reduce imports at one and the same time. p/pNow, if we look at the deficit over the last few years (see chart below), we can see that only a part is produced by the goods and services trade deficit.br /br /br /pa href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb7MEivOOrI/AAAAAAAANF8/J5d6y492EP0/s1600-h/estonia+ca1.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5313908988760177330" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 207px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb7MEivOOrI/AAAAAAAANF8/J5d6y492EP0/s400/estonia+ca1.png" border="0" //a That is because another part (structurally) of the deficit comes from the negative impact of income flows (these are basically composed of interest on loans and dividends on equities).br /br /a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb7MUL0QjRI/AAAAAAAANGE/nJMGF7I22jo/s1600-h/estonia+CA2.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5313909257485192466" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 240px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb7MUL0QjRI/AAAAAAAANGE/nJMGF7I22jo/s400/estonia+CA2.png" border="0" //abr /br /And why does Estonia have these negative income flows, well in part as a result of all those bank flows which paid for the loans that so many Estonians were contracting, and in part they are produced by income earned on Foreign Direct Investment. The point is FDI is good, but if you are a borrowing economy, rather than a saving one, then you accumulate over time an imbalance between the investments you make in other countries and the investments others make in your country. The upshot of this is that you accumulate a structural deficit under the income account of your Balance of Payments current account, and this is exactly what has happened to Estonia (see chart below).br /br /a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb7NwolQzkI/AAAAAAAANGM/ZVK6boXfUsE/s1600-h/estonia+FDI.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5313910845754887746" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 241px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb7NwolQzkI/AAAAAAAANGM/ZVK6boXfUsE/s400/estonia+FDI.png" border="0" //abr /br /So basically, not only does Estonia need to start exporting to create economic growth, it also needs to do more exporting to pay down the debt (hence addressing the structural weakness in the account) and to start accumulating a greater external FDI stock, which among other things can generate income to help you pay for your old age. One of the features of generalised economic corrections like the ones we are suffering from is that we tend to suffer from what Keynes called the Paradox of Thrift. Paul Krugman puts the situation like this (in a US setting, but Estonia'ssituation is not that different, structurally speaking) blockquoteI don’t know who else has made this point, but it’s quite clear that we’re in serious paradox of thrift territory here. Or perhaps more accurately, we’re in a paradox of debt. p/ppConsumers are pulling back because they’ve realized that they’re too far in debt. The economy is shrinking in large part because consumers are pulling back. And the result, almost surely, is to leave household balance sheets worse than ever. I can’t do this accurately until the Federal Reserve’s a href="http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/default.htm"flow of funds data/a have been updated, but almost without question the ratio of household debt to personal income has been rising, not falling, as consumers try to save more./p/blockquoteAnd guess what, while I don't have the data to hand, I bet you all the tea there is in China that the ratio of household debt to personal income will also have been rising as the economy contracts, even as Estonian consumers try to save rather than borrow. That is, the faster you try to save, the less you really do manage to save as your income contracts, and here is just another reason why you need exports. a href="http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/analytics/?doc=11201"I'm afraid that those who say/a "speculations about devaluing of the kroon are irresponsible as no one in Estonia would gain anything from such a move", simply don't understand what they are talking about. (Well that makes a href="http://www.politika.lv/blogi/index.php?id=61228"two Baltic central bank governors who don't agree with me/a).br /br /One of the reasons, of course, that it seems so difficult for people to contemplate increasing exports as a way out of this crisis is that the economy has been completely distorted by the construction, financial services and real estate boom. Just one indication of this can be found in the share of construction activity in the whole economy (see chart below). As we can see in the chart, the construction share in Estonian GDP climbed steadily after 2005. This share now needs to drop back again towards its historic average. This correction has started, but there is still a long way to go, and meanwhile the economy contracts and contracts.br /br /br /br /p/pblockquote/blockquotepa href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb7SzwD87eI/AAAAAAAANGU/Eo1KHuBTBbw/s1600-h/estonia+construction.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5313916396860403170" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 216px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb7SzwD87eI/AAAAAAAANGU/Eo1KHuBTBbw/s400/estonia+construction.png" border="0" //a So, summing up, and a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2009/pn0933.htm"in the words of the IMF/a: blockquoteThe recession is sharply reducing Estonia’s imbalances. The external currentbr /account deficit nearly halved between 2007 and 2008, stronglargely due to abr /demand-driven compression of imports/strong but also helped by a drop in incomebr /outflows, reflecting the fall in profits to foreign-owned companies and banks.br /Exports continued to grow modestly despite an appreciation of the real exchangebr /rate, owing to an improvement in terms of trade and a recovery of oil transitbr /trade with Russia. (my emphasis).br //blockquotepbr /strongQ4 2008 GDP/strongbr /br /So what is happening to the Estonian Economy? Well lets look at the latest GDP data. Now, according to the preliminary estimates from Statistics Estonia output in the Estonian economy dropped by 9.4 percent during the 4th quarter of 2008 (on a year on year basis). This is a huge drop, unprecedented in Estonia since the upheavals of the very early nineties, during the transition from a planned to a market economy. This, however, is not that surprising, since the recession in all highly developed economies is currently more serious than anything seen since the 1930s, and the Baltic correction is one of the most dramatic among these. Compared to the third quarter, the seasonally and working-day adjusted GDP was down by 4.3%, while fourth quarter GDP was even below Q3 at current prices for the first time since 1995 (down by 4.7% - that is GDP was down in what we economists call nominal, as well as real terms. this is quite a significant development to which we will return in the coming months and quarters).br /br //pa href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb9Z2slXSfI/AAAAAAAANGs/79CIZ8sBvg8/s1600-h/estonia+GDP+two.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5314064881536158194" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 230px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb9Z2slXSfI/AAAAAAAANGs/79CIZ8sBvg8/s400/estonia+GDP+two.png" border="0" //abr /br /a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb9Zr38A5UI/AAAAAAAANGc/9J6ZxG0XLAo/s1600-h/estonia+GDP+one.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5314064695605388610" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 228px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb9Zr38A5UI/AAAAAAAANGc/9J6ZxG0XLAo/s400/estonia+GDP+one.png" border="0" //abr /br /So, following year on year real GDP growth rates which were fluctuating in the 11-12 percent range for six consecutive quarters between mid 2005 and the end of 2006, we now have a strong and sustained contraction (which has now, according to Eurostat seasonally corrected quarterly data lasted for 5 quarters, with no end to the pain in sight). This is why we refer to a boom-bust process, since the normal (garden-variety) recession lasts only 2 quarters.br /br /In 1997, when Estonia went through its last comparable cycle, overheating driven growth lasted for around 5 quarters, and was then followed by several quarters of negative growth, starting in Q4 1998. GDP hit a low point with a 1.6 percent decrease in GDP in Q3 1999, and growth was positive again in Q4 1999, and by Q1 2000 was up at an annual 8.4% rate.br /br /Today nobody is expecting such a rapid recovery as the two crises are very different. In the first place, while during the 1997/98 crisis the downturn only really involved emerging markets, and especially in the Estonian context Russia, the current crisis is more of a depression than a recession and is a global one. West European countries, which were the main export markets for Estonian products by the late nineties, contributed to Estonia's rapid recovery with their own momentum. This year few expect Europe's economies to expand this year, and large question marks still hang over 2010. Further, the Estonian economy had a lot more in the way of sector transition driven easily achievable catch up growth in front of it, now this element will be much less favourable, since Estonia will really need to find substantial productivity and competitiveness improvements in existing activities, and even from abandoning some parts of the higher value sectors (like construction and real estate) which had been fuelling the earlier growth. So nothing here is going to be easy, and certainly nothing like as easy in 1999. The two moments just do not bear serious comparison.br /br /If we look at the Q4 data, the fall in GDP was largely produced by a drop in domestic demand (which fell year on year by 14.8%).br /br /br /a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb-CxXdf3OI/AAAAAAAANG0/9XiIJZ7e7YY/s1600-h/estonia+total+dpmestic.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5314109869943413986" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 214px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb-CxXdf3OI/AAAAAAAANG0/9XiIJZ7e7YY/s400/estonia+total+dpmestic.png" border="0" //abr /Domestic demand is basically composed of three elements, households’ final consumption expenditures (HFCE), gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and government spending. HFCE was down year on year by 10.4% in Q4.br /br /a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb-KkN-nFkI/AAAAAAAANHM/8LGtqJh3DUA/s1600-h/estonia+household+consumption.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5314118440152667714" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 215px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb-KkN-nFkI/AAAAAAAANHM/8LGtqJh3DUA/s400/estonia+household+consumption.png" border="0" //abr /Total government consumption expenditure (including transfers) was up 3.5%.br /br /br /a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb-GzAxUtjI/AAAAAAAANG8/KZt9HOmtghk/s1600-h/estonia+govt+spending.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5314114296258803250" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 231px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb-GzAxUtjI/AAAAAAAANG8/KZt9HOmtghk/s400/estonia+govt+spending.png" border="0" //abr /br /And GCFC (which basically means investment in one form or another) was down by 24% year on year.br /br /a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb-KNRatlxI/AAAAAAAANHE/9Lwp3jdIxDE/s1600-h/estonia+GCFC.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5314118045938849554" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 214px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb-KNRatlxI/AAAAAAAANHE/9Lwp3jdIxDE/s400/estonia+GCFC.png" border="0" //abr /So apart from the increase in government spending, the only bright spot in Q4 GDP came from the net trade effect, since this was a by product of the fact that imports fell (11.9%) by more than exorts (3.2%). The drop in imports was driven by a fall in machinery, equipment and motor vehicle imports. Which means simply that both investment and private consumption (or living standards) are falling.br /br /a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb-PaGVbQMI/AAAAAAAANHU/2LS1GupoUoE/s1600-h/estonia+exports.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5314123763860324546" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 214px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb-PaGVbQMI/AAAAAAAANHU/2LS1GupoUoE/s400/estonia+exports.png" border="0" //abr /strongThe Credit Driven Expansion Is Overbr //strongbr /br /During boom times the main supports for Estonia's extremely distorted economic growth were the excessively low interest rates available on euro denominated loans (which effectively fuelled the housing bubble) and strong capital inflows, which made possible the rapid increase in the volume of home loans and loans to building developers. During the current downturn as financial regulation is tightened, what Estonia can expect are higher interest rates, an end to real estate as a GDP growth driver and a decline in borrowing.br /br /During the boom time, the inflow of foreign capital, largely through foreign owners of local banks, seemed never ending. Bank liabilities to non-residents (as a share of total assets) rose from the 31-34% range in 2000-2003 to over 50% by 2007/08. Bank liabilities to Estonian residents as a % of GDP increased from 40% at the start of the century to over 60% in 2007/08, while liabilities to non-residents shot up from 20% to 70% of GDP over the same period.br /br /The share of locally owned banks in Estonia is marginal. Only the Baltic Investments Trust is locally owned and this accounts for under 1% of the total market. As of June 2008, 72% of Estonian banking assets were owned by two Swedish banks, Swedbank and SEB, with Swedbank alone holding a more than a 50% share. The ratio of total bank assets to GDP increased from 60 percent to more than 130 percent in the period of 2000-2008, while the share of loans in these assets increased from 58 percent to 76 percent over the same period. On a quick calculation basis, this means that the banks have an exposure to lonas of about 97% of GDP (and rising as GDP contracts, this is the paradox of thrift point, and especially as nominal GDP falls - as Estonia enters negative price deflation this percentage is set to shoot up, as nominal GDP falls more quickly than real GDP - this is yet one more reason why devaluation is a better option - you take some of the sting out of the growing burden of debt).br /br /Home loans and loans to the real estate sector made up 59 per cent of the total loan portfolio of the banks at the end of 2007, compared to 25 percent in 2000, which shows the enormous increase in Swedish bank exposire to Estonian real estate. Net savings (deposits less loans) of private individuals to GDP changed from around a positive 8 percent in 2000 to minus 26 percent in 2008, i.e. households moved from being net savers to becoming net borrowers, and they are now about to go all the way back upstream again, which is why .... well, you know, exports are about to become so vital.br /br /As can be seen from all the above, the Estonian economy is now heavily dependent on the standing and good will of the Nordic banks. The IMF, the Estonian Central Bank, the EU and other stakeholders arguethat the financial standing of the Nordic banks operating in Estonia should be strong enough to cope with both the global financial crisis and the risks related to Estonia's contracting economy. This may, or may not, prove to be the case. If their only exposure was to Estonia then probably they would be right, but what is happening in Estonia forms part of a broader regional picture, and needs to be seen in that light.br /br /But, anyway, this is beside the point. Even were the banks to view favourably future loan applications from Estonian citizens, those very same citizens would be unlikely to be seeking the loans in the first place. As we are seeing, Estonians will be more inclined to save than to borrow in the coming years, and especially given that the Estonian property market has now decisively turned, which means there will be no more juicy increases in house prices to continually tempt them back to the lending counter, nor rising home equity from which to extract that "something extra" with which to buy that nice new car.br /br /br /strongFinally, The Impact Of The Property Crash./strongbr /br /Before closing I would like to return to one rather contested (and possibly ill advised) point I made in my previous post. At the start of the post I said:br /br /blockquote"At the same time it is estimated that nearly 250,000 Estonians are currently living in homes whose market value is insufficient to cover the outstanding mortgage loans which their owners have taken out, making "exposure risk" a growing problem for the country's banks. During the boom, house sale transactions were commonly financed with a 90% loan to value (LtV) ratio. This is a very dubious practice at the best of time, but in the face of a sharp fall in both house values and wages it becomes well nigh disastrous." /blockquotebr /Now, I do say here "it is estimated" and indeed the estimated came from an Estonian journalist (writing in the newspaper Postimees on 27/02) even if the methodology used to make the "estimate" - calculating that between 2006-2008 there were 100 000 households who bought real estate, and then multiplying by the average household size of 2,5 persons, to get a grand toal of 250 000 Estonians). The truth of the matter is that no one really knows how many Estonians have negative equity in their homes at this point in time, other than the fact that the number is large and rising.br /br /What we do know is that property prices in Estonia’s residential real estate market continued to sfall in 2008 (and especially in Talinn and Parnu), after starting to fall in the last quarter of 2007. In fact, i Tallinn the average price of 2-room apartments was down by 17.2% at the end of Q3 2008 from a year earlier. Taking inflation into account, the average price drop was more like 25.3% in real terms. In a broader context, Estonia's 2008 price falls were among the highest seen globally, and were in sharp contrast to the enormous annual price increases we were seeing in the not very distant past, when annual rates peak at an annual price increase of 77.5% in Q1 2006. Record breakers on the way up, and on the way down. Is this, I ask you, a nice way to live?br /br /br /pa href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb1oeZzGQmI/AAAAAAAANFM/HPeBicK2ABE/s1600-h/estonia+3.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5313518006897623650" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 239px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb1oeZzGQmI/AAAAAAAANFM/HPeBicK2ABE/s400/estonia+3.png" border="0" //a Demand for properties in Tallinn, for example, reached an all time high in 2006, with the average price of 2 room flats rising by an average of 27% annually from 2001 to 2005 with the rate peaking in 2006, when prices rose by more than 50% year on year.br /br /a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb1oPllrVTI/AAAAAAAANFE/uClXj5V3Pxk/s1600-h/estonia+2.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5313517752364520754" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 239px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb1oPllrVTI/AAAAAAAANFE/uClXj5V3Pxk/s400/estonia+2.png" border="0" //abr /br /The average price of a 3-room apartment in Tallinn was down 11.5% - to EKK20,800 (€1,328) per sq. m. - during the year to end-Q3 2008, and down 18.4% from the peak level of EEK25,500 (€1,629) per sq. m. in Q2 2007. In Parnu average prices plunged by around 30% to end-Q3 2008 from a year earlier.br /br /br /The volume of real estate transactions also continues to fall, after reaching EEK39.8 billion in 2008, down from EEK57.6 billion in 2007 and EEK73.8 billion in 2006. The number of transactions in 2008 was 50,528, up slightly compared with 49,464 transactions in 2007 but well down on the 60,208 transactions registered in 2006.br /br /br /a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb1ort--tYI/AAAAAAAANFU/ml3poN6zCsY/s1600-h/estonia+4.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5313518235654468994" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 239px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb1ort--tYI/AAAAAAAANFU/ml3poN6zCsY/s400/estonia+4.png" border="0" //abr /br /And along with the decline in notarial contracts the number of building permits has also fallen. Permits for only 4,301 dwellings were filed in the first three quarters of 2008, significantly down compared with the 7,795 permits issued in 2007.br /br /So really we have seen a huge bubble here with the average price of 2-room flats in Tallinn up by 448.7% from 2000 to 2007, in Tartu by 431.5% and in Parnu by 440%. And almost the entire population is affected, since owner-occupancy rates have risen strongly, and are up from 85% in 2002, to 96% in 2004. Estonia's rental market shrank from 12% of households (with 9% privately renting and 3% in social rents) in 2002, to just 4% in 2004.br /br /br /And the house price boom was supported by a massive expansion of the mortgage market, with an average rate of annual increase of 62% yearly between 2002 and 2006. Outstanding housing loans grew from EEK4.5 billion (€286 million) in 2000 to EEK88 (€5.6) billion in 2007 and EEK 97 (€6.2) billion in 2008; or if you prefer from 4.7% of GDP in 2000, to 37% in 2007. Even more to the point, at the peak of the boom, banks were willing to provide loans with a maximum lending period of 30 years on a loan-to-value ratio of 100%. /ppstrongMonetary Policy Always Flawedbr //strongbr /One cause of Estonia's inflated boom has undoubtedly come from the pronounced tendency of the Estonian people to favour the pegging of the kroon, first to the deutschemark in 1992 and then to the euro in 2001. Initially the peg lead to lower inflation and lower interest rates. Mortgage interest rates fell from over 10% during the late-1990s, to below 4% between 2004 and 2006, while inflation fell from 89% in 1992 to 8.2% in 1998. Between 2002 and 2006, inflation was permanently below the 5% mark (with an annual average of 3.3%).br /br /However pegging is always a problematic strategy, and so it has been in the Estonian case. Follwoing the decision to peg to the euro, interest rates in Estonia have basically followed the key policy rate set by the ECB. Hence when the ECB began to raise key rates in mid-2005, mortgage rates also increased in Estonia. ECB base rates were gradually raised in 25 basis point steps, from 2% in October 2005 to 4% in May 2007, and again to 4.25% in July 2008.br /br /Clearly these rates were lower than warranted by Estonia’s inflation. Yet Estonia's monetary authorities remained relatively powerless because the kroon’s peg to the euro means the central bank could not raise interest rates further, and even if they did, this would only accelerate the preference for euro loans, with the majority of those borrowing sublimely unaware of the risks they were assuming in taking out unhedged foreign currency loans./ppI say that Estonia's monetary authorities remained relatively powerless, but relatively here does not mean completely, since more could surely have been done on both the fiscal and the monetary side to avert the present tragedy. The fiscal authorities could have paid more heed to the warnings from the IMF and the credit ratings agencies that a higher level of budget surplus was urgently needed to drain all the excess demand which was violently overheating the system. The central bank (you know those people who now blithely say that "speculations about devaluing of the kroon are irresponsible as no one in Estonia would gain anything from such a move") could have issued very strict instructions to the banks about the income multipliers on loans, loan to value percentages, and documentation needed, and this, as we saw later, would surely have has an effect. And above all, both the central bank and the fiscal authorities could have taken a much less tolerant attitude to the sharp wage inflation which broke out in the second half of 2006. It is not so much a matter of having no policy remedies available, as a lack of the necessary will to look for the tools and find them. All of this is far more reminiscent of what we are unfortunately all too accustomed to seeing in country's with "currency corridors" like Ukraine or even Russia itself than it is of the sort of modern new dynamic and free market economic model we were all lead to believe Estonia had firmly set its path on./ppbr /strongHousing Oversupply And Declining Construction Activity/strongbr /br /So what we have before us is a huge housing overhang, a seriously endebted population, and an economy which was dependent on construction and real estate which will now need to "reinvent" itself. It wasn't always like this. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, housing construction entered dramatic deceleration and between 1996 and 2001 less than 1,000 dwellings were added to the dwelling stock annually - not even enough to meet "normal" demand. After 2001, housing construction really took off, and in 2007, around 7,200 units were added to the dwelling stock, up from the 5,100 units built in 2006. /ppThis massive increase in dwelling completions has now transformed a housing shortage situation to substantial oversupply one, pushing house prices down in the process. Another 4,282 new dwelling units were completed within the first three quarters of 2008. Although less than the 4,911 completions which were registered in the same period in 2007, these, in a market which is already "oversold" have only added more pressure on an already bloated 645,400 dwelling stock. Maybe it is worth someone remebering at this point that Estonia's population is actually falling. So, as buildings output drops by 25% year on year in Q4 (see chart below) maybe the time has come to ask when will the level of output ever start to rise again? And in the meantime, what will Estonia live from in the meantime? Anyone ready now to have second thoughts about exports?br /br //pa href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb1oAhD2R2I/AAAAAAAANE8/z4BUn3YdMAs/s1600-h/estonia+construction.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5313517493450852194" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 243px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/Sb1oAhD2R2I/AAAAAAAANE8/z4BUn3YdMAs/s400/estonia+construction.png" border="0" //adiv class="blogger-post-footer"img width='1' height='1' src='http://res1.blogblog.com/tracker/8991369883287712098-4821694980746956465?l=globaleconomydoesmatter.blogspot.com'//div]]></description>
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		<title>Will All Be Well, And End Well, In Estonia?</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/global-economics/will-all-be-well-and-end-well-in-estonia/</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2009 15:54:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Edward Hugh</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[by Edward Hugh: Barcelonabr /br /Well, there doesn't seem to much room for doubt at this point does there, the Baltic Economies are in the van of the European economic slowdown for 2009, just as they were leading the charge up in 2007, and all that debate about whether we were going to get a hard landing or a soft one seems now so out of date and and old hat as we watch how Estonia's economy contracts almost faster than the body of the incredible shrinking man (by an annual 3.5% in the third quarter of 2008), while Latvia's seems to be rivalling Harry Houdini in the expert art of staged disappearance (dropping as it did by an annual 4.6% in Q3). Even Lithuania's economy - which like a half drunken man still manages to stagger forward before it finally gets to fall over - is now expected by IMF regional representative Christoph Rosenberg to be set to contract an annual 2% in 2009. As a href="http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/analytics/?doc=8577"Rosenberg so pointedly says/a "Latvia had the highest growth rate in the EU for several years, but it was a bubble."br /br /br /pa href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SR1UddzuMSI/AAAAAAAALec/p4Z1cFiFgJc/s1600-h/estonia+qoq.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5268460004287852834" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 184px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SR1UddzuMSI/AAAAAAAALec/p4Z1cFiFgJc/s320/estonia+qoq.png" border="0" //abr /br /br /The only slightly worrying thing about all the belated acceptance that the Baltics are going to have one of the hardest landings in the global economy this time round is the apparent collective failure to do the ritual "soul searching", and address the tricky issue of just what it was in the original analyses which lead so many to place such trust in the good intentions of the Nordic Banks and in the consequent probability of a soft landing, since the danger is now that we simply get misplaced policy piled upon well-meaning but misplaced policy in an attempt to address problems whose roots (which I am convinced are located to some extent at least in the regions rather peculiar demography) are quite simply left untackled. That is, we remain stuck on the currency pegs, we continue to count on the goodwill of the Nordic Banks, we expect wages and prices to exhibit a downward flexibility not seen, for example, a href="http://eurowatch.blogspot.com/2009/01/portugal-sustains.html"in a comparable country like Portugal/a, whilst over at Eesti Pank (the Estonian National Bank) they a href="http://www.eestipank.info/pub/en/dokumendid/publikatsioonid/seeriad/ylevaade/_2008_02/_3_208.pdf"still expect the recovery to begin in 2010/a (in rather stark contrast to the much more realistic assessment for the US economy from the Congressional Budget Office - who don't expect the US recovery to really get underway till 2012, and don't see trend growth being reached till 2015). If they were serious about seeing through the correction in terms of allowing a long and painful downward adjustment in living standards to take place as the favoured alternative to devaluation, then they would realise that this process would really only be getting itself going in 2010, let alone be over - so why, oh why, I ask myself, do people in the Baltics insist on trying to view things through such rosy tinted spectacles? The main ones hurt by all this at the end of the day are those very people we are all, I am sure, trying so hard to help. blockquoteThe Estonian economy should start to recover by 2010, according to the nation's central bank.Although Eesti Pank expects the country's gross domestic product to fall by 4.48 per cent in 2009, growth could be experienced in as little as 12 months, reports Baltic Business News./blockquotebr /strongThe Future is In Exports/strongbr /br /Basically the future outlook for the Estonian economy lies in exports. This simple point should not be so hard to grasp, since it can be easily deduced from one fundamental structural aspect of the Estonian economy: the presence of a fairly large current account deficit (which admittedly is not as large as the Latvian one, but the fact that others are even worse off is somehow cold comfort here) which now needs correcting. In fact, as we can see in the chart below, the correction has already started.br /br /br /br /pa href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWipdi4p56I/AAAAAAAAMGs/tR8QaZvCLv0/s1600-h/estonia+current+account.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5289664087392380834" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 202px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWipdi4p56I/AAAAAAAAMGs/tR8QaZvCLv0/s320/estonia+current+account.png" border="0" //abr /br /But what the correction means is that domestic demand will have to contract - to make space for the export oriented activity - since it has basically been the excess of domestic demand in relation to the economy's capacity to meet it which has been at the heart of the process which has produced the deficit. Effectively Estonian's need to consume less, or pay for more of what they consume by exporting, there really is no third alternative here, and the reality is that the way to "correct" the current account imbalance problem is more than likely going to be by a combination of these two paths, Estonians are going to consume less and they are going to export more, as the latest economic forecast from Eesti Pank timidly admits:/pblockquoteA new upward cycle highly depends on the reallocation of labour to sectors with stronger productivity growth...........Possibly, the new cycle will require part of the workforce currently serving domestic demand to be reallocated to export oriented sectors. Otherwise Estonia’s economy might be facing a long period of slow growth. It should also be said that in some cases a new job may entail smaller wages, although households are not really prepared for that./blockquotepI think it is possible to be a bit more specific and explicit than Eesti Pank on all of this: the new cycle strongwill /strong(certainly, definitely) require part of the workforce currently serving domestic demand to be reallocated to export oriented sectors, and in strongalmost all/strong cases a new job strongwill/strong entail smaller wages (and indeed existing jobs will have to accept wage reductions), since this is quite simply what maintaining the krona-euro peg entails - if you don't devalue, then you need to reduce wages and prices to achieve the same result. Of course, as the bank notes, "households are not really prepared for that"./ppBasically Estonia (and most other CEE economies) have been running large CA deficits due to the insufficiency of domestic savings to meet the principal lending and borrowing needs, so the first thing Estonians are going to need to do (and not for one year, or two years, for several years, I hardly see the structural position of the Estonian economy being better than the US one at this point, so we are talking about a correction which can run all the way through to 2015, and while we may have some sort of idea what US trend growth may be in 2015 - the famous 2% - we have no idea at all what trend growth could be in Estonia at that point, but certainly a lower than many imagine)./ppAnother reason Estonians need to save can be seen in the chart blow, and that is the divergence between the evolution of the trade balance (which is improving) and the income balance, which continues to deteriorate. Basically the income balance reflects the difference in interest paid on loans (and dividends paid on equities) between outsiders investing in Estonia, and Estonians investing externally. This balance is deteriorating, and this steady deterioration needs to be arrested, since otherwise the achievement of a simple goods and services trade surplus will be of no avail, if all the proceeds are simply sucked out in a negative income stream.br /br /a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWj-lv8g3fI/AAAAAAAAMHE/Lq3sL72Qe4o/s1600-h/estonia+BoP.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5289757686825541106" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 174px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWj-lv8g3fI/AAAAAAAAMHE/Lq3sL72Qe4o/s320/estonia+BoP.png" border="0" //abr /This ongoing correction in the CA deficit is, of course, easily visible in household consumption, which is now year on year negative (see chart), where it will remain as far ahead as the eye can see (this is a simple deduction which comes from the need to save)./ppa href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWimTdLD9lI/AAAAAAAAMGk/8oYxsNt6yNs/s1600-h/estonai+household+consumption.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5289660615525398098" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 170px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWimTdLD9lI/AAAAAAAAMGk/8oYxsNt6yNs/s320/estonai+household+consumption.png" border="0" //aAt the same time the trade balance is going to have to be turned round, and exports begin to take a leading role, something that they were conspicuously unable to do for many, many quarters, although there is a little evidence from Q3 2008 that the position may have begun to improve. However, as Eesti Panki themselves note, with the worsening external environment this improvement is going to be hard to maintain in the short term. /ppbr //ppa href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWimDfQ7hwI/AAAAAAAAMGc/WF37eREsM1k/s1600-h/estonia+exports.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5289660341208975106" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 172px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWimDfQ7hwI/AAAAAAAAMGc/WF37eREsM1k/s320/estonia+exports.png" border="0" //a But I really do think it is important not to fall into fatalism on the export question at this point. Simply because doing anything is hard is not a good reason for sitting there with folded arms and doing nothing. The first step towards recovery will come not from the exports themselves, but from the fixed capital investment (machinery, plant and equipment) which will be undertaken in order to make exports subsequently possible. But to attract the FDI you need to get relative wages and prices competitive, you need to convince would be investors that you are a better destination than your rivals. Sorry, but capitalism is just like that, this is how it runs, and you can't take one part (the bit you like), and ignore the other (the bit you definitely don't like). There is, for better or for worse, a competitive process at the heart of all our economies, and not every situation can be straightforwardly win-win (would that!). So basically, if there do have to be winners and losers here, are you happy for your country and your economy to stay in the second group, and wait and see if eventually a rising tide can lift all boats./ppAt the present time, as we can see in the chart below, Estonian fixed capital formation is also running at a pretty constant year on year negative, and this is the part Estonia needs to turn round, since without this turnaround the economy will simply not get that productivity boost which again almost everyone agrees forms part of the solution recipe./ppbr //ppa href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWil3I7ShoI/AAAAAAAAMGU/DoAImM3JpfY/s1600-h/estonia+GFCF.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5289660129054197378" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 171px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWil3I7ShoI/AAAAAAAAMGU/DoAImM3JpfY/s320/estonia+GFCF.png" border="0" //a So with private consumption falling and investment falling, it isn't hard to understand that even the small increase in govenment spending that Estonia can permit itself is insufficient to stop total domestic demand from falling./ppbr //ppa href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWiloqjY6OI/AAAAAAAAMGM/T7oOFZUC-LQ/s1600-h/estonia+total+domestic+demand.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5289659880382720226" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 184px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWiloqjY6OI/AAAAAAAAMGM/T7oOFZUC-LQ/s320/estonia+total+domestic+demand.png" border="0" //abr //ppstrongIndustrial Output Plummets In November/strong/ppbr /All of this "macro" level data is of course also reflected in the day-to-day data releases we are seeing, and as might only be expected Estonia’s industrial production fell the most in at least 14 years in November. Output fell 21.7 percent, the most since at least 1995 when the Tallinn-based statistics office started compiling data in this series. This compared with a revised 11.7 percent drop in October. /pa href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWeCY_VktFI/AAAAAAAAMFc/Jh1e1T97RPY/s1600-h/estonai+output+year+on+year.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5289339653200327762" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 187px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWeCY_VktFI/AAAAAAAAMFc/Jh1e1T97RPY/s320/estonai+output+year+on+year.png" border="0" //abr /br /blockquote“The real crisis in its real extent is starting to arrive,” according to Rutabr /Eier, an economist with SEB AB in Tallinn. “The slump in demand has beenbr /enormous and is continuing. Such a big fall probably means that export ordersbr /also declined a lot.” Gross domestic product will decline “significantly more”br /than the 3.5 percent fall in the third quarter. /blockquotepbr /Output adjusted for working days was down by an annual 17.7 percent, while manufacturing industry, which is the second-biggest contributor to GDP (second only to the property sector and construction industry) fell a working-day adjusted 25.5 percent, led by a 40 percent fall in the output of building materials and a 30 percent decline in textiles’ production.br /br /Forty-nine percent of Estonias industrial companies said they are planning job cuts in the next three months, according to a recent survey by the Eesti Konjunktuuriinstituut research institute. Company order books were down to 3.4 months of future output in December compared with historic average of 5 months. Capacity usage was down to 67 percent, compared with an 81 percent-average for the European Union as a whole. As we can see in the chart below, it isn't only the year on year readings in recent months which indicate deterioration, the output index peaked around the start of 2008, and is now heading sharply down even below the levels of early 2006.br /br /br //ppa href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWeCh_L6hJI/AAAAAAAAMFk/dfmruG943eY/s1600-h/estonia+ip+index.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5289339807778636946" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 187px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWeCh_L6hJI/AAAAAAAAMFk/dfmruG943eY/s320/estonia+ip+index.png" border="0" //abr /br /Companies like seatbelt manufacturer the Swedish subsidiary AS Norma (who have announced plans to cut 52 jobs, or about 6 percent of the workforce) or Dutch office equipment manufacturer Atlanta Office Products BV, a Dutch office supplies maker (who planto close their factory in Kohila, northern Estonia, with the loss of more than 200 jobs) are steadily reducing jobs, possibly the numbers seem small, but do remember strongEstonia really is/strong a small open economy.br /br /As a result Estonia’s seasonally adjusted unemployment rate rose to 8.3 percent in November from 4.1 percent a year ago, the second- biggest jump in the EU following Spain, according to the latest data release from the EU statistics office, Eurostat. The unemployment rate may rise to 10 percent by next year, according to a worst-case scenario proposed by The Estonian Finance Ministry in November, but it now seem that even that level may now be a significant underestimate, although it really does depend on whether we are referring to the unemployment rate as measured by the Estonia Labour Board methodology or the one the Estonian statistics office supply to Eurostat using the EU harmonised methodology (the Estonian Labour Board number is significantly lower).br /br /a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWnNjdixKEI/AAAAAAAAMHM/Ed1oPP8OB5w/s1600-h/estonai+unemployment+rate.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5289985246432929858" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 175px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWnNjdixKEI/AAAAAAAAMHM/Ed1oPP8OB5w/s320/estonai+unemployment+rate.png" border="0" //abr /br /br /strongInflation Falling/strongbr /br /At the same time Estonia’s inflation rate is falling (if still far to slowly) and hit its lowest level in 16 months in December - 7 percent, the lowest since August 2007 down from 8 percent in November.br /br /a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWeGE2yWpfI/AAAAAAAAMF0/_UW3UDYGTGw/s1600-h/estonia+cpi+yoy.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5289343705354249714" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 202px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWeGE2yWpfI/AAAAAAAAMF0/_UW3UDYGTGw/s320/estonia+cpi+yoy.png" border="0" //abr /br /So inflation is falling quite fast and is likely to significantly undershoot the central bank forecast of 3.7 percent in 2009. In fact prices fell on the month by 0.2 percent from November. This was largely the result of a sharp fall in fuel prices - down 8.1 percent from the previous month - but food (up 0.5 percent) and administered prices still continue to rise. However, as we can see in the chart below, the general index has now been more or less stable since the summer.br /br /a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWeFq7HiTwI/AAAAAAAAMFs/VcxAc9TKwSo/s1600-h/estonia+cpi.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5289343259840237314" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 200px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWeFq7HiTwI/AAAAAAAAMFs/VcxAc9TKwSo/s320/estonia+cpi.png" border="0" //abr /strongRetail Sales Also Falling Sharplybr //strongbr /Estonian retail sales also posted a record decline in November - dropping by an annual 9 percent (the most since the start of the present time series in 1994, following a revised 7 percent drop in October. This drop includes an annual fall in car sales of nearly 50%, while the value of food sales is already falling in prices not adjusted for inflation.br /br /a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWITUF543aI/AAAAAAAAL_k/RwlIL0R_OsM/s1600-h/estonia+retail+yoy.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5287810148389674402" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 201px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWITUF543aI/AAAAAAAAL_k/RwlIL0R_OsM/s320/estonia+retail+yoy.png" border="0" //abr /The constant price sales index also peaked at the start of 2008, and it will be a very very long time before we see domestic retail sales hitting this sort of level again, which is another good reason why employment needs to be steadily displaced out of the domestic sector and into the export one.br /br /a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWISa0UioTI/AAAAAAAAL_c/RNfafvbP68Q/s1600-h/estonia+retail+sales+index.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5287809164417081650" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 174px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWISa0UioTI/AAAAAAAAL_c/RNfafvbP68Q/s320/estonia+retail+sales+index.png" border="0" //abr /br /br /strongExports Still Holding Up In Octoberbr //strong/ppAccording to the latest data we have from Statistics Estonia, October goods exports were up by 13% year on year while imports declined by 3%. Goods to the value of 13.2 billion kroons were exported, 1.5 billion kroons more than in October 2007 - however the growth in exports was largely caused by the increase in the re-exports of fuels - up by nearly one billion kroons.br //ppImported were down to 15.7 billion kroons - 0.4 billion kroons less than in October 2007. The decline was the result of a decrease in domestic demand with the biggest falls being in the transport equipment and in machinery and equipment sections. As a result of the increase in exports and the decrease in imports the Estonian foreign trade deficit fell to 2.5 billion kroons - 1.9 billion kroons less than in October 2007. If we take account of the increase in re-exports it is evident that the reduction in imports for the domestic market was much sharper than the aggregate 3%.br /br /a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWIWXtBWkgI/AAAAAAAAL_s/NJtEvyeZ4gM/s1600-h/estonia+exports.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5287813508964454914" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 167px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWIWXtBWkgI/AAAAAAAAL_s/NJtEvyeZ4gM/s320/estonia+exports.png" border="0" //abr /br /br /63% of October exports went to the EU and 17% to CIS countries accounted for 17% of the total exports. The main destination countries were Finland, Russia and Sweden.br /br /br /br /strongThe Outlook On The IMF View/strongbr /br /a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWfT0bdRQRI/AAAAAAAAMGE/W0VEc7-rGDQ/s1600-h/estonia+confidence+index.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5289429185047118098" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 188px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWfT0bdRQRI/AAAAAAAAMGE/W0VEc7-rGDQ/s320/estonia+confidence+index.png" border="0" //abr /br //pblockquote"The major policy challenge is the budget. The 2009 budget incorporates a welcome adjustment that required difficult decisions. However, given the deteriorating global outlook, our assessment is that the deficit will likely exceed 3 percent of GDP in 2009 and beyond. This does not present a near-term financing risk given the prudent accumulation of fiscal reserves via surpluses in recent years. But the current fiscal posture is not sustainable going forward. Moreover, it risks breaching the Maastricht fiscal threshold just when inflation is receding. This could delay euro entry, which the authorities rightly consider to be their highest priority. What is needed now is early action to achieve fiscal consolidation.br /IMF Staff Mission Statement, December 2008/blockquotepThis is the IMF conclusion as to the short term outlook for Estonia, and the view was confirmed only last week by IMF representative Christophe Rosenberg who said a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchiveamp;sid=aWeB6GSOFbBM"in a Bloomberg interview/a last week that “Estonia is the least vulnerable of the Baltics because it has big buffers, it’s been running a budget surplus for a number of years now and so there are fiscal assets.” /ppThis view is not entirely confirmed by the latest EU economic sentiment index reading (see chart above) which shows Lithuania still in an apparently better position than Latvia or Estonia, but Christoph's reasoning here is based on his assessment that Lithuania’s economy is about to “decline sharply” and I am hardly in any position to dispute his view here (nor would I wish to, I simply have not been following Lithuania closely enough). In fact the IMF forecasts that Lithuania's economy may well contract by “at least” 2 percent in 2009, even though Lithuania's central bank’s suggested an expansion of 1.2 percent in their October outlook. But on the one had we all know that the economic outlook in the CEE economies has deteriorated significantly since October - as domestic demand has waned and banks have tightened lending - while "at least" means simply that, the number could well be a lot worse. /pblockquote“Lithuania is in a more difficult position as GDP growth is predicted to declinebr /sharply this year and this may create fiscal problems,” Rosenberg said in anbr /interview conducted on Tuesday in Warsaw. /blockquotepWhat the IMF is referring to basically is the fiscal reserve which Estonia has, there is no accumumulated national debt, and indeed the government as net assets to the tune of something like 5% of GDP, so there is a certain leeway to use this money to soften the impact of the correction, although it is important that the country's savings are spent on facilitating the necessary correction and not on postponing it./ppAs Christoph Rosenberg points out the Baltic problems were created by a soaring wages and a credit boom which saw funds channeled into non-tradable sectors like real estate, retail and banking. As a result these economies became structurally distorted and they didn't diversify enough since insufficient was done to curtail rapid credit growth and to use counter-cyclical fiscal policies to cool the economy off before it was much too late. The danger is that if in the downturn we get the same inability to translate sound economic sense into practical economic policy that we saw during the upcycle, then problems can become worse, a lot worse, without getting any better. That is Estonia's challenge, and if it isn't grasped fully and with both hands then it can just as easily turn into Estonia's tragedy. 12 years from now (ie come 2020) Estonia's population will be much older, and the elderly dependency ratio will be much higher, than it is now. It is also to be imagined that the potential annual GDP growth rate will be comparatively lower, even as the needs for social spending rise and rise. So while Estonia still has a window of opportunity, it is not an indefinite one, and once it closes it won't come back. I think Estonia's citizens would do well to dwell on this point./p]]></description>
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		<title>In Search Of The Bottom &#8211; Estonia&#8217;s Economy Continues To Drift Aimlessly</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-in-europe/in-search-of-the-bottom-estonias-economy-continues-to-drift-aimlessly/</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Nov 2008 07:45:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Manuel Alvarez-Rivera</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[The Estonian recession continues to deepen, month by month. The most recent evidence comes to us in the form of a decline in both Estonian retail sales and industrial production, which fell in each case for the fifth consecutive month in September, leading us to expect the rate of GDP contraction to accelerate further in Q3.<br /><br /><p></p><p></p><p><strong>Retail Sales Fall An Annual 8%</strong><br /><br />Retail sales, excluding cars and fuel, fell by an annual 8 percent in August, the largest such decline registered since at least 2001. This follows a 6 percent in August. The year on year chart (see below) couldn't be clearer.<br /><br /><br /><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQsv3sasumI/AAAAAAAALQE/nPQWlyDeJqw/s1600-h/estonai+retail+sales.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQsv3sasumI/AAAAAAAALQE/nPQWlyDeJqw/s320/estonai+retail+sales.png" border="0" /></a><br />Sales were also down month on month (ie with respect to August), this time by a non seasonally adjusted 7%. In fact, on a seasonally adjusted basis retail sales peaked in February 2008, and have been trending down since. We still don't have the seasonally corrected data from Eurostat for September, but looking at the uncorrected data we do have from the Estonian statistics office, it does seem that retail sales were down again in Q3 over Q2.<br /><br /><br /><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQszUMrwIhI/AAAAAAAALQU/WNjK4jMwBX0/s1600-h/estonia+index.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQszUMrwIhI/AAAAAAAALQU/WNjK4jMwBX0/s320/estonia+index.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br />Thus retail sales turned negative in March and the trend simply continues. The decrease in the retail sales of goods was most influenced by the stores selling manufactured goods where sales decreased by 12% compared to September 2007. Sales in non-specialized stores selling manufactured products and shops selling household goods and appliances, hardware and building materials were the worst hit.<br /><br />Sales in grocery stores have, as might be expected, been rather more stable, with sales only down 3% . As had been the case in previous months, the decrease in food sales was largely influenced by the rise in food prices and the resulting decline in consumption.<br /><br /><br /><br /><strong>Industrial Output Down 3.8%</strong></p><p></p><p>Output adjusted for working days decreased an annual 3.8 percent, compared with a revised fall of 3.7 percent in August.<br /><br /></p><p><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQs12wTQVkI/AAAAAAAALQk/n8N3AlFOkEY/s1600-h/estonia+ip+yoy.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQs12wTQVkI/AAAAAAAALQk/n8N3AlFOkEY/s320/estonia+ip+yoy.png" border="0" /></a><br />If we look at the seasonally and working day adjusted output index, then we can see that the level of output is now meandering downwards, and we now are way off the highs reached during last October and November. With this in mind we should expect the year-on-year percentage drops to start to decline after December, but it will then become much more interesting to follow the evolution of the absolute levels indicated by the general output index.<br /><br /><br /><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQs1gZvNGkI/AAAAAAAALQc/QN-Zp507iSc/s1600-h/estonia+ip+inices.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQs1gZvNGkI/AAAAAAAALQc/QN-Zp507iSc/s320/estonia+ip+inices.png" border="0" /></a> </p><p>The main reason for the decline in output is evidently the lack of demand. The fall in manufacturing output was greatest in food, wood and building materials production. Food output was especially hit by the decrease in consumption resulting from this years large price increases. Although the rate of price increase has decelerated in recent months, food product prices are still up by 12% compared to September 2007. </p><p>The other area with big output drops is the manufacturing of wood and wood products, where the drop in sales in both domestic and external markets continues. The Estonian market is influenced by the construction slump, while in the external market Estonian manufactures are having a hard time due to the competitive environment and their own weaknesses in price competitiveness. Compared to September 2007, 22% less sawn timber and 9% less glue-laminated timber were produced. The largest drop (32%) was in the production of building materials which is directly connected with the decline in the construction market. </p><p></p><p>Some export-oriented industries have been continuing to expand - even in this difficult environment - especially enterprises involved in the manufacture of metal products, chemical products, and electrical machinery. Output was also up in the manufacture of machinery, radio and communication equipment, precision instruments and motor vehicles, since again a lot of the output is for export. The export share is 97% in the manufacture of radio and communication equipment and 91% in the manufacture of precision instruments.<br /><br /><strong>Both Wages and Unemployment Still On The Rise</strong><br /><br /><br />Wages continued to rise rapidly in the second quarter, up by 15.2%, even if this was the slowest pace of increse in more than two years, while the unemployment rate rose - to 3.1 percent in September - the highest level in more than three years.<br /><br />Estonia's jobless rate, based on the number of unemployed registered with labor offices, rose to 3.1 percent, the highest since July 2005, from 2.9 percent in August, according to data from the Estonian Labor Market Board. The number of people signed on as seeking a job rose 6.6 percent from the previous month to 20,015. This number is of course, incredibly low by any comparable international standard, and is hard to square with a country in the midst of a very deep rcession (even after all the ritual genuflections towards the labour marekt being a lagged indicator). In order to understand how this situation is possible it is important to take into consideration Estonia's special demography and migration history.<br /><br /><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ27t-m7AQI/AAAAAAAALSM/RePuhrvfilg/s1600-h/estonia+unemployment.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ27t-m7AQI/AAAAAAAALSM/RePuhrvfilg/s320/estonia+unemployment.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br />However, it is also true to say that unemployment does normally follow changes in economic output with a time lag, se we should expected it to rise considerably in the coming months and quarters. Indeed the unemployment rate as measured by the Estonian statistics office in quarterly labor surveys is nearer to 4 percent in the second quarter (and the EU harmonised rate which is based on the survey shows 4.2% for September in the Eurostat database), and may rise as high as 10% according to recent estimates from Erkki Raasuke, head of Baltic research for Swedbank AB (not that they have been getting too much right of late, but still).<br /><br /><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ292K5Ku8I/AAAAAAAALSU/b17ZSbL7TaQ/s1600-h/estonia+wages.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ292K5Ku8I/AAAAAAAALSU/b17ZSbL7TaQ/s320/estonia+wages.png" border="0" /></a><br />Despite the fact that unemployment will undoubtedly rise further as the recession deepens, it is the very tighness of the labour market (which is, as I say, in part a product of Estonia's demography) which prevents wage increases slowing down more rapidly, and thus the entire Estonian price system adapting to the slowdown (this phenomenon is often called "sticky wages and prices", and as we can see, the degree of viscosity here is almost treacle like). So Estonia's low earlier fertility fuelled the initial wage craze which along with the credit boom got us to the present point, and now the same lack of strength in depth in the labour market blocks the downward adjustment. In both cases the net by-product is massive pressure on the Kroon-Euro peg as Estonia struggles to find export competitiveness.<br /><br /><br /><strong>Consumer Confidence Falls Again</strong><br /><br /><br />Unsurprisingly Estonian consumer confidence fell again in October, hitting its lowest level in more than 9 years, a sure sign the that the economy is about to shrink again, as domestic demand continues to search for a bottom. The Tallinn-based Konjunktuuriinstituut consumer confidence index declined to minus 27, its lowest reading since June 1999, and down from minus 22 in September. The institute cited worsening expectations for personal and state finances as the key drivers behind the drop.<br /><br /></p><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ1h5mfmO-I/AAAAAAAALQs/Gu2Sqoh1E_w/s1600-h/estonia+consumer+confidence.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ1h5mfmO-I/AAAAAAAALQs/Gu2Sqoh1E_w/s320/estonia+consumer+confidence.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br />And of course, consumer confidence is not only falling in Estonia, it is also falling among potential consumers of Estonian products in all Estonia's export destinations. Indeed general European economic confidence saw its biggest ever fall in October as the global bank crisis generated the bleakest outlook since the early 1990s, at least these are the findings of this months European Commission economic sentiment survey. The survey results give us just one more dramatic illustration of the devastating impact the financial turmoil is having on Europe's real economy. Pessimism has risen dramatically on all fronts - from manufacturers' expectations about exports to consumers' fears about unemployment.<br /><br />The European Union executive's "economic sentiment" indicator for the 27-country bloc fell by 7.4 points in October to 77.5 points. The latest index reading was the lowest since 1993 and marked the largest month-on-month decline ever recorded.<br /><br /><br />And even as confidence deteriorated sharply in key EU economies like Germany, Italy and Spain, the increasingly-worrying outlook for all those previously fast-growing eastern European economies is now hitting business and export opportunities pretty hard, and this is plain from the survey. All three Baltic economies registered another sharp lurch downwards, with Lithuania, as has now become almost traditional, hanging back slightly from the Ocean depths currently being combed by her Estonian and Latvian neighbours.<br /><br /><br /><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ10NtpZvDI/AAAAAAAALRE/vXhDDq_bToI/s1600-h/eu+sentiment+baltics.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ10NtpZvDI/AAAAAAAALRE/vXhDDq_bToI/s320/eu+sentiment+baltics.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br /><br /><br /><strong>The Outlook Darkens</strong><br /><br />And just to add to all these woe's Eastern Europe is currently experiencing what amounts to its biggest credit rating downgrade in at least a decade, adding to evidence that the region far from avoiding the impact of the global credit crisis, may well find itself at the very heart of the next stage.<br /><br /><blockquote>“We expect the EU and the IMF to announce additional rescue packages for other Central and Eastern European economies in the coming days and weeks. Top of the list are the most imbalanced countries in the region - the Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria."<br />Lars Christensen, Danske Bank, Copenhagen</blockquote><p><br /><br />Both Standard &#38; Poor's and Fitch Ratings have responded over the last month to mounting risks from the global credit crunch by downgrading or revising credit rating outlooks to negative for a number of CEE economies including the Baltic states, the Balkans, Hungary and Ukraine. Moody's Investors Service has also revised its outlook to negative for Latvia and downgraded Ukraine.<br /><br />S&#38;P and Fitch both downgraded long-term sovereign ratings to Latvia and Lithuania on Oct. 27, citing recession risks and the growing need for external financing, while Estonia, had its rating cut by Fitch and outlook revised to negative by S&#38;P. Basically, the crunch is biting in terms of both the cost and the availability of credit. This tightening in credit conditions is not, of course, new in Estonia, and in many ways we could say that the credit conditions should never have been allowed to get so "loose" in the first place. As can be seen from the chart below, the year on year rate of increase in peaked at the end of 2006, and since then the slowdown in Estonian domestic demand has been driven by the slowdown in the availability of credit (strictness off the terms, documentational requirements etc). Evidently, if such criteria had been applied much earlier, and the rate of annual increase never approached 80% all this may well have been a much less dramatic process.<br /><br /><br /><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ1ztmrFPJI/AAAAAAAALQ8/BwmNx_MJ8sI/s1600-h/estonia+hl+yoy.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ1ztmrFPJI/AAAAAAAALQ8/BwmNx_MJ8sI/s320/estonia+hl+yoy.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br /><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ1zmxSIyLI/AAAAAAAALQ0/DTRzcmYhgeE/s1600-h/estonia+HL+kroon.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ1zmxSIyLI/AAAAAAAALQ0/DTRzcmYhgeE/s320/estonia+HL+kroon.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br /><br />The Estonian central bank said last week revised it's forecast for the economy, which has already made the turn around from being the second-fastest growing one in the EU in 2006, to being one of the most rapidly contracting ones in 2008. According to the bank the Estonian economy may shrink 1.8 percent in whole-year 2008 and 2.2 percent in 2009. As we have noted above the economy sank by 0.8% q-o-q in Q2 and by 1% year on year.<br /><br /><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ2QwqWNr6I/AAAAAAAALRc/fcAINYtsFdY/s1600-h/estonia+gdp+yoy.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ2QwqWNr6I/AAAAAAAALRc/fcAINYtsFdY/s320/estonia+gdp+yoy.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br />The decrease in GDP in Q2 was mainly a result of weak domestic demand, but the drop in both imports and the rate of increase in the export of goods and services meant that the contribution from external trade was negative. About the only item which maintained some momentum was government spending - buoyed by the tax income from an earier and better epoch. Compared to Q2 2007, total domestic demand was down by 2.8% , largely as a result of adecrease in private consumption and capital investments ( down by 2.0% and 2.5%, respectively).<br /><br /><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ2UhQFujUI/AAAAAAAALRs/gr0w1FDjO7w/s1600-h/esonia+domestic+demand.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ2UhQFujUI/AAAAAAAALRs/gr0w1FDjO7w/s320/esonia+domestic+demand.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br />Private consumption decreased mainly due to the decrease in expenditures on transport and clothing and footwear. The growth of expenditures on food and non-alcoholic beverages decelerated. Capital investments decreased in both the financial and the household sector. Investments in manufacturing industry were almost stationary year on year. At the same time public sector construction investments accelerated.<br /><br /><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ2VuE8m4YI/AAAAAAAALR0/OuOYQmEw9b8/s1600-h/estonia+household+demand.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ2VuE8m4YI/AAAAAAAALR0/OuOYQmEw9b8/s320/estonia+household+demand.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br />The decrease in exports and imports since the second half of 2007 which had been noted in Q1 went even further in the 2nd quarter. Compared to the 2nd quarter of the previous year, exports of goods and services decreased by 4.9% and imports by 8.2% (at constant chain-linked prices).<br /><br /><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ2XquhS5aI/AAAAAAAALSE/JmG1AX6PBmc/s1600-h/estonia+exports.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ2XquhS5aI/AAAAAAAALSE/JmG1AX6PBmc/s320/estonia+exports.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br /><br />Goods exports were down by 3.2% primarily due to the decrease in exports of refined petroleum products. At the same time, exports of basic metals and electrical machinery (electrical motors and appliances), which significantly influence export movements, increased. Exports of services decreased by 8.9% primarily due to the decrease in exports of services for railway cargo, airway passengers and cargo transport and trade related exports services. The decrease in imports of goods was influenced mainly by the decrease in imports of refined petroleum products and motor vehicles. While imports decreased faster than exports, the deficit of net exports in GDP has increased since the second half of 2007 and amounted to -4.6% of GDP in the 2nd quarter. In the 1st quarter the impact of net exports was -7.1% (so the negative impact slowed vis a vis Q1).<br /><br /><strong>Fiscal Crunch Coming</strong><br /><br />Basically, as the economy slows, and government income increases even while counter cyclical spending policies add to expenses, the government is moving into tricky fiscal deficit territory. Mindful of this the Estonian government approved on September 25 a draft 2009 budget which attempted to balances overall finances, including local government and the social insurance funds. The budget, which is still to be finally approved by the Estonian parliament, will fall into a deficit and need to be covered from government reserves, according to former Prime Minister Vaehi in a recent interview with the Maaleht newspaper Maaleht.<br /><br />A deficit of 10 billion krooni would equal 3.5 percent of the expected gross domestic product of 283 billion krooni forecast by finance ministry in August. SEB have forecast a deficit of 1 percent of GDP in Estonia's overall finances next year.<br /><br />Falling tax revenue has forced the Estonian governemnt of Prime Minister Andrus Ansip to cut spending and seek out new financing in an attempt to maintain a balanced budget, formerly a linchpin of the country's fiscal policies. The Finance Ministry have already forecast the budget will fall into a deficit of 3.1 billion krooni, or 1.2 percent of gross domestic product this year, after running surpluses in each of the last 6 years.<br /><br /><br /><br /><strong>Two Questions In Conclusion</strong><br /><br />Basically then, it is hard to call the exact impact of trade on Q3 data without having the September trade data in front of us, since although the July and August export numbers are well below the April and May ones, we also need to take into account the accompanying drop in imports (which helps net trade, and thus is GDP positive). On the other hand the general impression you should get from all the data is that we are in for another shocker in Q3. Which leaves us with two questions:<br /><br />1/ Where do we go from here?<br />2/ Just how long will it be before we hit generalised price deflation?<br /><br />Let's take the second one first. Possibly for many people the question will appear to be a ridiculous one, but it isn't. If you look at the CPI index itself (this now becomes much more important than the year on year inflation rates, since what we need to watch for are the price movements from month to month. Now in the rate of increase from one month to another has been slowing, and in September the index was barely up over August (less than 0.5%, following a virtually stationary reading in August over July) so we should not be surprised to see the index hit a ceiling at some point, and then start to come down. Basic economic theory leads us to expect this (on the back of falling commodity and food prices and in a situation where internal capacity is way above the sum of internal and external demand available to the Estonian economy at current prices). Thus there is only one way for prices and wages to go: down. Although people may struggle with all this yet awhile before they accept the inevitable.<br /><br /><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ15iR5r8kI/AAAAAAAALRM/-EWGlBxNz7I/s1600-h/estonia+inflation+index.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SQ15iR5r8kI/AAAAAAAALRM/-EWGlBxNz7I/s320/estonia+inflation+index.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br />So what about the future of the economy in general? Well, let's take two quotes <a href="http://www.eestipank.info/pub/en/press/Press/kommentaarid/Arhiiv/_2008/_215.html">from the most recent Eesti Pank growth forecast</a>. First, a recognition that they got it wrong in the past:<br /><br /><blockquote>According to the base scenario of Eesti Pank's 2008 autumn forecast, Estonia's gross domestic product will decline by 1.8% in 2008 and by 2.1% in 2009. So far the economic correction ha<strong>s been more abrupt than expected</strong> primarily due to decreasing domestic demand. In addition to the cessation of the rapid real estate market expansion, also private consumption dropped in spring more than forecasted. </blockquote><br /><br />and now a forecast which, it seems to me is based on the same faulty methodology that lead the current deline to be "more abrupt" than they expected earlier.<br /><br /><blockquote>According to Eesti Pank's estimate, the economy should pick up again either at the end of 2009 or at the beginning of 2010. The average economic growth rate of 2010 will be 3%. <strong>Private consumption growth should recover in 2010</strong> along with the revival of household confidence, whereas 2009 will be characterised by slowing wage growth and increasing unemployment.</blockquote><br /><br />As I say above, I expect wage declines, and not slowing wage growth, but this is beside the point. Household consumption will undoubtedly decline in 2009, but I am not expecting any significant recovery in 2010. And the reasons for this expectation are based on some of the main tenets of economic theory as I understand them. Basically Estonia is in the midst of the transition from being a domestic consumption driven economy to being an export driven one. This, in part, has something to do with the demographic transition which Estonia is currently passing through.<br /><br />Estonia is, if you like, about to become more like Germany and Japan, and less like the UK, or the US, or France, in terms of a basic typology of economies. And if you look carefully, you will see that the one thing that doesn't recover (ever) in Japan or Germany is household demand. The reason for this is obvious, and it has to do with the demand for credit. Proportionately less people in the age groups which drive the demand for credit increases means that credit (and with it domestic consumer demand) becomes less of a driver of economic growth and exports become proportionately more important. This is why German and Japanese banks have relatively less exposure to their own domestic property booms, but have been carrying losses from housing liabilities elsewhere.<br /><br />Unfortunately, this is not some strange opinion I have acquired from some distant planet or other. It is based on, and supportable by, fact, and by what is going on right in front of our noses. We are not playing some sophistocated intellectual game here to see who is right and who is wrong. People's livelihoods and those of there children depending on getting a hold on this, and the sooner that the economists over at Eesti Pank (and elsewhere) get the underlying dynamics straight, the better.</p>]]></description>
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		<title>The Vodka Pipeline to Estonia</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-in-russia-stocks/the-vodka-pipeline-to-estonia/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-in-russia-stocks/the-vodka-pipeline-to-estonia/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 18:04:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Robert Amsterdam</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Estonia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EUR]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gazprom]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tallinn]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2008/09/the_vodka_pipeline_to_estonia.htm</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.robertamsterdam.com/kaput.jpg"><img alt="kaput.jpg" src="http://www.robertamsterdam.com/kaput-thumb.jpg" width="220" height="181" align="right" hspace="5"/></a>The <a href="http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iVlF9lAbIgCqrmArgJM1iztpR3lw">AFP</a> is reporting today that eleven people have been arrested in a criminal operation to smuggle vodka via an underwater pipeline from Russia to Estonia.  Though certainly a lucrative black market trade, it doesn't look like they were sending the good stuff:

<blockquote>According to prosecutors the men had pumped at least 6,200 litres of illegal spirit to Estonia, avoiding paying 57,000 euros (900,000 Estonian Crowns) in excise duty.

"The investigation also revealed that the men had tried to sell some of the alcohol in Tallinn in early November 2004 but the quality of the spirit was too bad and no buyers were found. They then transported their cargo back to Narva and later managed to sell it in Tartu, the second largest town in Estonia," Luuk said.</blockquote>

And here all along we thought that Gazprom wasn't a dynamic company ... As least they weren't smuggling tanks and arms for the separatists like in some other former Soviet countries...]]></description>
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