Some additional observations (see Jim Hamilton's take, as well as others) on the GDP release: (1) the five year revision indicates that GDP was larger than we thought, but it also declined faster in 2009Q1; (2) GDP growth was lower throughout 2008 than earlier estimated; (3) GDP growth in 2008Q2 at 1.5% SAAR would have likely been at zero or negative in the absence of the January 2008 stimulus package in which case; (4) GDP q/q growth would have been negative from 2008Q1 to 2009Q2; (5) the case that ARRA directly affected 2009Q2 GDP is limited, in a mechanical sense since most of the increase in government spending is accounted for by defense spending; and (6) the US ex-oil ex-agricultural net exports to GDP ratio is back to where it was in 1998Q1.

Just a recap: GDP q/q SAAR came in above the -1.6% growth predicted in the

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Here's an update of US imports and export behavior. The trade collapse remarked upon a couple of months ago is still in play.

Figure 1: Log goods import ex.-oil from NIPA (blue), and log goods exports ex.-agricultural goods (red), all in Ch.2000$, SAAR. NBER recession dates shaded gray. Source: BEA, GDP 2009Q1 preliminary release of 28 May 2009, NBER, and author's calculations.

The annualized drop in non-oil goods imports was 60.5% in 2009Q1 (log terms), while that of non-agricultural goods exports was 51.5% (both in log terms).

The misprediction by the standard (i.e., old fashioned) macroeconometric models (see [1]) documented in an earlier post persists. The model is given by:

Imp = α 0 + α 1 y + α 2 r

Where Imp is real imports, y is real income, and r is the real value of the dollar.

I estimate an error correction version of this

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It's not news that the US current account, trade balance and trade balance ex.-oil are all moving toward zero percentage points of GDP. As I've observed before, time will tell how much of this movement is durable (see Bertaut, Kamin and Thomas for skeptical look; see also Cline-Williamson); this in turn depends on whether the adjustment reflects standard macro effects, including a permanent downshift in US consumption growth [0], and how much reflects perhaps transitory effects like a credit crunch in trade financing (as speculated upon here). Here's the trade balance situation for the US.

Figure 1: Net exports to GDP (blue), net exports ex.-oil to GDP (green), and current account to GDP (green). NBER defined recession dates shaded gray; assumes current recession has not ended by 2009Q1. Source: BEA, 2009Q1 GDP preliminary release (28 May 2009), NBER, and author's calculations.

The trade balance

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Carry trades unwind…Euro zone GDP falls…Will TIC flows be enough?? Aussie dollar predicted to outperform…And Now…Today’s Pfennig! Good day…The currency markets fell back into their established routine also, as fear drove investors out of riskier assets and back into the US$. We saw a general reversal of the carry trade, with the Japanese yen the only major currency which appreciated vs. the US$. As Chuck pointed out last week, investors feeling more confident about the global economy, dusted off their carry trades which had made them good money over the past few years. But traders are still a bit skittish, and move back out of these leveraged trades at the first sign of trouble in the global economy.

Europe delivered the bad news overnight with the released of first quarter GDP in the 16 member euro region. Gross domestic product fell 2.5% from the fourth quarter, when it fell 1.6% according

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My views on the short term prospects for GDP growth at home and abroad were little changed (relative to this post) by the information in the March trade release. Goods imports are collapsing, albeit at a slower but still substantial rate, and goods exports are declining, with high volatility.

First consider the growth rates of real goods imports ex.-oil and real goods exports.

Figure 1: Month-on-month annualized growth of real goods imports ex.-oil (bold red), and of real goods exports (bold blue); and year-on-year growth rates (respectively teal, purple); all in Ch.2000$, calculated as log differences. NBER defined recession dates shaded gray, assuming recession has not ended by May 2009. Source: BEA/Census, March trade release, NBER, and author's calculations.

Note that imports seem to be recovering. But it's important to look closely at the vertical axis; month-on-month annualized growth rate is minus 10.9%, and the year-on-year growth

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This is a slightly revised version of a piece that appeared on the Washington Post's The Hearing today.

In her testimony before the Joint Economic Committee today, Dr. Romer, Chair of the CEA, presented an explication of the progress of the financial crisis and the economic downturn, the anticipated effects of the measures undertaken and planned, and the outlook going forward. On most points, we're in agreement, so I'll only highlight some key issues of interest.

The outlook

I would characterize the description of the economic outlook as guardedly optimistic. We can't say much more, since Dr. Romer -- in line with historical practice -- did not provide specific forecast numbers associated with her testimony. She did indicate that the CEA forecast is in line with the Blue Chip forecast, of -2.1% annualized growth in 2009Q2 and leveling off in 2009H2. What specifically "in line" means is up for some debate; in

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I've been thinking about trying to convey exactly how startling the drop in U.S. imports has been. First, take a look how much non-oil goods imports (in real terms) have dropped, relative to, for instance, GDP.

Figure 1: Log GDP (blue, left scale), log goods import ex.-oil from NIPA (red, right scale), estimated from trade release (purple, right scale), all in Ch.2000$, SAAR. 2009q1 estimate is based on actual January and February data and March estimate incorporating continued 5% decline from February. NBER recession dates shaded gray. Source: BEA, GDP final release of 26 March 2009, February trade release, NBER, and author's calculations.

The annualized drop in these imports was 36.5% in 2008Q4 (log terms). In addition, with non-oil imports dropping about 5% (non-annualized, in logs) in the first two months of 2009, 2009Q1 imports seem set continue the drop. In Figure 1, I've assumed that the

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The trade release has already been remarked upon, in terms of the dropoff in both exports and imports signaling a synchronized recession. [1], [2], [3], [4] I have little to add here, except for plotting the "cliff-diving" in log real terms.

Figure 1: Log real goods exports (blue), real goods imports (red), real goods imports ex.-oil (green), seasonally adjusted. NBER-defined recessions shaded gray (assumes recession has not ended by December 2008). Source: BEA/Census trade release of 13 January 2009 and NBER.

I do want to follow up on a point I made in an earlier post. If import prices are mismeasured due to a combination of invoicing in dollar terms and the price matching model used by BLS for export/import prices (as argued by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) [pdf]), then two points flow from this assumption. First, as discussed earlier, current GDP is

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From "Trade-Finance Pinch Hurts the Healthy," WSJ, 12/22/08:

The global financial crisis is drying up the financing that firms depend on for trade. That's making the global recession nastier and deeper than it otherwise would be.

As with all kinds of credit these days, financial institutions are making less trade finance available and charging more for it. But the squeeze in trade stands out because it pinches otherwise healthy companies that should be driving a recovery in global commerce. Already, the World Bank predicts trade will contract next year for the first time since 1982.

The Deteriorating Trade Outlook

Here's the IMF's recent forecasts for exports -- from October and then November -- for world trade, disaggregated into advanced and developing country groupings.

Figure 1: Real goods and services exports by country group. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Oct. 2008; Nov. 6 WEO update.

These developments in trade financing suggest that

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Brad Setser says "Ut-Oh", beating me to the punch on the September trade release, which showed US exports plunging. It's a post that Paul Krugman rightly expresses some angst upon reading. And now I'm going to add two more reasons to worry (not that I think Setser and Krugman aren't aware of these points).

First, after reflecting upon the collapse of exports noted by Setser, think "disaggregate".

Figure 1 depicts exports of capital goods; they declined 10%, exceeding the 8% reported for all goods exports (all calcuations in log terms). That's 10% for September alone. Since the standard deviation of monthly log changes is 3.1% (2004M02-08M9), well, that's pretty significant... Why focus on capital goods exports (more so than say ag exports), given their volatility? Because they represent foreign demand for goods that can be used to produce things; as demand for capital goods goes down, so too should

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