On Friday, the 30-share Dow Jones industrial average fell 14 points, or 0.1%, to close at 10,318.16.  The broader S&P 500 index closed 0.3% lower at 1091.38 and the tech-heavy Nasdaq finished the day at 2146.04, off 0.5%.  On the week, the Dow average managed to hang on to gains, registering a paltry 0.5% advance.  The S&P 500 and the Nasdaq fell 0.2% and 1%, respectively.  On the New York Stock Exchange, 1.1 billion shares exchanged hands, with declining issues ahead of those that advanced in price by a three-to-two margin.

Last week’s disappointing reports on housing and weak forecasts from technology companies had antsy investors swooping up safe haven investments like Treasury bonds and dollar.  The demand for safe havens also spiked after European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet remarked that the bank is planning to unwind some of its stimulus measures.  A higher dollar pushed crude prices lower and pressured stocks.

Nevertheless, at the center of the activity on the Wall Street is the ascending price of such physical assets as gold, which touched its fresh highs of $1146.80 on Friday, and a declining dollar.  The metal, although lacking fundamental valuation measures, has surged 29.7% so far this year.  Since India's central bank bought 200 tons from the IMF, the metal has jumped 11.5% on its dollar-alternative, safe-haven, inflation-resistant appeal.

Meanwhile, the decline in the US dollar has raised valuation expectations for the major industrial companies, with offshore sales expected to boost revenues.  Nevertheless, this week’s highlight remains today’s after-market-close earnings from Hewlett-Packard (NYSE:HPQ).  Last week the company preannounced strong quarterly numbers, anticipating record sales results of $30.36 billion, and earnings of $1.13, and also lifted its 2010 guidance.

Last week, the 1% decline in the technology shares came after weaker-than-expected guidance from two software companies, Autodesk (NASDAQ:ADSK) and Salesforce.com (NYSE:CRM), was compounded by disappointing numbers from Dell (NASDAQ:DELL).  Technology companies felt the heat after Dell (NASDAQ:DELL) reported quarterly earnings that were well below analysts’ expectations.  The company said sales of its computers to big businesses remain weak.  Shares in the company plunged 10% to $14.29.  So far in November, the NASDAQ has advanced 5%, and is up 36.1% year-to-date. 

The 0.2% pullback in S&P500 was caused by declines in oil and gas (-1.4%) and tech (-1.3%) sector shares that offset gains in health care issues (+1.5%) and basic materials (+1.2%).

The earnings calendar has slowed, but companies still due to report include: Campbell Soup (NYSE:CPB) on Monday; American Eagle (NYSE:AEO), Barnes and Noble (NYSE:BKS), Dollar Tree (NASDAQ:DLTR) on Tuesday, with Deere (NYSE:DE), J Crew (NYSE:JCG) and Tiffany (NYSE:TIF) on Wednesday.

On Thursday, the European Central Bank and Bank of England left interest rates unchanged.  Sentiment also received a boost from domestic corporate borrowing, which rose for the eight straight week. 

The growing optimism surrounding consumer spending, which is crucial for an economic recovery, followed late Wednesday's good results from Alcoa.  The company surprised investors with its first profit in nine months, which the aluminum company attributed to cost-cutting and rising sales to automakers.  Analysts believe that it will take more than just cost cutting to impress investors this earnings season.  

Meanwhile, a better reading on the job market also fueled investors' optimism.  The Labor Department reported that new claims for jobless benefits fell to 521,000 last week from 554,000 during the previous week.  Claims came to the lowest level since early January.

The Dow rose 61.29, or 0.6%, to 9,786.87. The index ended off its highest level after demand at a government auction of 30-year bonds fell short of expectations.  The Standard & Poor's 500 index rose 7.90, or 0.8%, to 1,065.48, while the Nasdaq composite index rose 13.60, or 0.6%, to 2,123.93.  About three stocks rose for every one that fell on the New York Stock Exchange, where consolidated volume came to 5.2 billion shares, compared with 5.1 billion on Wednesday.  The market's measure of investor worries, the CBOE Vix, dropped 2% to 24.18.

The Dollar Index, which tracks the US currency against a basket of currencies, dropped 0.7% to 75.968 after reaching 75.767, its weakest level since August 2008.  This morning, however, the dollar rebounded from its lows after Fed Chairman Bernanke seemed to signal a shortening of its accommodative policy timeline.  Economists currently do not expect policy shifts before mid-2010; however, Bernanke advised the Fed is ready to tighten monetary policy once the economy improves.  At the same time, he cautioned that "accommodative policy will likely be warranted for an extended period."  Gold closed at a record $1,056.30 an ounce and hit an electronic trading high of $1,062.70 during the day.

A weak dollar, along with rising oil and gold prices, gave a boost to dollar-sensitive multi-nationals, such as Dow components 3M (MMM), GE (GE) and Johnson & Johnson (JNJ). The rise in oil prices lifted Chevron (CVX), Exxon Mobil (XOM) and other commodity names. 

The House is considering an extension of the first-time homebuyers' tax credit, slated for November expiration. Pulte Homes (NYSE:PHM) shares climbed 4.3%; DR Horton (NYSE:DHI) increased 8.0%; and Lennar (NYSE:LEN) rose 9.1%.

Among retailers, Macy's (NYSE:M) increased 5.1% after reporting a 2.3% sales drop, half the projected decline. Abercrombie & Fitch (NYSE:ANF) rose 5.2% after its sales decline proved less than feared.  Luxury retailer Saks (NYSE:SKS) fell 4.5% following its reported 11.6% decline in comparable sales.

The European Central Bank has made up to €1bn in extra profits from crisis-related emergency lending, but its caution on unconventional policy measures has curbed potential earnings, analysts estimate. Extra liquidity pumped into the eurozone banking system since the collapse of Lehman Brothers last year has probably generated an extra €900m ($1.5bn, £780m) in profits so far, according to calculations by Goldman Sachs.

Some €300m of the total has been generated since June, when the ECB provided €442bn in one-year loans in its biggest liquidity providing operation. The extra profits are on top of the sums that the ECB normally makes on its market operations. Although the interest rate currently charged by the ECB – 1 per cent – was the lowest in its 11-year history, revenues “remain juicy because of the quantity of liquidity that banks keep hoarding”, said Natacha Valla, European economist at Goldman Sachs in Paris.

From last October the ECB has been meeting, in full, eurozone banks’ demand for liquidity. Ms Valla argued, however, that by sticking largely to using policy instruments already in its armoury the ECB had forgone potentially far higher margins.

Profits on the ECB’s programme to buy €60bn in covered bonds – low risk assets issued by banks and backed by public sector loans and mortgages – could be dwarfed by those on schemes launched by other central banks, which have involved higher risk. The Financial Times reported last month that the US Federal Reserve had made a $14bn profit on its crisis loan programmes, with its purchases of commercial paper among its most lucrative operations.

Instead, the ECB has created arbitrage opportunities for eurozone banks, which have used liquidity provided by the central bank to buy large amounts of government bonds, including from some of the smaller eurozone countries and riskier assets. These, in turn, can be used as collateral to raise fresh funds from the ECB. Eurozone banks’ holdings of euro-denominated government bonds have increased by more than €200bn since last year.

The Bank of Canada-ECB conference papers are here. All the papers, as well as powerpoint files of the presenters and discussants, are available from the conference website; I've reproduced some of the abstracts below.

Order flows and the exchange rate disconnect puzzle

M. Evans (Georgetown University)

Discussant: P. Vitale (G. D'Annunzio University)

This paper was also presented at the NBER conference -- see below for the abstract and my discussion of the paper.

What does the yield curve tell us about exchange rate predictability?

Y. Chen (University of Washington), K. P. Tsang (Virginia Tech)

This paper uses information contained in the cross-country yield curves to test the asset pricing approach to exchange rate determination, which models the nominal exchange rate as the discounted present value of its expected future fundamentals. Since the term structure of interest rates embodies information about future economic activity such as GDP growth and inflation, we extract the Nelson-Siegel (1987) factors of relative level, slope, and curvature from cross-country yield differences to proxy expected movements in future exchange rate fundamentals. Using monthly data between 1985-2005 for the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and the US, we show that the yield curve factors predict bilateral exchange rate movements and explain excess currency returns one month to two years ahead. They also outperform the random walk in forecasting short-term exchange rate returns out of sample. Our findings provide an intuitive explanation to the uncovered interest parity puzzle by relating excess currency returns to inflation and business cycle risk.

Discussant: R. Alquist (Bank of Canada)

I found this paper quite interesting as it links up, in an atheoretical/empirical fashion, with the findings Guy Meredith and I obtained -- namely that short term interest rate differentials mispredict exchange rate changes, but long term interest rate differentials do not.

On the unstable relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals

*P. Bacchetta (University of Lausanne), E. van Wincoop (University of Virginia)

It is well known from anecdotal, survey and econometric evidence that the relationship between the exchange rate and macro fundamentals is highly unstable. This could be explained when structural parameters are known and very volatile, neither of which seems plausible. Instead we argue that large and frequent variations in the relationship between the exchange rate and macro fundamentals naturally develop when structural parameters in the economy are unknown and change very slowly. We show that the reduced form relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals is driven not by the structural parameters themselves, but rather by expectations of these parameters. These expectations can be highly unstable as a result of perfectly rational "scapegoat" effects. This happens when parameters can potentially change much more in the long run than the short run. This generates substantial uncertainty about the level of parameters, even though monthly or annual changes are small. This mechanism can also be relevant in other contexts of forward looking variables and could explain the widespread evidence of parameter instability found in macroeconomic and financial data. Finally, we show that parameter instability has remarkably little effect on the volatility of exchange rates, the in-sample explanatory power of macro fundamentals and the ability to forecast out of sample.

Discussant: C. Engel (University of Wisconsin)

This paper is closely related to another paper by Bacchetta, Wincoop, and Beutler, discussed in this post from June.

What is driving exchange rates? New evidence from a panel of US dollar bilateral exchange rates

J. Cayen (Bank of Canada), D. Coletti (Bank of Canada), R. Lalonde (Bank of Canada), *P. Maier (Bank of Canada)

Discussant: H. Bouakez (HEC Montreal)

Common risk factors in currency markets

*H. Lustig (UCLA), N. Roussanov (University of Pennsylvania), A. Verdelhan (Boston University)

We identify a 'slope' factor in exchange rates. High interest rate currencies load more on this slope factor than low interest rate currencies. As a result, this factor can account for most of the cross-sectional variation in average excess returns between high and low interest rate currencies. A standard, no-arbitrage model of interest rates with two factors -- a country- specific factor and a global factor -- can replicate these findings, provided there is sufficient heterogeneity in exposure to the global risk factor. We show that our slope factor is global risk factor. By investing in high interest rate currencies and borrowing in low interest rate currencies, US investors load up on global risk, particularly during bad times.

Discussant: F. Fornari (European Central Bank)

Crash risk in currency markets

*E. Farhi (Harvard University), X. Gabaix (New York University), A. Verdelhan (Boston University)

Discussant: P. Della Corte (University of Warwick)

Dinner address: J. Murray (Bank of Canada)

Demand imbalances, exchange rate misalignment and monetary policy

Corsetti (European University Institute), L. Dedola (European Central Bank) S. Leduc (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco)

In standard open macro models with incomplete markets, monetary policy geared towards price stability may result in (rather than correcting) misalignments in important asset prices like the exchange rate, even when the latter only reflects fundamental-based valuation. We discuss instances in which optimal monetary policy redresses these inefficiencies, achieving significant welfare gains relative to price stability. These gains are obtained by leaning against an over- or under-valued exchange rate, associated with suboptimal cross-country demand and current account imbalances, consistent with flexible inflation targeting.

Discussant: J. Gali (Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional)

I think this paper by Corsetti et al. is an important one, because it's one of the few papers I know that explicitly defines what real exchange rate misalignment is, in the context of a formal New Keynesian model. I think it, and the discussion by Jordi Gali, are required reading for anybody interested in thinking about equilibrium real exchange rates.

The dynamics of international trade invoicing

*L. Goldberg (Federal Reserve Bank of New York), C. Tille (Geneva Graduate Institute)

International trade transactions can be invoiced in the producer currency, in the destination currency, or in some third vehicle currency. This paper shows how an exporter's invoicing choice is affected by her market share, industry structure, the role of imported inputs, the hedging of macroeconomic shocks, and exchange rate regimes. We address a shortcoming in the existing literature by invoicing choices as the outcome of a bargaining game between exporting producers and their customers abroad. Using a new dataset of 45 million individual Canadian import transactions, we examine the roles of the various invoicing determinants, documenting the importance of each of these factors in the invoicing decisions of specific industry exporters, distinguishing between U.S. exporters and those from other countries.

Discussant: M. Devereux (University of British Columbia)

The predictive information content of external imbalances for exchange rate returns: How much is it worth?

*P. Della Corte (University of Warwick), L. Sarno (Cass Business School), G. Sestieri (European Central Bank)

Discussant: G. M. Milesi-Ferretti (International Monetary Fund)

Keynote speech: On Global Currencies

*J. Frankel (Harvard University)

I approach the state of global currency issues by identifying eight concepts that I see as having recently "peaked" and eight more that I see as currently rising in relevance. Those that I see as having already seen their best days are: the G-7, global savings glut, corners hypothesis, proliferating currency unions, inflation targeting (narrowly defined), exorbitant privilege, Bretton Woods II, and currency manipulation. Those that I see as receiving increased emphasis in the future are: the G-20, the IMF, SDR, credit cycle, reserves, intermediate exchange rate regimes, commodity currencies, and multiple international currency system.

I've discussed some of the points Frankel lays out in a previous post, including the idea that “global savings glut” is an idea that is over.

Policy panel discussion: Exchange rate behaviour and policy: Before, during and after the global economic crisis

Chairman: L. Papademos (European Central Bank)

M. Chinn (University of Wisconsin) [presentation]

C. Engel ( University of Wisconsin )

J. Murray (Bank of Canada)

The second meeting (organized by Fabio Ghironi, Boston College, and Nelson Mark, Notre Dame) devoted the Wednesday session to exchange rates:

Order Flows and the Exchange Rate Disconnect Puzzle

Martin Evans, Georgetown University and NBER

The aim of this paper is to establish the link between the high frequency dynamics of spot exchange rates and developments in the macroeconomy. To do so, I first present a theoretical model of exchange-rate determination that bridges the gap between existing microstructure and traditional models. The model examines how dispersed microeconomic information known to individual agents outside the foreign exchange market is aggregated and transmitted to dealers via transaction flows (i.e., order flow); and how the information is then embedded in the spot exchange rate. I then report empirical evidence that strongly supports the presence of the link between the macroeconomy, order flow, and high frequency exchange rate returns implied by the model. In fact, my empirical results indicate that between 20 and 30 percent of the variance in excess currency returns over one- and two-month horizons can be linked back to developments in the macroeconomy. This level of explanatory power is an order of magnitude higher than that found in traditional models -- even the newly developed monetary models incorporating central banks reaction functions. Moreover, it provides a straightforward solution to the exchange-rate disconnect puzzle. Namely, the high frequency behavior of spot exchange rates reflects the flow of new information reaching dealers concerning the slowly evolving state of the macroeconomy, rather than the effects of shocks that drive rapidly changing macroeconomic conditions.

Discussant: Menzie Chinn, University of Wisconsin-Madison and NBER [presentation]

Taylor Rules and the Euro

Tanya Molodstva, Emory University, Alex Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, University of Memphis, David Papell, University of Houston

This paper uses real-time data to show that inflation and either the output gap or unemployment, the variables which normally enter central banks' Taylor rules for interest-rate-setting, can provide evidence of out-of-sample predictability and forecasting ability for the United States Dollar/Euro exchange rate from the inception of the Euro in 1999 to the end of 2007. We also present less formal evidence that, with real-time data, the Taylor rule provides a better description of ECB than of Fed policy during this period. The strongest evidence is found for specifications that neither incorporate interest rate smoothing nor include the real exchange rate in the forecasting regression, and the results are robust to whether or not the coefficients on inflation and the real economic activity measure are constrained to be the same for the U.S. and the Euro Area. The evidence is stronger with inflation forecasts than with inflation rates and with real-time data than with revised data. Bad news about inflation and good news about real economic activity both lead to out-of sample predictability and forecasting ability through forecasted exchange rate appreciation.

Discussant: Yu-chin Chen, University of Washington [presentation]

How Do Different Exporters React to Exchange Rate Changes? Theory, Empirics, and Aggregate Implications

Nicolas Berman, European University Institute, Philippe Martin, Science Po, Paris, Thierry Mayer, Paris School of Economics

This paper analyzes the reaction of exporters to exchange rate changes. We show that, in the presence of distribution costs in the export market, high and low productivity firms react differently to a depreciation . Whereas high productivity firms optimally raise their markup rather than the volume they export, low productivity firms choose the opposite strategy. This heterogeneity has important consequences for the aggregate impact of exchange rate movements. The presence of fixed costs to export means that only high productivity firms can export, firms which precisely react to an exchange rate depreciation by increasing their export price rather than their sales. We show that this selection effect can explain the weak impact of exchange rate movements on aggregate export volumes. We then test the main predictions of the model on a very rich French firm level data set with destination specific export values and volumes on the period 1995-2005. Our results confirm that high performance firms react to a depreciation by increasing their export price rather than their export volume. The reverse is true for low productivity exporters. Pricing to market by exporters is also more pervasive in sectors and destination countries with higher distribution costs. Another result consistent with our theoretical framework is that the probability of firms to enter the export market following a depreciation increases. The extensive margin response to exchange rate changes is modest at the aggregate level because firms that enter, following a depreciation, are less productive and smaller relative to existing firms.

Discussant: Linda Goldberg, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and NBER [presentation]

This paper has embedded estimated Markov-switching rules for U.S. monetary and fiscal policy into an otherwise conventional calibrated DSGE model with nominal rigidities to deliver some quantitative predictions of the impacts of government spending increases. When monetary and fiscal policy regimes vary -- from active monetary/passive fiscal to passive monetary/active fiscal to doubly passive to doubly active -- government spending multipliers can vary widely. An increase in government spending of $1 in present value raises output by $0.80 in present value under [Active Money/Passive Fiscal] AM/PF, while it raises output by as much as $1.80 in present value when monetary policy is passive. In our simple model, this translates into a decrease in consumption of $0.20 in present value under AM/PF, but an increase in consumption of about $0.80 in present value under passive monetary policy.

The paper also simulates the general equilibrium impacts of the government spending path implied by the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. When the government spending path is modeled as a sequence of shocks to spending, the present-value multiplier for output is about $0.68 under a fixed regime of AM/PF, while it can be well over $3.00 in a fixed [Passive Money/Active Fiscal] PM/AF regime. If the government spending path is treated as foreseen by economic agents -- because the path is announced by the passage of the Act -- the present-value multiplier for output falls somewhat when the regime is AM/PF, but it rises to nearly $5.00 in the short run when policy obeys a PM/AF regime.

The evolution of the output gap under either regime is shown in Figure 7 from the paper.

The difference in results depending upon the form of monetary policy is, not surprisingly, not specific to this model. An IMF Conference on Fiscal Policy a couple months ago also highlighted this fact. Particularly salient in this regard was this presentation by Doug Laxton which showed impulse response functions (IRF's) for a variety of calibrated DSGE models. Below is one example of IRFs for one year fiscal stimulus in the form of government investment, when there is no monetary accomodation, and when there is 2 years of monetary accomodation (I'll let readers determine what they think is a more realistic appraisal of current monetary policy).

The models' IRF's depicted in the graphs are European Commission (QUEST), International Monetary Fund (GIMF), European Central Bank (New Area Wide Model), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB-US and Sigma), and the Bank of Canada (GEM). (The OECD model results are not shown in this particular graph).

Bottom line: The diversity of views regarding multipliers is not always driven by the type of models (although that's definitely part of it), but can also be driven by assumptions regarding the nature of monetary policy.

Zero interest rate bounds are yet another dimension to be examined. See large multipliers in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, who ask "When is the Government Spending Multiplier Large?" (Their answer: When the zero bound on nominal interest rates is binding.)

However, and with the recent rate meeting one is tempted to conclude that the ECB is now seriously committed to considering alternative measures and also, as it were, drastic measures along the lines of its peers at the Fed, the BOE and the BOJ who have all in their distinct way been engaged in QE for quite some time. In the recent print edition, the Economist provides a fine overview of global central banking in the midst of the current financial crisis; what has changed, whether there will be a "normal" again, and specifically whether central banks will emerge in new clothing, as it were, with new policy targets and objectives. I think these are some important questions since there is indeed a big risk that the edifice of central bank policy which has been built up during the financial crisis may turn out to be anything but temporary. And here I am not talking about the inflationist hobby horse that central bankers may be too slow to haul back the reigns when the economy picks up again, but more so about the fact that whatever trend we will observe in the aftermath won't be anything near the one markets and policy makers expect. Of course, the good old principle of falsification will help on this one as we move forward.

One way in which the ECB has so far differed from its peers can be seen from looking at the first figure in the Economist article where it shown how the ECB has certainly expanding its lending operations (and credit facilities), specifically in the interbank market, it has not yet entered the securities market to buy up debt and equity. Some of us has been surprised by this reluctance which, together with the fact that the ECB has been relatively shy in slashing nominal rates, means that the ECB has appeared lagging in its response. Now, there is nothing wrong with being different and there is certainly nothing wrong with applying different tools to a situation which you genuinely find different. However, as one friend to me pointed out a while back, the ECB's unique, and according to some brave and prudent, response to the crisis is now a liability rather than an asset, and one has to wonder whether that strategy hasn't been subject to revision for a while now.

Indeed, I would be unfair in omitting to mention the fact that the ECB has indeed continued to slash interest rates and that signs have emerged to indicate that the ECB may be more flexible towards non-traditional policy measures. However, if you look at the assessment of the central bank the risk of deflation is still not paramount. At the recent policy meeting where interest rates were lowered by 25 basis points to 1.25 Trichet consequently pointed towards risks being balanced and more specifically how he did not view dis-inflation as being the same thing as deflation. This suggests that the ECB is not yet ready to take steps similar to the ones being taken by the Fed, the BOE and the BOJ.

Trichet, a Man of Principles

The impending comparison in this relation is the one with the Fed and in a recent speech Trichet points towards three, well known, reasons why we should not compare the US and the Eurozone.

The first reason relates to the ECB's focus on the banking sector. Pointing to the fact that banking loans make up a substantially larger part in the Eurozone than in the US (as a percentage of GDP), the chairman defends the focus on easing bank credit issues. Moreover, and as a related point Trichet points towards the importance of small and medium sized companies in the Eurozone (SMEs) and how these companies rely heavily on banks. Far be it from me to disagree with an expert (and I do consider Trichet an expert here), but I would humbly submit the point this is not only a (credit) supply story. At this point it is very much a demand story and how those very same companies need to find investment opportunities beyond maintaining credit to smooth their short term expenses with whatever revenues they might have in prospect.

As a second reason Trichet points towards a higher risk associated with the housing market in the US and thus why the US' asset programs to purchase toxic housing assets should not be replicated in the US. Now, it is true that the wealth effect from housing is considerably higher in the US than in the Eurozone countries at large, but this is also as far as the argument goes. In essence, I really don't know what to say here, and quite frankly this is an embarrassing remark from the president. I mean, doesn't he know that Spain and Ireland are part of the Eurozone? Also the implicit narrative that Europe and the US differs because of the role of housing in the latter is extremely simplified. Take Eastern Europe for example not to mention my own country Denmark. In fact, if there ever was a call for a program to relinquish banks and credit institutions of bad mortgage assets it would be in the case of Spain. Add to this that the crisis exactly turned global the minute BNP Paripas revealed that they too would be suffering subprime related losses and after them a veritable tableau d'horreur has followed.

Thirdly and perhaps most popularly in this discourse, Trichet points to the mitigating effects of a relative high degree of price rigidities in a European context. The point goes that if prices are rigid on the downside, companies will have a harder time lowering wages and prices and thus provoking inflation. We could think of this as a structural hedge against a collapse into deflation and it is basically driven by the fact that if headline inflation did not spark core inflation growth on the up, it won't do it on the downside either. From the point of view of ECB policy however, this argument would be rather inconsistent since we all remember the horror of second round effects that the ECB tried to enshrine into markets as rates were raised back in 2006-07 to counter the increase in headline inflation. In this way, one would assume that such logic applied on the downside too and what is more, it is quite obvious that the deleveraging needed across the global economy need to be deflationary by very nature of the problem at hand. Trichet on the other hand is a man of principles and his remarks, in the context of inflation expectations, during an interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung brought a smile to my face.

But citizens can have full confidence that we will guarantee stable prices over the medium and long term. The 329 million citizens of the euro area are very clever. They would not improve their level of confidence and help restarting the economy if they had the sentiment that we were forgetting our primary medium term goal.

(...)

We should not confuse disinflation and deflation. At the moment I am speaking, we are experiencing very low inflation and in the months to come negative inflation due to the decrease of the prices of oil, energy and commodities, before it increases again at the end of the year. This is good for the purchasing power of households and is a correction of the high prices of the past.

It would be interesting to take a poll to see whether those 329 million souls really were as clever as Trichet thinks, whether they are imbued with the kind expectations assumed here, or whether they agree with the ECB overall main objective.

The ECB, a Hydra?

Meanwhile and although the President certainly seems to be keeping his discourse straight, it is not easy to get a handle of what exactly the ECB is planning as we move forward. One classic dichotomy in the context of ECB watching and one which is dearly loved by financial journalists is between Axel Weber, as a hawk, one the one side and e.g. Greek council member Athanasios Orphanides on the other. It is well known that the former on several occasions have argued against slashing the nominal interest rates below 1% whereas the latter has advocated for the ECB to engage in QE-like purchases of assets in the market place. Weber has even been quoted of arguing how the ECB should set a specific floor under how low the nominal interest rate could be slashed.

But, by no means is this only a Saxon-Hellenist skirmish.

Recently, Bloomberg ran a piece in which the Dutch and Belgian council members Noel Wellink and Guy Quaden were quoted of saying that the ECB could (potentially) serve up extraordinary measures as we move forward from the next meeting the 7th of May. On the economic outlook, it is also difficult to get a handle on what the council members think with some arguing how the economy is improving and some, on the other hand, voicing concern over downside risks to prices and economic momentum. Also, on the outlook for deflation, the opinions are many. Trichet is well known to hold the belief that we are not going to see deflation, but only dis-inflation which, in itself, is not detrimental and may even be good for households' disposable income. However, Wellink was also quoted by Bloomberg of saying that the longer this disinflationary process lingers, the higher the risk will be that we get into an unwanted situation.

Adding to the cacophony, executive board member Lorenzo Bini Smaghi recently pointed to the fact (get the speech here) that bringing interest rates close to the zero bound would risk distorting money markets as it could curtail interbank lending. Apart from constituting yet another voice in the wilderness of official ECB opinion makings, this is a point worth considering in the sense that financial institutions might swap what was otherwise a smoothly functioning interbank market for the soothing liquidity tap of the central bank. I think it is important to emphasise though that there is a big difference between short term and long term financing here, where one would assume the central bank to stay exclusively on the short end of the curve. In essence, Mr. Smaghi's speech is a well argued one, and I would not want to leave the impression that I am trying to present a picture of an ECB that is torn to a greater extent than is really the case.

However, it appears that I am not the only picking up the mixed discourses on the radar. Consequently, Bloomberg reporter Simone Meier has a piece which details how Trichet has decided to silence his fellow council members, at least as so far goes the measures taking during the next meeting the 7th of May.

European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet has imposed a vow of silence on Governing Council members as they struggle to agree on what to do next to rescue the economy from recession.

Trichet asked council members last week to refrain from commenting on what new measures the ECB will unveil at its next policy meeting on May 7. Austria’s Ewald Nowotny confirmed the ban today, telling reporters in Vienna officials had been asked “in the name of the President not to talk about details before the May meeting.” Trichet said on April 27 that council members had agreed “not to give any further indications.”

Given the short overview above of the different voices, one can hardly fault the President for this initiative and as David Milleker, chief economist at Union Investment in Frankfurt is quoted of saying;

“They’ve created more confusion than clarity. The entire cacophony didn’t exactly give the picture of a united council in any case.”

This seems to be the point in a nutshell and in an environment where the uncertainty surrounding the ECB's strategy and play book is generally high, the confusion only increases.

Charting a Course

In many ways I think it is natural that the ECB, just as its peers, are finding it difficult to deal with the present circumstances. Nobody ever said that this was easy, but the ECB still leaves an impression that it really does not know what it wants and, more importantly, how it wants to get there. In the recent World Economic Outlook 09, the IMF heads of the description of the European economic edifice with the point that Europe is searching for a coherent policy response. The fund highlights how the severe stress that has built up in the financial system and in the real economy (especially in the context of the CEE) calls for coordination between fiscal and monetary policy. The niggle here is of course that, at present, this is difficulty achieved in Eurozone let alone European context. Moreover, the ECB's sole focus on price stability may be robbing it of looking at more flexible measures although of course, in relation to buying securities in the open market, it is not certain e.g. which countries' bonds it should buy. This is why I, and among others the IMF, have argued that Euro Bonds be considered.  

For me, there are two additional issues here. Firstly, I think the ECB is too dogmatic. Sure, you can call me excessively worried about deflation and you can argue that since we are currently sustaining a three month rally things are perhaps not as bad as they seem. However, I still believe that the myopic look on inflation expectations in the aggregate for the Eurozone as well as the idea that price stability in the long run follows naturally from anchoring these expectations constitute a severely miscalibrated compass to navigate the waters in which the economy finds itself at present. There is a fine balance between sticking to one's convention and adjusting to new circumstances, and the ECB is, in my opinion, leaning too much to former. Secondly, I think the ECB and the indeed Eurozone policy makers have a responsibility towards one the one hand, the CEE and on the other keeping the Eurozone in one piece.  I think that this responsibility should be conveyed very clearly in speech and action. You can always argue that measures already have been taking, but I think there is good chance (risk) that the whole European economic system needs a serious re-boot on the back of this crisis. Such re-structuring need to be intimately tuned to these two challenges which means that we need to be able to speak openly about them and not narrate anything in the context of one set of aggregate inflation expectations measures. If it is not, then we will truly be all at sea.

1. We, the Leaders of the Group of Twenty, met in London on 2 April 2009.

2. We face the greatest challenge to the world economy in modern times; a crisis which has deepened since we last met, which affects the lives of women, men, and children in every country, and which all countries must join together to resolve. A global crisis requires a global solution.

Things stink all over due to this mess, and it has gotten worse lately.

3. We start from the belief that prosperity is indivisible; that growth, to be sustained, has to be shared; and that our global plan for recovery must have at its heart the needs and jobs of hard-working families, not just in developed countries but in emerging markets and the poorest countries of the world too; and must reflect the interests, not just of today's population, but of future generations too. We believe that the only sure foundation for sustainable globalization and rising prosperity for all is an open world economy based on market principles, effective regulation, and strong global institutions.

It would be nice if everybody could grow and get richer.  Lets not forget about the poor countries that have been hurt even more than the rich countries by this crisis, even though it was not their fault.  However, we will not fundamentally alter the overall global economic system.

4. We have today therefore pledged to do whatever is necessary to:

• restore confidence, growth, and jobs;
• repair the financial system to restore lending;
• strengthen financial regulation to rebuild trust;
• fund and reform our international financial institutions to overcome this crisis and prevent future ones; promote global trade and investment and reject protectionism, to underpin prosperity; and
• build an inclusive, green, and sustainable recovery.

By acting together to fulfill these pledges we will bring the world economy out of recession and prevent a crisis like this from recurring in the future.

Nice set of goals.  However, what is meant by do "what ever is necessary" to repair the financial system.  Calls for stronger regulation of markets are good and very much needed.  The international financial institutions they are referring to here are the World Bank, the IMF and their regional counterparts.

5. The agreements we have reached today, to treble resources available to the IMF to $750 billion, to support a new SDR allocation of $250 billion, to support at least $100 billion of additional lending by the MDBs, to ensure $250 billion of support for trade finance, and to use the additional resources from agreed IMF gold sales for concessional finance for the poorest countries, constitute an additional $1.1 trillion programme of support to restore credit, growth and jobs in the world economy. Together with the measures we have each taken nationally, this constitutes a global plan for recovery on an unprecedented scale.

This is a major increase in support for the IMF and is a very useful step.  It actually means that the calls to help out the poor countries that are suffering from this are not just platitudes, but that the major countries of the world are actually prepared to help.

Restoring growth and jobs

6. We are undertaking an unprecedented and concerted fiscal expansion, which will save or create millions of jobs which would otherwise have been destroyed, and that will, by the end of next year, amount to $5 trillion, raise output by 4 per cent, and accelerate the transition to a green economy. We are committed to deliver the scale of sustained fiscal effort necessary to restore growth.

I will note that the vast bulk of that $5 trillion is coming from a handful of countries, most notably the U.S. and China, with honorable mentions to Japan and the U.K. Continental Europe is effectively trying to free ride off the increased aggregate demand from the countries that are actively stimulating their economies. I would however read this clause as an endorsement of the Obama Strategy.

7. Our central banks have also taken exceptional action. Interest rates have been cut aggressively in most countries, and our central banks have pledged to maintain expansionary policies for as long as needed and to use the full range of monetary policy instruments, including unconventional instruments, consistent with price stability.

A pat on the back for the central bankers.  This is an explicit endorsement of the use of Quantitative Easing (central banks buying long term government bonds and effectively printing money) which is being implemented by the Fed and the Bank of England.  I would also see this as a call for the European Central Bank (ECB) help out a bit more.

8. Our actions to restore growth cannot be effective until we restore domestic lending and international capital flows. We have provided significant and comprehensive support to our banking systems to provide liquidity, recapitalize financial institutions, and address decisively the problem of impaired assets. We are committed to take all necessary actions to restore the normal flow of credit through the financial system and ensure the soundness of systemically important institutions, implementing our policies in line with the agreed G20 framework for restoring lending and repairing the financial sector.

We have thrown lots of money at the banks to keep the system afloat and are prepared to continue throwing money at the banks.

9. Taken together, these actions will constitute the largest fiscal and monetary stimulus and the most comprehensive support programme for the financial sector in modern times. Acting together strengthens the impact and the exceptional policy actions announced so far must be implemented without delay. Today, we have further agreed over $1 trillion of additional resources for the world economy through our international financial institutions and trade finance.

Yes, it has been a lot of money we have thrown at the banks.  So far we have been helping out private commercial banks.  However given the scale of this problem we also need to significantly increase the resources of the IMF and World Bank (mostly IMF).

10. Last month the IMF estimated that world growth in real terms would resume and rise to over 2 percent by the end of 2010. We are confident that the actions we have agreed today, and our unshakeable commitment to work together to restore growth and jobs, while preserving long-term fiscal sustainability, will accelerate the return to trend growth. We commit today to taking whatever action is necessary to secure that outcome, and we call on the IMF to assess regularly the actions taken and the global actions required.

The sun will come out tomorrow.  We think this plan will work, but perhaps the IMF can give some progress reports from time to time.

11. We are resolved to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability and price stability and will put in place credible exit strategies from the measures that need to be taken now to support the financial sector and restore global demand. We are convinced that by implementing our agreed policies we will limit the longer-term costs to our economies, thereby reducing the scale of the fiscal consolidation necessary over the longer term.

We are sure we can pull back from the fiscal stimulus before it bankrupts us and from the monetary stimulus before hyperinflation breaks out.  You don't get to be a head of state by lacking in confidence, and this was a meeting of 20 heads of state or government.

12. We will conduct all our economic policies cooperatively and responsibly with regard to the impact on other countries and will refrain from competitive devaluation of our currencies and promote a stable and well-functioning international monetary system. We will support, now and in the future, to candid, even-handed, and independent IMF surveillance of our economies and financial sectors, of the impact of our policies on others, and of risks facing the global economy.

If the independent surveillance of the economy by the IMF applies to the U.S. then this is big news.  More likely there are no teeth to this.  If the U.S were any other country, the IMF would have long ago pressed us to nationalize the banks, clean them up and sell them off.

Strengthening financial supervision and regulation

13. Major failures in the financial sector and in financial regulation and supervision were fundamental causes of the crisis. Confidence will not be restored until we rebuild trust in our financial system. We will take action to build a stronger, more globally consistent, supervisory and regulatory framework for the future financial sector, which will support sustainable global growth and serve the needs of business and citizens.

Deregulation was a VERY bad idea when it comes to financial institutions.  With the world now interconnected more than ever before, regulations need to be strengthened and made more consistent across boarders.

14. We each agree to ensure our domestic regulatory systems are strong. But we also agree to establish the much greater consistency and systematic cooperation between countries, and the framework of internationally agreed high standards, that a global financial system requires. Strengthened regulation and supervision must promote propriety, integrity and transparency; guard against risk across the financial system; dampen rather than amplify the financial and economic cycle; reduce reliance on inappropriately risky sources of financing; and discourage excessive risk-taking. Regulators and supervisors must protect consumers and investors, support market discipline, avoid adverse impacts on other countries, reduce the scope for regulatory arbitrage, support competition and dynamism, and keep pace with innovation in the marketplace.

Everyone has to regulate, no trying to lure financial activity to your country by promising to look the other way when institutions take on excessive risk in the hunt for short term profits.

15. To this end we are implementing the Action Plan agreed at our last meeting, as set out in the attached progress report. We have today also issued a Declaration, Strengthening the Financial System.

In particular we agree:

• to establish a new Financial Stability Board (FSB) with a strengthened mandate, as a successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), including all G20 countries, FSF members, Spain, and the European Commission;
  that the FSB should collaborate with the IMF to provide early warning of macroeconomic and financial risks and the actions needed to address them;
  to reshape our regulatory systems so that our authorities are able to identify and take account of macro-prudential risks;
• to extend regulation and oversight to all systemically important financial institutions, instruments and markets. This will include, for the first time, systemically important hedge funds;
• to endorse and implement the FSF's tough new principles on pay and compensation and to support sustainable compensation schemes and the corporate social responsibility of all firms;
• to take action, once recovery is assured, to improve the quality, quantity, and international consistency of capital in the banking system. In future, regulation must prevent excessive leverage and require buffers of resources to be built up in good times;
• to take action against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens. We stand ready to deploy sanctions to protect our public finances and financial systems. The era of banking secrecy is over. We note that the OECD has today published a list of countries assessed by the Global Forum against the international standard for exchange of tax information;
• to call on the accounting standard setters to work urgently with supervisors and regulators to improve standards on valuation and provisioning and achieve a single set of high-quality global accounting standards; and
  to extend regulatory oversight and registration to Credit Rating Agencies to ensure they meet the international code of good practice, particularly to prevent unacceptable conflicts of interest.

That is a long list of reforms and areas for tighter supervision.  Mostly it amounts to more international cooperation on regulation, in a more formal and institutionalized way.  The call for regulation and oversight of the Credit Rating agencies (i.e. Moody's and S&P) is long overdue, as their lack of action and incompetence was a major factor in this whole mess occurring.  All big financial institutions, including hedge funds need to be regulated.

16. We instruct our Finance Ministers to complete the implementation of these decisions in line with the timetable set out in the Action Plan. We have asked the FSB and the IMF to monitor progress, working with the Financial Action Taskforce and other relevant bodies, and to provide a report to the next meeting of our Finance Ministers in Scotland in November.

We hope we can get our act together by November.

That is about half of the statement, I will have a follow up post on the rest of it.  In general the basic thrust of the statement is that it endorses aggressive government actions, both on the fiscal and monetary front to address the crisis.  It calls for much stronger regulation.  Perhaps the most significant news is a very large commitment to strengthening the resources of the IMF to help some of the emerging economy's deal with the fallout of this mess that they did not create.