So now, there'll be even a greater need for reasoned analysis. One addition to the discussion is a Symposium on China's impact on the global economy just published in Pacific Economic Review (August 2009). From my introductory chapter to the symposium:

Over the past decade, China's presence in the global economy has grown increasingly large. Along many dimensions, China is, rightly or wrongly, perceived to have an enormous impact. In the trade arena, China is now widely considered to be the world's workshop, displacing some traditional exporters of labour-intensive goods, even as its economy is ever more closely woven into the fabric of the increasingly fragmented chain of production....

The development of trade linkages has been accompanied by such rapid economic growth that the resulting demand for inputs has driven up commodity prices: at least that is the popular view. China has also become a large net saver in the world economy, as its current account has expanded in recent years. Figures 1 and 2 highlight these trends.

In this volume, our contributors examine several aspects of China’s economic interactions with the world economy. In so doing, they cast some light on the Chinese economy's prospects.

The contributors include Jeffrey A. Frankel (Harvard University); Steven Dunaway (Council on Foreign Relations), Lamin Leigh (IMF), Xiangming Li (IMF); Charles P. Thomas, Jaime Marquez, Sean Fahle (all Federal Reserve Board); Willem Thorbecke (George Mason University and RIETI), Hanjiang Zhang (University of Texas); Francois Lescaroux (GDF Suez), Valerie Mignon (University of Paris Ouest and CEPII); and Joshua Aizenman (UC Santa Cruz), Yothin Jinjarak (Nanyang Technological Institute). Also in the issue are two other China-related papers, by Michael Dooley (UC Santa Cruz), David Folkerts-Landau (Deutsche Bank), Peter Garber (Deutsche Bank); Yin-Wong Cheung (UC Santa Cruz), Xingwang Qian (SUNY Buffalo). Many of these contributors have had their research discussed on Econbrowser posts dealing with China.

The entire introduction is here, while the table of contents and articles are here. Below are the abstracts from the papers in the symposium.

New Estimation of China's Exchange Rate Regime (p 346-360)

Jeffrey A. Frankel

The present paper updates the question: what precisely is the exchange rate regime that China has put into place since 2005, when it announced a move away from the US dollar peg? Is it a basket anchor with the possibility of cumulatable daily appreciations, as was announced at the time? We apply to this question a new approach of estimating countries' de facto exchange rate regimes, a synthesis of two techniques. One is a technique that has been used in the past to estimate implicit de facto currency weights when the hypothesis is a basket peg with little flexibility. The second is a technique used to estimate the de facto degree of exchange rate flexibility when the hypothesis is an anchor to the US dollar or some other single major currency. Because the RMB and many other currencies today purportedly follow variants of band-basket-crawl, it is important to have available a technique that can cover both dimensions, inferring weights and inferring flexibility. The synthesis adds a variable representing 'exchange market pressure' to the currency basket equation, whereby the degree of flexibility is estimated at the same time as the currency weights. This approach reveals that by mid-2007, the RMB basket had switched a substantial part of the US dollar's weight onto the euro. The implication is that the appreciation of the RMB against the US dollar during this period was due to the appreciation of the euro against the dollar, not to any upward trend in the RMB relative to its basket.

Since the paper was written (late-2008), Frankel has observed that the Chinese have essentially reverted to a dollar peg.

How Robust Are Estimates of Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates: The Case of China (p 361-375)

Steven Dunaway, Lamin Leigh, Xiangming Li

Assessments of a country's real exchange rate relative to its 'equilibrium' value as suggested by 'fundamental' determinants have received increasing attention. Using China as an example, the present paper illustrates models commonly used to derive equilibrium real exchange rate estimates. The large variance in the estimates raises serious questions about the robustness of these results. The basic conclusion is that, at least for China, small changes in model specifications, explanatory variable definitions, and time periods used in estimation can lead to very substantial differences in equilibrium real exchange rate estimates. Therefore, such estimates should be treated with great caution.

In this article, the authors cover some of the same ground Cheung, Fujii and I surveyed, with largely the same conclusions, but different approaches.

Measures of International Relative Prices for China and the USA (p 376-397)

Charles P. Thomas, Jaime Marquez, Sean Fahle

In this paper we assemble a measure of international relative prices to gauge the average amount by which prices in China and the USA differ from the prices of their trading partners. Our estimated weighted average of relative prices for China and the USA are the first to use the significantly revised purchasing power parities embodied in the price data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. Our analysis reveals several findings of interest. First, interactions between the structure of trade and the levels of relative prices are sufficiently important to induce divergences between the weighted average of relative prices and conventional real effective exchange-rate indexes. Second, revisions embodied in World Development Indicators price data generally lower the estimate of US international relative prices. Third, net exports are inversely related to the estimate of US international relative price, but, for China, the correlation is positive. Estimating this correlation for other countries reveals no systematic pattern related to the level of development alone. Fourth, unlike previous work, using our price measures we find that an increase in US prices relative to Chinese prices raises the share of China's exports to the USA. Finally, there is a distinct possibility of eliminating the long-standing differential in income elasticities of US trade in empirical applications.

The Effect of Exchange Rate Changes on China's Labour-intenstive manufacturing exports (p 398-409)

Willem Thorbecke, Hanjiang Zhang

Chinese policy-makers fear that an RMB appreciation will reduce low technology exports. We investigate this issue using data on China's exports to 30 countries. We find that an appreciation of the RMB would substantially reduce China's exports of clothing, furniture and footwear. We also find that an increase in foreign income, an increase in the Chinese capital stock, and an appreciation among China's competitors would raise China's exports. Because Europe is the second leading exporter of labour-intensive manufactures behind China, these results indicate that the appreciation of the euro relative to the RMB since 2001 has crowded out European exports.

These two articles provide different perspectives on the issue of how exchange rate changes impact Chinese trade flows. For recent discussion of this subject, see [7].

Measuring the Effects of Oil Prices on China's Economy: A Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive Approach (p 410-425)

Francois Lescaroux, Valerie Mignon

The aim of this paper is to investigate the impacts of oil prices on the Chinese economy. To this end, we rely on the factor-augmented vector autoregressive methodology, which allows us to evaluate the response of various macroeconomic variables to an oil price shock. Our results suggest that an oil price shock leads to: (i) a contemporaneous increase in consumer and producer price indexes, inducing a rise in interest rates; (ii) a delayed negative impact on GDP, investment and consumption; and (iii) a postponed increase in coal and power prices.

The USA As the 'Demander of Last Resort' and the Implications for China's Current Account(p 426-442)

Joshua Aizenman, Yothin Jinjarak

The present paper evaluates the current account patterns of 69 countries during 1981-2006. We identify an asymmetric effect of the USA as the 'demander of last resort': a 1% increase in the lagged US imports/GDP is associated with a 0.3% increase in current account surpluses of countries running surpluses, but results in insignificant changes in the current accounts of countries running deficits. The impact of US demand variables is larger on the current accounts of developing countries than that of OECD countries. We also contemplate China's current account over the next 6 years, and project a large drop in its current account/GDP surpluses.

Also related are the two other papers in the issue. The first is an update on the Bretton Woods II argument, by my former colleague, Mike Dooley and his coauthors:

Bretton Woods II Still Defines the International Monetary System (p 297-311)

Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau, Peter Garber

In this paper we argue that net capital inflows to the USA did not cause the financial crisis that now engulfs the world economy. A crisis caused by such flows has been widely predicted but that crisis has not occurred. Indeed, the international monetary system still operates in the way described by the Bretton Woods II framework and is likely to continue to do so. Failure to properly identify the causes of the current crisis risks a rise in protectionism that could intensify and prolong the decline in economic activity around the world.

They focus, rightly, on "catastrophic failure of risk management", on the part of both private and public (my emphasis) sector agents. In other words, they are quite skeptical of what I called the "Blame it on Beijing" meme favored by the previous Administration (see Economic Report of the President, 2009) and many other observers.

The second is by another former colleague, Yin-Wong Cheung and his coauthor

Empirics of China's Outward Direct Investment (p 312-341)

Yin-Wong Cheung, Xingwang Qian

We investigate the empirical determinants of China's outward direct investment (ODI). It is found that China's investments in developed and developing countries are driven by different sets of factors. Subject to the differences between developed and developing countries, there is evidence that: (i) both market-seeking and resource-seeking motives drive China's ODI; (ii) Chinese exports to developing countries induce China's ODI; (iii) China's international reserves promote its ODI; and (iv) Chinese capital tends to agglomerate among developed economies but diversify among developing economies. Similar results are obtained using alternative ODI data. We do not find substantial evidence that China invests in African and oil-producing countries mainly for their natural resources.

Chinese outward FDI must be a hot topic. Another study, by a former colleague of mine from EOP days, Dan Rosen, has just published China's Changing Outbound Foreign Direct Investment Profile PB09-14 (with Thilo Hanemann).

By the way, a slightly older but still very relevant, compendium is the volume entitled China's Growing Role in World Trade, edited by Rob Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei

...basically, it seems to me, we're all flying blind. The markets are spiraling down, and our leading experts don't have much of a clue as to what to do.

Given that, one has to welcome the expected appointment to senior positions in the Obama administration of economists like Lawrence Summers, Timothy Geithner, Jason Furman, Peter Orszag, and Goolsbee himself. They're sober and competent people who know we face a real crisis -- and who, importantly, may be more willing than many of their colleagues to adjust their thinking early and often.

Indeed, one hopes they're not too invested in the findings of the economics profession of which they're such distinguished products -- because one suspects many of the conventional answers of that profession aren’t much applicable to the current situation. After all, wasn't it excessive confidence in complex economic models and sophisticated financial instruments on the part of people well educated in modern economics that helped get us into the current mess?

So I hope the best and the brightest who will be joining the new president will at least entertain the possibility that a lot of what they think they know is wrong. I trust they'll remember that successful economic policies in the past have pulled together elements from unlikely sources, and that they're as likely to find wisdom from reading political economists like Friedrich Hayek or Joseph Schumpeter, or Keynes himself, as from poring over the latest academic paper in a peer-refereed economics journal.

My puzzlement is driven by several assertions.

• Are our economic leaders flying blind?
• Were the economists overly enamored of complex economic models?
• Were the economists overly confident in sophisticated financial instruments?
• Is it as likely to find wisdom from Hayek or Schumpeter as in the latest academic paper?

On the first point, I think Kristol is on the most solid ground. So much of what has happened has been unprecedent in terms of institutions, although as Markus Brunnermeier has pointed out, the general outlines are remarkably similar to banking crises of the past. So, here I think reasonable people can certainly disagree whether it's ignorance, or failure to agree between Fed and the Bush Administration and components thereof.

What about complex models? First ask what exactly constitutes a complex model? Is Kristol alluding to models involving algebra? Or calculus? Or lots of equations? I think one could make the argument that the models weren't complex enough to capture important effects (asymmetric information, agency costs, etc.) despite the complexity along other dimensions.

Were economists overly confident in sophisticated financial instruments? Here I think it might be useful to discriminate between economists that work in the financial world, and those that work in academia. From the former group, I always heard a lot about "risk management" and sophisticated statistical models to price derivatives. From the latter, I heard a lot more skepticism, perhaps borne of ignorance. So, Kristol might be right, but I suspect his views are deeply influenced by the sample of economists he talked to.

By the way, I won't say I saw the full enormity of the leveraging problem, but at least I can truthfully say I was suspicious of the free lunch aspects of the net borrowing binge of the past decade. From my August 2005 Council on Foreign Relations report:

Although the likelihood of a "disorderly adjustment," is small,37 the potential consequences are so troubling that the possibility of economic disruption cannot be ignored. In addition to the threat of rising unemployment and declining income, sharp movements in asset prices and interest rates could also threaten the stability of the financial system. In the past, policymakers have been able to contain the threats of systemic crises, such as the crisis of Long Term Capital Management in 1998. That event was at least partly attributable to bets on interest rates movements that did not meet expectations. Markets for making bets are much larger and diverse than they were seven years ago. Some are very new and remain untested. The question is whether they are up to the task of distributing risks when low probability events occur.38 This open question should in itself give some additional weight to the case for action now, to avoid putting the world economy in the position of finding out the answer.

I'm confident it's quite easy to dig up plenty of quotes from other economists who were nervous.

Finally, the assertion that really caught my attention: That the likelihood of finding useful nuggets of economic wisdom in Schumpeter and Hayek is equal to that of finding it in the latest article in peer reviewed journals (I get the feeling he's making a perjorative remark about peer reviewed journals, but I'll let that slide).

Why do I think this is odd? Well, because the statement identifies modern economics as distinct from the great thinkers of the past. But in fact many of the works in the "peer reviewed journals" are not orthogonal to the works of the past, but like many other intellectual endeavors, based upon them. Open up the JPE or the QJE (or better yet, the NBER Working Paper series, and there are plenty allusions to "the greats", and ideas like "creative destruction". That being said, just like there has been plenty of thinking in political science since Machiavelli and The Prince (you'll get the allusion if you've read Dani Rodrik's take on Kristol's economics acumen), there's been a lot of insight developed in economics over the past hundred years. In this respect, the admonition to look backward sound good, but is less profound that it appears at first glance.