From "'Created or saved' doesn't add up", by Joseph Lawler:

...[t]he "created or saved" numbers are meaningless. The administration purposefully devised the metric to be nebulous. Without a counterfactual, showing the trend of unemployment in the absence of the stimulus, it is impossible to know how many jobs the stimulus saved.

But this is completely counter to what I learned in economics, and how, for instance, the CBO conducts analysis. I assume Mr. Lawler doesn't dispute the impartiality of the CBO (but who knows?). Here's the way real macroeconomists conduct analysis:

As the President has discussed, analysis done within the Administration has shown how his tax cuts have substantially offset the series of adverse shocks that have been buffeting the economy. Simulations of a conventional macroeconomic model show that, without the tax cuts, the level of real GDP would have been about 2 percent lower in the middle of 2003. About 1.5 million fewer people would have jobs today. The job market is not what we would like it to be right now, but it would have been worse without the Administration's actions.

One can view the short-run effects of these tax cuts from a classic Keynesian perspective. The tax cuts let people keep more of the money they earned. This supported consumption and thus helped maintain the aggregate demand for goods and services. There is nothing novel about this. It is very conventional short-run stabilization policy: You can find it in all of the leading textbooks.

The writer is Greg Mankiw, discussing in 2007 a particular fiscal measure, namely the 2003 tax cuts (h/t, Brad Delong).

So let us return to how the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conducted analysis. In their February analysis, they presented this set of results, based on a range of multipliers in the literature.

So GDP is estimated to be between 1.4 to 3.8 percentage points (ppts) higher than baseline in 2009Q4, due to the stimulus bill. The midpoint of this range is 2.6 ppts. Relatedly, the range of employment gain relative to baseline is 0.8 to 2.3 million; the midpoint of this range is 1.55 million.

Interestingly, taking the CEA's model based approach (Table 2, Joint Economic Committee testimony of 22 October), and assuming the same incremental growth rate in 09Q4 as in 09Q3, the implied deviation from baseline is 2.56 ppts, or right in the midpoint of the CBO's range.

Now using the error correction model that I estimated in last Tuesday's post (where the cointegrating relationship between log GDP and log nonfarm payroll employment is 0.37), I find the range of increased employment relative to baseline is between 0.68 and 1.84 million, slightly lower than the CBO range of 0.8 and 2.3 million. The estimated employment impact is 1.26 million, using the midpoint of the CBO range for impact on GDP.

I know counterfactuals and math are hard to fit on a bumper sticker. But one would hope that in an 800-plus word essay on economics (even if in Politico), some economic content could be included.

By the way, Jeff Frankel debunks a similar misapprehension in National Journal.

Today, we're fortunate to have David Papell, Professor of Economics at University of Houston, as a guest contributor.

The Federal Open Market Committee voted last Wednesday to keep the federal funds target rate at a record low of between zero and 0.25 percent. If it was not constrained by the zero lower bound, should the federal funds rate be negative? If the answer is yes, this suggests that the rate should remain at its record low for a considerable period and provides a justification for continued increases in the Fed's balance sheet. If the answer is no, then the Fed may need to raise its interest rate target sooner rather than later.

There has been a lively debate on this topic in the context of the Taylor rule for monetary policy. The debate started with an article in the Financial Times, which cites a confidential Fed staff study that placed the implied Taylor rule rate at negative 5 percent. John Taylor, speaking at the Atlanta Fed, counters that the Fed got both the sign and the decimal point wrong and calculates the rate at 0.5 percent. Glenn Rudebusch, writing in the San Francisco Fed's Economic Letter, argues for negative 5 percent. Most recently, Taylor writes in a Bloomberg.com commentary that the rate should be zero.

In its original form, the Taylor rule states that the Fed's interest rate target should be one plus 1.5 times the inflation rate plus 0.5 times the output gap. According to the most recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections, "core" CPI inflation, excluding food and energy, was 2.0 percent in 2008 but is expected to fall to 1.6 percent in 2009. The output gap is expected to be negative 7 percent in the second half of 2009 and the first half of 2010. Using 2.0 percent for inflation, the implied rate is 0.5 percent while, with 1.6 percent inflation, the rate is -0.1 percent, both around the Fed's current target.

The implied interest rate target can change if the Taylor rule is modified. It is often argued that, because monetary policy is forward-looking, policy evaluation with Taylor rules should be conducted using forecasts rather than actual data. The CBO forecasts that core inflation will fall further to 1.1 percent in 2010. Using this forecast, the implied rate falls to -0.85 percent. More dramatically, Rudebusch and others argue that the coefficient on the output gap in the Taylor rule should be 1.0 instead of 0.5. With inflation forecasts and the larger output gap coefficient, the implied Taylor rule interest rate falls to -4.35 percent.

In "Taylor Rules and the Great Inflation: Lessons from the 1970s for the Road Ahead for the Fed," written with Alex Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy of the University of Memphis, we use research on the natural rate of unemployment published in the 1970s to construct real-time output gap measures for the periods of peak unemployment in 1971 and 1975, and argue that real-time linear and quadratic detrended output gaps provide the best measure of what policymakers perceived the output gap to be at the time. Using these gaps to estimate Taylor rules, we conclude that:

• The Fed did not follow a stabilizing Taylor rule in the 1970s. In order for policy to be stabilizing, the federal funds rate needs to be raised more than point-for-point when inflation increases, so that the real interest rate rises. Our estimates never produce a coefficient on inflation that is significantly greater than one.
• The Fed did follow a stabilizing Taylor rule if inflation forecasts, rather than inflation rates, are used. These forecasts, however, systematically under-predicted inflation following the 1970s recessions and this does not constitute evidence of stabilizing policy.
• The Fed responded too strongly to negative output gaps, with estimated coefficients between 0.7 and 1.0.

In the 1970s, the Fed "stabilized" overly optimistic inflation forecasts and responded too strongly to output gaps, lowering interest rates too much -- especially during and following the 1970-1971 and 1974-1975 recessions, resulting in frequent recessions and the Great Inflation. What are the lessons from the 1970s for Fed policy today?

• The Fed should respond to inflation, not inflation forecasts, especially in an environment where large negative output gaps are causing forecasted inflation to fall.
• The Fed should not tinker with Taylor's output gap coefficient of 0.5.

Using the rule with Taylor's original coefficients, the experience of the 1970s suggests that, even if it could, the Fed should not lower its interest rate target below zero. If the incipient recovery takes hold and inflation stays the same or rises, it may need to raise rates sooner than many people think.

This post written by David Papell.

Chicago, IL – September 1, 2009 – Zacks.com announces the list of stocks featured in the Analyst Blog. Every day the Zacks Equity Research analysts discuss the latest news and events impacting stocks and the financial markets. Stocks recently featured in the blog include: American International Group (AIG), Citigroup (C), Morgan Stanley (MS), Bank of New York Mellon Corporation (BK) and Goldman Sachs (GS).

Get the most recent insight from Zacks Equity Research with the free Profit from the Pros newsletter: http://at.zacks.com/?id=5513

Here are highlights from Monday’s Analyst Blog:

Moody’s Confident About U.S.

According to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, the U.S. government and the Federal Reserve have injected about $12 trillion to revive the economy and credit markets. As a result, the budget deficit is expected to reach $1.6 trillion this year and $1.4 trillion next year. In its mid-year economic review, the Office of Management and Budget increased its estimate of the 10-year deficit by almost $2 trillion from the previous level to $9.05 trillion.

The U.S. government has also invested hundreds of billions of dollars to rescue many financial institutions including American International Group (AIG) and Citigroup (C) as part of its goal to stimulate the economy. These spending programs have also increased debt.

Most banks still have short-term debt guaranteed by the government. However, some large financial firms have repaid the government funds, including Morgan Stanley (MS), Bank of New York Mellon Corporation (BK) and Goldman Sachs (GS), among others. The repayment of government money can be viewed as a sign of recovery of the institutions as well as the economy.

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Only a small share of the spending will occur in 2009, even though Keynesians would argue that stimulus spending should be frontloaded to kick-start growth. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the largest share of the spending will occur in 2010, with the amount in 2011 being slightly larger than in 2009. Again, the timing exacerbates the problem: It will be tough to cut back on spending written into budgets as far out as 2011.

CBO Director Elmendorf provides an interesting counterpoint in his comments from June (I believe the same document Professor Lazear drew his statistics from):

• Many forecasters expected a large gap between actual and potential output to persist for some time. (In CBO's forecast the output gap was 7 percent of potential in 2009 and 2010 and 5 percent in 2011.) Therefore, policies that provided stimulus for an extended period of time seemed appropriate.
• Moreover, fiscal stimulus that ends before the economy has started to regain its footing runs the risk of exacerbating economic weakness when the stimulus ends.

Thus, Professor Lazear must believe the recession will be over soon, and -- more importantly -- that we will revert to potential GDP in short order. He's certainly free make that prediction. But when considering his record on predictions, I'm reminded of this quote from WSJ May 2008.

"I would be very surprised if the NBER, looking back at this period, would date this as a recession," Mr. Lazear said. There are even indications that revised first-quarter estimates would be slightly stronger than 0.6%. "The optimists seem to have been closer to right on that than the pessimists," he said.

As many readers might recall, most indicators that the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee (BCDC) pays attention to had plateaued or started to decline by April of that year (see this April 23, 2008 post); and in fact the NBER declared the beginning of the recession to be December 2007.

Here is CBO's assessment (June 2) of the impact of the ARRA on the output gap, using the mid-point of range of estimates of multipliers.

[Update, 2:15 Pacific]

Here's a useful set of points to remember when assessing the stimulus package, from CBPP, yesterday.

Total public debt outstanding of the U.S. Federal Government is currently $11,490 billion, or $124,000 per taxpayer. But a fair chunk of that total public debt-- $4,350 B to be exact-- is money that the government owes to itself, about half to the Social Security Trust Fund, and the remainder to other government accounts such as Civil Service Retirement and Disability, Military Retirement, Medicare, and Unemployment Insurance Trust Funds. The debt actually held by the public is "only" $7,140 billion, which amounts to half of last year's GDP. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that debt held by the public will rise to 56.6% of GDP by the end of this year. That will put the number well above the peaks reached in the Revolutionary War, Civil War, World War I, or the Reagan years, though still significantly below the debt run up from World War II.

Figure 1. Federal debt held by the public as a percent of GDP, 1790-2008, and projected for 2009. Data source: Congressional Budget Office.

But is it correct to subtract off the $4.3 trillion that the government owes "to itself"? These intragovernmental accounting entries represent an intention of the government to deliver real resources to certain parties, such as retirees, at a future date, so perhaps we should include them in a reckoning of all that the government has promised to pay. On the other hand, given what is currently promised, and given trends in the aging population and rising medical costs, if benefit formulas continue as present, the amount that the government would be obligated to deliver far exceeds the sums acknowledged in the intragovernmental debt accounts or what could be covered with future tax revenues.

One calculation that the CBO has performed is what they call an "alternative fiscal scenario" representing

one interpretation of what it would mean to continue today's underlying fiscal policy. This scenario deviates from CBO's baseline even during the next 10 years because it incorporates some policy changes that are widely expected to occur and that policymakers have regularly made in the past.

According to the CBO, in the absence of a significant increase in taxes above historical rates or change in benefit policies, growth in Medicare, Social Security, and Medicaid would quickly produce an explosion of federal debt.

Figure 2. Debt held by the public as a percent of GDP, 1790-2008, and projected for 2009-2083 under the "alternative fiscal scenario". Data source: Congressional Budget Office.

Of course such a path is completely infeasible and unsustainable. Then what exactly is the government promising to provide in the way of retirement medical care and income for those currently working, and what will the government actually deliver? The answer to both questions is unclear to me, though I have no doubt that this category of off-balance-sheet liability represents a potentially staggering sum.

But whatever you think future spending on Medicare will be, consider some of the other off-balance sheet federal promises. At the end of 2008, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had insured $4.8 trillion in deposits. Fannie and Freddie, which are now effectively nationalized, bring perhaps another $4.9 trillion in notional liabilities to the table. Those two alone sum to an amount well in excess of the current federal debt owed to the public.

Ah, but the federal government wouldn't actually be asked to honor more than a small fraction of those guarantees, would it? Only a few banks will fail, and the prime loans insured by Fannie and Freddie are safe, right? Right?

Still, even a modest fraction of $10 trillion sounds like a lot of money to me.

Then there's the loose change, such as the $1.1 trillion in obligations of the Federal Home Loan Banks. The federal government does not officially acknowledge responsibility for the liabilities of these government-sponsored enterprises, though that of course is what it had also claimed about Fannie and Freddie. Government-owned Ginnie Mae has issued guarantees on another $577 billion in mortgage-backed securities, while the Federal Housing Administration has insured $532 billion in mortgages. The U.S. Federal Reserve has added $1.1 trillion to its liabilities since September. And now loan guarantees appear to be the instrument of choice for U.S. energy policy ([1], [2]).

Of course there's a simple reason why all this happens. There is tremendous pressure for politicians to deliver in the form of off-balance-sheet commitments. Voters credit them for giving us what we want now, and blame somebody else when the time comes to pay for it. I'm amazed that no one is being held accountable for the fiasco of Fannie and Freddie, and indeed leading elected officials continue to advocate more of the same policies that created the original problem.

Some might look at Figure 1 and conclude that the U.S. could issue much more debt and still find ready buyers. But I worry that Figure 1 is only the tip of a very big iceberg.

"With the passage of Cap and Trade there is a good chance that unemployment will be worse than 1933 by the end of 2010."

So writes an Econbrowser reader. Well, anything can happen, but that is not the outcome I predict. Nor the CBO, EPA, and other informed analysts.

From the CBO:

The incidence of the gains and losses associated with the cap-and-trade program in H.R. 2454 would vary from year to year because the distribution of the allowance value would change over the life of the program. In the initial years of the program, the bulk of allowances would be distributed at no cost to various entities that would be affected by the constraint on emissions. Most of those free allocations would be phased out over time, and by 2035, roughly 70 percent of the allowances would be sold by the federal government, with a large share of revenues returned to households on a per capita basis. This analysis focuses on the effect of the legislation in the year 2020, a point at which the cap would have been in effect for eight years (giving the economy time to adjust) and at which the allocation of allowances would be representative of the situation prior to the phase-down of free allowances. The incidence of gains and losses would be considerably different once the free allocation of allowances had mostly ended. Although the analysis examines the effects of the bill as it would apply in 2020, those effects are described in the context of the current economy --that is, the costs that would result if the policies set for 2020 were in effect in 2010.

On that basis, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the net annual economywide cost of the cap-and-trade program in 2020 would be $22 billion -- or about $175 per household. That figure includes the cost of restructuring the production and use of energy and of payments made to foreign entities under the program, but it does not include the economic benefits and other benefits of the reduction in GHG emissions and the associated slowing of climate change. CBO could not determine the incidence of certain pieces (including both costs and benefits) that represent, on net, about 8 percent of the total. For the remaining portion of the net cost, households in the lowest income quintile would see an average net benefit of about $40 in 2020, while households in the highest income quintile would see a net cost of $245. Added costs for households in the second lowest quintile would be about $40 that year; in the middle quintile, about $235; and in the fourth quintile, about $340. Overall net costs would average 0.2 percent of households' after-tax income.

From the EPA Analysis of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 H.R. 2454 in the 111th Congress (6/23/09):

The cap & trade policy has a relatively modest impact on U.S. consumers assuming the bulk of revenues from the program are returned to households.

• Average household consumption is reduced by 0.03-0.08% in 2015 and 0.10-0.11% in 2020 and 0.31-0.30% in 2030, relative to the no policy case.
• Average household consumption will increase by 8-10% between 2010 and 2015 and 15-19% between 2010 and 2020 in the H.R. 2454 scenario.
• In comparison to the baseline, the 5 and 10 year average household consumption growth under the policy is only 0.1 percentage points lower for 2015 and 2020.
• Average annual household consumption is estimated to decline by $80 to $111 dollars per year* relative to the no policy case. This represents 0.1 to 0.2 percent of household consumption.
• These costs include the effects of higher energy prices, price changes for other goods and services, impacts on wages and returns to capital. Cost estimates also reflect the value of some of the emissions allowances returned to households, which offsets much of the cap and trade program’s effect on household consumption. The cost estimates do not account for the benefits of avoiding the effects of climate change.
• A policy that failed to return revenues from the program to consumers would lead to substantially larger losses in consumption.

While this analysis contains a set of scenarios that cover some of the important uncertainties when modeling the economic impacts of a comprehensive climate policy, there are still remaining uncertainties that could significantly affect the results.

*Annual net present value cost per household (discount rate = 5%) averaged over 2010-2050 under the core scenario

Here's a set of graphs and figures detailing these results.

Of course, this tabulation only includes the costs. In order to do a benefit-cost analysis, one would need to know the benefits of avoiding global climate change associated with green house gas emissions. CBO has its recent analysis Potential Impacts of Climate Change in the United States (May 2009).

Despite the wide range of projected impacts of climate change over the course of the 21st century, published esti­mates of the economic costs of direct impacts in the United States tend to be modest.110 Most of the economy involves activities that are not likely to be directly affected by changes in climate. Moreover, researchers generally expect the U.S. economy to grow dramatically over the coming century, mainly in sectors (such as information technology and medical care) that are relatively insulated from climate effects. Damages are therefore likely to be a smaller share of the future economy than they would be if they occurred today. As a consequence, a relatively pessi­mistic estimate for the loss in projected real (inflation-adjusted) U.S. gross domestic product is about 3 percent for warming of about 7 degrees F by 2100. 111

However, such estimates tend to mask larger losses in subsectors of the economy. Some sectors in certain regions are likely to bear sizable costs requiring significant adjustments and adaptations, and a few sectors in a few regions may be eliminated altogether. Even at the low end of the projected range of warming, for example, changing winter conditions would cut the Western ski season by up to four months and would virtually eliminate the Eastern snowmobiling season.112

...

The most comprehensive published study includes estimates of nonmarket damages as well as costs arising from the risk of catastrophic outcomes associated with about 11 degrees F of warming by 2100. That study projects a loss equivalent to about 5 percent of U.S. output and, with substantially larger losses in a number of other countries, a loss of about 10 percent of global output.116

CBO has a lot of its analyses compiled here; EPA here. EIA has lots of analyses of previous climate change and other legislation here.

When President Obama's administration released the proposed budget for the upcoming fiscal year, drug stocks quickly dropped. Fears of socialized medicine, or "Hillary-Care 2.0" turned investors away from the sector.

Was the drop warranted?

There are 6 key components to healthcare reform that could have a meaningful impact on pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies in the near future.Four of these are potentially negative, whereas the other 2 are potentially positive.

First Potential Negative: Increasing Pricing Rebates

The new proposal calls for an increase in Medicaid rebates from the current level of 15% to 21%. This equates to a 6% decrease in pricing power by all the companies in our universe into the Medicaid market. If we delve deeper into the ramification of this action, we see that the potential earnings impact for most large pharmaceutical companies is in the area of 1%, at most.

Most pharmaceutical companies average roughly 5% to 20% of their U.S.business to Medicare / Medicaid. Some companies, including Wyeth (WYE), Pfizer (PFE), and Abbott Labs (ABT) are on the low-end, whereas others, such as Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMY), Eli Lilly (LLY), Merck (MRK), and Gilead (GILD) are on the high-end.

The overall impact to the top-line is muted significantly for companies with greater sales outside the U.S., including PFE, ABT and Johnson & Johnson (JNJ).

Notice Abbott and Pfizer are on the right side of that list twice, low exposure to Medicaid, high percent of sales outside the U.S. But nevertheless, we would classify the 1% EPS risk associated with increased pricing rebates as mostly bark, only a tiny bite.

Segment Analysis For Top Drug Companies
Company	% U.S. Revenues*	Est. % Govt. Biz	% At Risk Exposure
Abbott Labs	48%	~8%	~4%
Bristol-Myers	59%	~14%	~9%
Johnson & Johnson	51%	~9%	~5%
Merck & Co.	56%	~10%	~6%
Schering-Plough	30%	~8%	~3%
Eli Lilly & Co.	54%	~18%	~10%
Pfizer, Inc.	42%	~6%	~3%
Wyeth, Inc.	47%	~5%	~2%
*Revenues include all operations, not just Pharmaceuticals

Second Potential Negative: Biologic Generics

It is clear that we will have some sort of path to approval for generic biologic drugs, or "biosimilars," in the near-future. New draft legislation is expected to call for 10 years of market data exclusivity for new biologic drugs - a victory for the biotech industry as Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA), Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, recently introduced a bill calling for only 5 years of data exclusivity.

But biosimilars will not be as devastating to biotech products as generics were to small molecules. Manufacturing biologic drugs is significantly more cost prohibitive and knowledge intensive than small molecules.

Biotechnology companies themselves often struggle with manufacturing scale-up and meeting demand. Manufacturing Eli Lilly's Erbitux or Amgen's (AMGN) Enbrel is no easy task. There are few generic manufacturers with the necessary expertise, or capital required, to manufacture large batches of biosimilars.

And, there are significant additional hurdles. If the FDA will require proof of bioequivalency, then generic manufacturers will need to start doing costly large-scale clinical trials - something most will shy away from doing. Conversely, if the FDA does not require a bioequivalency study, we believe most doctors will shy away from using the "biosimilar" products because they know the complexity of the manufacturing process and have no proof that the generic Aranesp really is identical to the branded Aranesp.

It's a catch-22 that generic companies looking to break into the biologic market will have to deal with.

That being said, firms with potentially the biggest risk exposure to generic biologic legislation include Amgen and Biogen Idec (BIIB). Teva Pharmaceuticals (TEVA) is most likely the biggest winner.

Top Biologic Drugs And Their Patent Expiration
Neupogen (Amgen)	2013	Neulasta (Amgen)	2015
Aranesp (Amgen)	2014	Enbrel (Amgen)	2012
Myozyme (Genzyme)	2016	Fabrazyme (Genzyme)	2015
Herceptin (Roche)	2019	Avastin (Roche)	2018
Rituxan (Roche)	2018	Lucentis (Roche)	2018
Erbitux (Eli Lilly)	2017	Remicade (J&J)	2014
Humira (Abbott)	2016	Synagis (AstraZeneca)	2018

Third Potential Negative: Drug Reimportation

A consortium of 4 Senators (Dorgan D-ND, Stabenow D-MI, McCain R-AZ, and Snowe R-ME) introduced in early March 2009 the, "Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act." The bill would allow U.S.-licensed pharmacies and drug wholesalers to import FDA-approved medications from Canada, Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Japan - areas where drug prices are on average 35% to 55% lower than in the U.S. The legislation would also allow individual consumers to purchase prescription drugs for personal use from safe, reliable, FDA-inspected Canadian pharmacies.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the bill would save American consumers $50 billion over the next decade, including more than $10 billion in federal government savings. If we assume the savings are linear, or average roughly $5 billion per year, that represents approximately 2% of the total U.S. $250 billion pharmaceutical market. The EPS impact from a 2% haircut to the top-line of each pharmaceutical company, assuming drug reimportation hits everyone equally, is extremely manageable, and will most like average no more than 1% to 2% per company if enacted.

Fourth Potential Negative: Tax Reform

(This also the one with the most teeth.) .

Tax reform has little to do with fixing the healthcare system and more to do with closing loopholes and going after drug company's profits directly.  It is also by far the most socialistic approach to the problem, as we would classify drug reimportation and biosimilars as more capitalistic approaches.

Over the past several years large-pharmaceutical companies have gotten quite good at lowering their effective tax rates thanks to foreign subsidiaries and R&D credits. In fact, the average tax rate using the 14 largest U.S-based pharmaceutical and biotech companies in 2008 was 23%.

It is possible that the President's proposal could raise the effective rate for each firm to 30% by closing these loopholes and cutting R&D tax credits.

That equates to a 7% increase in effective tax rate for the average company, or as much as a 20% to 30% decrease in net income. The details on the tax reform aspect to President Obama's proposal have yet to be divulged, but this does have the potential to be a significant negative for our coverage universe.

2008 Tax Rates for Top U.S. Drug Companies
Abbott Labs	22%	Amgen	22%
Bristol-Myers	22%	Alcon, Inc.	15%
Genentech	36%	Biogen Idec	29%
Genzyme	34%	Gilead Sciences	27%
Johnson & Johnson	23%	Eli Lilly & Co.	21%
Merck & Co.	17%	Pfizer, Inc.	22%
Schering-Plough	15%	Wyeth, Inc.	30%

It's not all potentially bad news though with respect to healthcare reform.We see two potentially very positive changes that could emerge as a result of new legislation.

First Potential Positive: New Research Funding

In early March 2009, President Obama reversed a standing executive order from the previous administration by lifting the federal ban on human clinical testing of embryonic stem cells. This opens the door to potentially billions of dollars in government funding for this new, and potentially breakthrough, platform.

Stem cell companies, although mostly small and unprofitable, are the biggest direct beneficiary of the news. However, big pharmaceutical companies are clearly interested in stem cell research, and with a significantly more friendly administration in control, we may see a big push in this area in the coming years.

Besides opening up funding for stem cell research, the Obama administration has made it clear it wants to see additional increases in funding for infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis-C, as well as for cancer and obesity-driven diseases such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease.  At this point, similar to the proposed tax reform, the details are thin. How much money the government will spend and who will get the money remains to be seen, but Genzyme (GENZ) and Gilead would seem to be the two biggest beneficiaries of increased funding in their core areas.

Second Potential Positive: Increase Coverage

This is the "no-brainer" when it comes to how universal healthcare would benefit big drug companies. There are an estimated 40 million people living in the U.S. without health insurance. Opening up some sort of government sponsored program that would insure even half of these people would be a significant revenue driver. We would view this as a systemic benefit across the entire universe of healthcare companies.

Potentially another 20 million Americans looking to use prescription drugs could mean as much as another $25 billion in drug sales per year. That would equate to an increase of over 10% in 2010. Therefore, even if pricing drops by 6% and reimportation takes down sales by another 2-3%, the net top-line impact of Obama's healthcare reform may be negligible if the size of the target market increases.

Healthcare Reform Is Necessary

Fixing healthcare, or at least starting on a long-term solution, is at the center of President Obama's plans for the next 4 years, and for good reason.

According to the National Center for Policy Analysis, the unfunded liability associated with Medicare / Medicaid is roughly 7x that of the current unfunded liability for Social Security. By 2030, it grows to 15x the size.

Social Security may be the "third rail" in American politics, but Medicare / Medicaid is the train bearing down on the tracks.

Still Waiting on the Details

It is also critical to realize that many of the details to President Obama's proposal have yet to be ironed out. That debate will take place on the floor of the House and Senate over the next few months.

What was released last month was more a broad stroke, sweeping legislation, plan of action. The President called for a $634 billion healthcare reform reserve fund over 10 years aimed at fixing many of the problems that exist with the current system. This $634 billion is paid for through $318 billion in tax increases on Americans earning over $250,000 and $316 billion in savings to be squeezed from drug makers, hospitals and managed-care companies.

The net result of healthcare reform is likely to be limited on big pharmaceutical earnings.

As noted above, the effective tax rate change has the potential to take the biggest bite out of profits. What we may end up seeing is a small reduction in revenue growth rates for the largest firms by 2% to 4%, with almost this entire drop hitting the gross margin line. Operating margins are likely to remain stable as most of the company look to cut costs and synergize through mega-mergers (Pfizer-Wyeth, Merck-Schering, Roche-Genentech). The mega-merger trend should continue, with names like Bristol-Myers, Eli Lilly, Sanofi-Aventis (SNY), and AstraZeneca (AZN) most likely the next to jump into the fray. Net margins could take a hit if tax rates increase, which would certainly have a negative impact on earnings, but we expect that this type of broad-based impact to the entire sector will have only limited impact on applied valuation multiples.

When the President's budget is finalized we should get a better sense on how the above 6 forces will impact each name individually. At this point, the fear of healthcare reform seems entirely more bark than bite. Although there is bite, the Amex Pharmaceutical Index is now down 13% YTD, and our calculations show that the expected earnings hit, excluding the tax rate issue, is significantly less.

Wishing you luck,
Jason Napodano, CFA
Senior Analyst, Zacks Equity Research

Jason covers the pharmaceutical industry for Zacks Equity Research. His article on how health care reform may impact the drug sector helps us view certain stocks in a new light.For example, Teva Pharmaceuticals is identified as a potential big winner with new generic biologic legislation. If you'd like to see Jason's in-depth research report on TEVA issued April 1, you may download now by starting a free trial to our Zacks Premium service.

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Even before the stimulus bill, the Congressional Budget Office was estimating deficits for the unified federal budget of nearly $1,186 billion for 2009 and $703 billion for 2010. On Friday CBO estimated that the new stimulus package would add another $185 billion to the 2009 figure and $399 billion for 2010. That would put the deficit at almost $1.4 trillion, or 9.6% of total GDP for 2009 and $1.1 trillion (7.6% of GDP) for 2010. Our World War II deficits were three times this size (as a percentage of GDP), but nothing since then comes even close. The 2007 deficit, for example, was only 1.2% of GDP.

Combined federal surplus (positive values) or deficit (negative values) as a percentage of GDP. Data source: 1950-2008 from FRED. 2009-2019 calculated from CBO projections ([1], [2]) by the author.

Recall that the government budget deficit is part of the accounting identity:

private saving + government budget surplus = investment + net exports

So, if the deficit increases as a fraction of GDP by 6% within two years, we're going to see adjustments in some combination of the other three terms of the same magnitude, that is, some combination of a plunge in private consumption, private investment, and net exports.

I take it as given that this is in part a policy response to a sharp drop in private consumption. From the point of view of the longer run objectives of policy, our goal should be to ensure that these higher rates of private saving persist and are used to fund an increase in investment and net exports, rather than finance an ongoing government budget deficit.

I grant that this is not a trivial thing to accomplish. Still, I wish I was hearing more consensus out of Washington that this is indeed the goal, and discussions of the best strategy for achieving it.

So what's your plan, you may ask? I've offered that here and here.

Technorati Tags: macroeconomics, economics, fiscal stimulus, deficit

The vertical axes in Figures 1 and 2 have been made conformable. What is clear is that in the Senate compromise version, (1) the green portion (tax provisions, approximately) of the bars is bigger, and (2) a larger proportion of spending takes place in the next 20 months. Is that a good thing? In combination, no. What will happen is that there will be more tax cuts that expand the already increasing deficit but will have minimal impact on aggregate demand; and less spending on things that will have a maximal impact on aggregate demand. (By the way, throwing in big tax cuts that have minimal effect on aggregate demand makes it more likely that one gets fiscal policy ineffectiveness, as shown in Case 3 in this post.) Figure 3 shows the relative costs of each bill normalized by GDP.

I want to point out that I have been consistent in arguing for getting the maximal impact on aggregate demand per dollar stimulus. [1], [2] It is even more important because of the incredible profligacy of the Bush Administration which as I have repeatedly noted constrained our options should times like the ones we are now experience arrive. [3] [4] I would observe that those who argued "no problems" with borrowing driven by massive tax cuts, and borrowing from China, have little credibility. Readers of Econbrowser will know of whom I speak (there's a pretty big overlap with those who are arguing against this stimulus package).

One observation is that it looks like the stimulus is more concentrated early on. But such an interpretation is misguided. Take a look at the components. The amounts in Div B "direct spending" provisions are very similar in the two bills. (Note: change of scale in axes.)

The big differences come in terms of discretionary spending (Division A) and tax revenue provisions (Division B - revenues).

Most pernicious in the "compromise" was the stripping out of transfers to the state. For this, there is no reason in terms of stimulating aggregate demand to limit this component. The propensity to spend would have been the highest out of these funds. And the spending would have occured fairly quickly. Indeed, in so many of the cuts to the original Senate bill, the wrong things were cut. And the wrong things were expanded, including most importantly tax provisions. That expansion in tax provisions is seen in Figure 6.

The tragedy is that so many of these tax provisions are clearly going to have little "stimulus" effect (e.g. homebuyer credit [5] [6]). But where is the Republican outrage on this count?

So, summing up, I can't see a reason to dissent with Krugman's assessment of what the "moderates" have given us.

The original plan also included badly needed spending on school construction; $16 billion of that spending was cut. It included aid to the unemployed, especially help in maintaining health care -- cut. Food stamps -- cut. All in all, more than $80 billion was cut from the plan, with the great bulk of those cuts falling on precisely the measures that would do the most to reduce the depth and pain of this slump.

Just to remind people, here are the ranges of estimates for multipliers for various types of measures, as provided by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office.

Just to remind us all of the stakes involved, take a look again at the vertical axis in Figure 3: it's the ratio to GDP. This "massive" stimulus bill is pretty small relative to GDP. And in the absence of a cost-effective stimulus bill, we are hurtling toward a negative output gap that -- in the post-War era -- is of unparallelled proportions, in terms of depth and duration.

Given what data has come out since January 7, I have no reason to believe the outlook is any better than what is provided in this picture.

While this has been a depressing weekend for those of us who believe that reason can triumph over sheer ignorance, at least it's provided plenty of examples of bad reasoning to dissect in macro class. (By the way, still looking for a reputable macroeconomist against a stimulus bill [7].)

I said out loud to the family, “This is interesting news! Bloomberg.com says, ‘The U.S. government’s borrowing needs will almost double to $2 trillion this fiscal year, prompting the Treasury to revive three-year notes and hold more frequent sales of 10- and 30-year debt, according to Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (NYSE:GS)’”

I forced a wooden smile onto my face as I stood up and slowly - so as not to draw attention to myself - started walking towards the…

Boo!

We begin today with a Halloween hypothetical: If you’re a mainstream economist or financial journalist, what’s the scariest possible scenario that could arise from an economic crisis?

Answer: That the ephemeral specter of the American consumer, whose purchases now make up over 70% of economic activity in I.O.U.S.A., would stop spending.

Uh-ho. In the third quarter of 2008, consumers reigned…

This from Oilver Garrett at Casey Research:

Doug Casey coined the term “Greater Depression” in his best-selling book Crisis Investing, published in 1979. Today, it resounds throughout the land; even CNN’s Glenn Beck recently used it in an op-ed piece. And the signs are increasing that a depression may indeed be what…

• American retirement plans have lost as much as $2 trillion, or 20% of their value, in the past 15 months, Peter Orszag, head of the Congressional Budget Office estimated yesterday (Tuesday). "Some people will delay their retirement. In particular, those on the verge of retirement may decide they can no longer afford to retire and will continue working," Orszag said.

• EBay Inc. (EBAY) said yesterday (Tuesday) that it will cut 10% of its work force and spend $1.3 billion to buy online payment and classified companies, in an effort to offset a slowdown in its web auctions business. The reduction is expected to incur restructuring charges of about $70 million to $80 million, but then save $150 million annually.

• Eli Lilly & Co. (LLY) yesterday (Tuesday) announced it will pay $62 million to 32 states and Washington D.C. to resolve an investigation into its marketing practices, The Associated Press reported. Lilly was accused of marketing its top-selling drug Zyprexa for off-label uses and inadequately disclosing the drug’s side effects to health care providers.

• Morgan Stanley (MS) and Japan’s Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc. (ADR: MTU) have received regulatory approval for the Tokyo-based bank’s $9 billion investment in the Wall Street firm. The U.S. Federal Reserve and other global regulators approved the deal, MarketWatch reported. Morgan Stanley also received antitrust approval from the U.S. government.

• The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted a worldwide economic slowdown in a report prepared for a Group of Seven meeting. “The global economy is entering a major downturn,” the IMF said in the report, dated Oct. 4 and obtained by Bloomberg News. “Many advanced economies are now close to recession, while emerging economies are also slowing rapidly.”

• Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC) will likely buy the bulk of Wachovia Corp. (WB) deposits, Reuters reported, citing an unnamed source. Citigroup Inc. (C) is expected to get 20% - 25% of Wachovia’s total deposits, with the remainder going to Wells Fargo, the news service reported, but cautioned that talks are ongoing and no deal has been finalized.

Source: Global Investing Roundups Wednesday, October 8th, 2008

"Over the past several weeks, the collapse of confidence in financial markets has become particularly severe. Short-term loans between financial institutions have fallen off sharply. Instead, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve have become the financial intermediaries for them. In other words, rather than financial institutions with excess money lending to institutions needing short-term funding, many institutions with excess short-term money have purchased Treasury securities, the Treasury has placed the proceeds on deposit at the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Reserve has then lent the money out to those institutions needing short-run funding."

The Central Bank has been forced to act like a regular bank.  This is not its normal function, but has stepped into the vacuum.

"Thus far, turmoil in the financial markets has had less impact on macroeconomic activity than may have been expected, and, indeed, economic growth was relatively strong in the second quarter of this year -- in part because of the stimulus package enacted earlier this year. A modern economy like the United StatesÂ’, however, depends crucially on the functioning of its financial markets to allocate capital, and history suggests that the real economy typically slows some time after a downturn in financial markets.

"Moreover, ominous signs about credit difficulties are accumulating. The issuance of corporate debt plummeted in the third quarter, and the short-term commercial paper market has also been hit hard. Bank lending, which has thus far remained relatively strong, will undoubtedly be severely curtailed by the difficulties that banks are facing in raising capital. Such a curtailment of credit means that businesses and individuals will find it increasingly difficult to borrow money to carry out their normal activities. In sum, the problems occurring in financial markets raise the possibility of a severe credit crunch, which could have devastating effects on the U.S. and world economies."

If you think things are bad on Main Street right now, you ain't seen nothing yet.  Soon it will be No Cash for Nobody.

"To mitigate the risks, the Department of the Treasury has proposed the Troubled Asset Relief Act of 2008, and similar proposals have also been put forward by the Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee and the Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee. In an analysis of these proposals, it is useful to identify two problems facing financial markets: illiquidity triggered by market panic and the potential insolvency of many financial institutions."

We have two basic problems: a deep underlying problem of insolvency of many major financial institutions and a liquidity problem on top of it.  With financial institutions, even solvent, well-capitalized firms can fail due to liquidity problems (classic "run-on-a-bank" scenario).  However, merely solving the liquidity problem will not get us out of the woods when the problem is insolvency.

"One problem is that the markets for some types of assets and transactions have essentially stopped functioning. To address that problem, the government could conceivably intervene as a 'market maker,' by offering to purchase assets through a competitive process and thereby provide a price signal to other market participants. (That type of intervention, if designed carefully to keep the government from overpaying, might not involve any significant subsidy from the government to financial institutions.)

"The second problem, though, involves the potential insolvency of specific financial institutions. By some estimates, global commercial banks and investment banks may need to raise a minimum of roughly $150 billion more to cover their losses. As of mid-September 2008, cumulative recognized losses stood at about $520 billion, while the institutions had raised $370 billion of additional capital...Restoring solvency to insolvent institutions requires additional capital injections, and one possible source of such capital is the federal government."

I would argue that the real sum needed to be raised is far bigger than the $150 billion he cites.  That figure might be the case if there were no more losses coming down the pike, and that is clearly not the case.

"Those two problems are related in the sense that it is difficult to know which institutions are insolvent without being able to value the assets they hold (which in turn is impeded by illiquid markets). Undisclosed losses are unlikely to be distributed uniformly throughout the financial system, and the inability to identify which institutions are carrying the largest losses has led to a breakdown of trust in the entire financial sector...

"That loss of trust has sharply increased the cost of raising capital and rolling over debt, which threatens the solvency of all financial institutions. Injecting more capital into financial institutions could help to restore liquidity to some financial markets, because, with larger cushions of capital to protect against default, the institutions would be more willing to lend to one another.

"Another linkage between these two problems could occur if some institutions are unwilling to sell assets at current market prices if that then triggered the recognition of accounting losses; such reluctance to sell can contribute to illiquid markets. With additional equity, those institutions may be more willing to sell at current market prices even if that required recognizing losses.

"Although the problems of illiquidity and insolvency are interrelated, they are at least conceptually distinct. Indeed, some policy proposals appear to be aimed primarily at the illiquidity of particular asset markets, and others appear to be aimed primarily at the potential insolvency of specific financial institutions."

While the two problems are inter-related, it is easier to understand if they are treated separately.

First, what is the source of the crisis? Is it as is asserted here in this statement from John McCain today?

....

There are certainly plenty of places to point fingers, and it may be hard to pinpoint the original event that set it all in motion. But let me give you an educated guess. The financial crisis we're living through today started with the corruption and manipulation of our home mortgage system. At the center of the problem were the lobbyists, politicians, and bureaucrats who succeeded in persuading Congress and the administration to ignore the festering problems at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

These quasi-public corporations lead our housing system down a path where quick profit was placed before sound finance. They institutionalized a system that rewarded forcing mortgages on people who couldn't afford them, while turning around and selling those bad mortgages to the banks that are now going bankrupt. Using money and influence, they prevented reforms that would have curbed their power and limited their ability to damage our economy. And now, as ever, the American taxpayers are left to pay the price for Washington's failure.

...

I certainly concur with the first sentence. But I do wonder about the assertion that the problem started with and is fundamentally driven by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. After all, neither of these two institutions were at the heart of the massive surge in subprime mortgages that are the most toxic component of these asset backed securities. Smarter people than me (Justin Fox, Tanta at CR h/t Mark Thoma) have been similarly dubious.

Moreover, the originating entities for these subprime mortgages were not Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, by large, but rather the banks that the Federal government refused to let state agencies regulate. Or the ones the Treasury's OTS itself failed to regulate. To refresh memories, consider this article from December 18, 2007 NYT:

WASHINGTON-- Until the boom in subprime mortgages turned into a national nightmare this summer, the few people who tried to warn federal banking officials might as well have been talking to themselves.

Edward M. Gramlich, a Federal Reserve governor who died in September, warned nearly seven years ago that a fast-growing new breed of lenders was luring many people into risky mortgages they could not afford.

But when Mr. Gramlich privately urged Fed examiners to investigate mortgage lenders affiliated with national banks, he was rebuffed by Alan Greenspan, the Fed chairman.

In 2001, a senior Treasury official, Sheila C. Bair, tried to persuade subprime lenders to adopt a code of "best practices" and to let outside monitors verify their compliance. None of the lenders would agree to the monitors, and many rejected the code itself. Even those who did adopt those practices, Ms. Bair recalled recently, soon let them slip.

And leaders of a housing advocacy group in California, meeting with Mr. Greenspan in 2004, warned that deception was increasing and unscrupulous practices were spreading.

John C. Gamboa and Robert L. Gnaizda of the Greenlining Institute implored Mr. Greenspan to use his bully pulpit and press for a voluntary code of conduct.

"He never gave us a good reason, but he didn't want to do it," Mr. Gnaizda said last week. "He just wasn't interested."

Today, as the mortgage crisis of 2007 worsens and threatens to tip the economy into a recession, many are asking: where was Washington?

An examination of regulatory decisions shows that the Federal Reserve and other agencies waited until it was too late before trying to tame the industry's excesses. Both the Fed and the Bush administration placed a higher priority on promoting "financial innovation" and what President Bush has called the "ownership society."

...

On Tuesday, under a new chairman, the Federal Reserve will try to make up for lost ground by proposing new restrictions on subprime mortgages, invoking its authority under the 13-year-old Home Ownership Equity and Protection Act. Fed officials are expected to demand that lenders document a person’s income and ability to repay the loan, and they may well restrict practices that make it hard for borrowers to see hidden fees or refinance with cheaper mortgages.

It is an action that people like Mr. Gramlich and Ms. Bair advocated for years with little success. But it will have little impact on many existing subprime lenders, because most have either gone out of business or stopped making subprime loans months ago.

...

The Fed was hardly alone in not pressing to clean up the mortgage industry. When states like Georgia and North Carolina started to pass tougher laws against abusive lending practices, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency successfully prohibited them from investigating local subsidiaries of nationally chartered banks.

Virtually every federal bank regulator was loathe to impose speed limits on a booming industry. But the regulators were also fragmented among an alphabet soup of agencies with splintered and confusing jurisdictions. Perhaps the biggest complication was that many mortgage lenders did not fall under any agency's authority at all.

...

And for some more concrete examples of how deregulatory zeal had an effect, consider this account from the WSJ (March 22, 2007):

Regulators appointed by President Bush often have been more sympathetic to industry concerns about red tape than their Clinton administration predecessors. When James Gilleran, a former California banker and bank supervisor, took over the OTS in December 2001, he became known for his deregulatory zeal. At one press event in 2003, several bank regulators held gardening shears to represent their commitment to cut red tape for the industry. Mr. Gilleran brought a chain saw.

He also early on announced plans to slash expenses to resolve the agency's deficit; 20% of its work force eventually left. When he left in 2005, Mr. Gilleran declared that the OTS had "exercised increased diligence in its review of abusive consumer practices" while reducing thrifts' regulatory burden. But his successor, Mr. Reich, a former community banker, has reversed many of Mr. Gilleran's cuts. Citing "understaffing," he hired 80 examiners last year and plans to add 40 more this year. A spokeswoman for Mr. Gilleran, now chief executive of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle, said he wasn't available to comment.

So, from my perspective, locating the source of the current crisis in corruption/influence peddling surrounding Fannie and Freddie exhibits a misreading of recent history. (More important might have been lax monetary policy and the saving glut, and exemptions from capital requirements for certain investment banks... [see Ritholtz])

Second, how hard will the rescue be given the reckless decisions of the past? It seems that whatever entity is established to purchase these bad assets will require some fiscal outlay. Estimates are all over the place, given that there is so much uncertainty over how much the assets will be bought for and eventually sold; here is one account:

U.S. Debt May Grow $1 Trillion on Rescue, Barclays' Pond Says

By Sandra Hernandez

Sept. 19 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. may have to borrow an extra $700 billion to $1 trillion to fund the biggest rescue of the financial system since the Great Depression, according to Barclays Capital Inc.'s Michael Pond.

Federal takeovers of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and American International Group Inc.; the central bank's expansion of lending to financial firms; and a slowing economy will add $455 billion to the Treasury's borrowing needs, the New York-based interest-rate strategist estimated. Pond said Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's plan to rid banks of "hundreds of billions" of troubled assets would bring the amount to $700 billion assuming the plan costs $200 billion.

"We could easily add up to an additional trillion to the outstanding Treasury debt just from the initiatives announced over the past couple of weeks," said Pond, ranked the best Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities analyst in 2008 by Institutional Investor magazine.

The government's liabilities swelled in past weeks as policy makers sought to arrest a growing financial crisis by taking over financial institutions threatened by a shortage of capital.

The Treasury on Sept. 7 took over mortgage-finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and said it would buy mortgage-backed debt in the open market. The Fed this week boosted its Treasury auctions to bond dealers by $25 billion, loaned $85 billion to the insurer AIG, and quadrupled the amount of dollars foreign central banks can auction to $247 billion. Paulson today said the government will buy illiquid assets from banks' balance sheets and insure money-market mutual fund holdings.

Deficit Widens

"The odds of the deficit becoming enormous are certainly there," said Nils Overdahl, a bond fund manager in Bethesda, Maryland, at New Century Advisors, which oversees $500 million. "I suspect you will see issuance at a variety of maturities."

The deficit will likely widen to $650 billion in fiscal 2009 because of the U.S. rescue of Fannie and Freddie, analysts at JPMorgan Chase & Co. wrote in a Sept. 12 report.

Over the next decade, the gap between spending and receipts will swell to $5.3 trillion, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. analysts wrote Sept. 10, revising a previous forecast of $3.6 trillion. The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office forecast a record $438 billion deficit for 2009 on Sept. 9.

"The deficit will soar to enormous proportions,'' said Lou Crandall, the chief economist at Wrightson ICAP LLC in Jersey City, New Jersey. ``Even before this week's events, estimates based on visible factors were pointing to a deficit above $500 billion next year, with the prospect of billions of mortgage- backed securities on top of that."

See also this Bloomberg article.

Here, I want to return the issue I've brought up countless times before. We cut taxes, and we embarked upon a war of choice, and in addition to the opportunity and fiscal costs, this constrained our range of actions for the future. Even if you thought the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 "benefitted" the US economy on net, we know that the war in Iraq has cost on the order of $653 billion nominal dollars from FY03-FY0-09 [2] -- in current dollars that's even more given inflation. Those dollars could have been spent fixing the financial system. Now, we'll have to either borrow or tax to to finance the operation.

So, if you wanted the McCain extension of the Bush tax cuts, and the additional $1.3 trillion tax cuts, then you might wonder about the impact on US borrowing rates. If you were hoping for more domestic initiatives, perhaps to give tax relief to the lower and middle income households, or to invest in infrastructure, the borrowing constraints will be more binding than they otherwise would have been.

Perhaps that's obvious, but sometimes in the midst of crisis, the obvious bears repeating. Here's a picture to illustrate the budget balance outlook pre-intervention....

The purple square is just for illustrative purposes. If you think the Treasury will only have to borrow $350 billion in FY2009, then the orange square is relevant. Further, if we're lucky (and Brad Delong is right), in future years we will recoup all and more of these outlays, so the deficit will be smaller than otherwise. But, in the short run, we'll have to take a hit (of unknown magnitude) now and hope for the best.

Technorati Tags: , subprime, Fannie Mae, Freddie+Mac, and deregulation, Office of Thrift Supervision, and tax cuts.

First, what is the source of the crisis? Is it as is asserted here in this statement from John McCain today?

....

There are certainly plenty of places to point fingers, and it may be hard to pinpoint the original event that set it all in motion. But let me give you an educated guess. The financial crisis we're living through today started with the corruption and manipulation of our home mortgage system. At the center of the problem were the lobbyists, politicians, and bureaucrats who succeeded in persuading Congress and the administration to ignore the festering problems at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

These quasi-public corporations lead our housing system down a path where quick profit was placed before sound finance. They institutionalized a system that rewarded forcing mortgages on people who couldn't afford them, while turning around and selling those bad mortgages to the banks that are now going bankrupt. Using money and influence, they prevented reforms that would have curbed their power and limited their ability to damage our economy. And now, as ever, the American taxpayers are left to pay the price for Washington's failure.

...

I certainly concur with the first sentence. But I do wonder about the assertion that the problem started with and is fundamentally driven by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. After all, neither of these two institutions were at the heart of the massive surge in subprime mortgages that are the most toxic component of these asset backed securities. Smarter people than me (Justin Fox, Tanta at CR h/t Mark Thoma) have been similarly dubious.

Moreover, the originating entities for these subprime mortgages were not Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, by large, but rather the banks that the Federal government refused to let state agencies regulate. Or the ones the Treasury's OTS itself failed to regulate. To refresh memories, consider this article from December 18, 2007 NYT:

WASHINGTON-- Until the boom in subprime mortgages turned into a national nightmare this summer, the few people who tried to warn federal banking officials might as well have been talking to themselves.

Edward M. Gramlich, a Federal Reserve governor who died in September, warned nearly seven years ago that a fast-growing new breed of lenders was luring many people into risky mortgages they could not afford.

But when Mr. Gramlich privately urged Fed examiners to investigate mortgage lenders affiliated with national banks, he was rebuffed by Alan Greenspan, the Fed chairman.

In 2001, a senior Treasury official, Sheila C. Bair, tried to persuade subprime lenders to adopt a code of "best practices" and to let outside monitors verify their compliance. None of the lenders would agree to the monitors, and many rejected the code itself. Even those who did adopt those practices, Ms. Bair recalled recently, soon let them slip.

And leaders of a housing advocacy group in California, meeting with Mr. Greenspan in 2004, warned that deception was increasing and unscrupulous practices were spreading.

John C. Gamboa and Robert L. Gnaizda of the Greenlining Institute implored Mr. Greenspan to use his bully pulpit and press for a voluntary code of conduct.

"He never gave us a good reason, but he didn't want to do it," Mr. Gnaizda said last week. "He just wasn't interested."

Today, as the mortgage crisis of 2007 worsens and threatens to tip the economy into a recession, many are asking: where was Washington?

An examination of regulatory decisions shows that the Federal Reserve and other agencies waited until it was too late before trying to tame the industry's excesses. Both the Fed and the Bush administration placed a higher priority on promoting "financial innovation" and what President Bush has called the "ownership society."

...

On Tuesday, under a new chairman, the Federal Reserve will try to make up for lost ground by proposing new restrictions on subprime mortgages, invoking its authority under the 13-year-old Home Ownership Equity and Protection Act. Fed officials are expected to demand that lenders document a person’s income and ability to repay the loan, and they may well restrict practices that make it hard for borrowers to see hidden fees or refinance with cheaper mortgages.

It is an action that people like Mr. Gramlich and Ms. Bair advocated for years with little success. But it will have little impact on many existing subprime lenders, because most have either gone out of business or stopped making subprime loans months ago.

...

The Fed was hardly alone in not pressing to clean up the mortgage industry. When states like Georgia and North Carolina started to pass tougher laws against abusive lending practices, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency successfully prohibited them from investigating local subsidiaries of nationally chartered banks.

Virtually every federal bank regulator was loathe to impose speed limits on a booming industry. But the regulators were also fragmented among an alphabet soup of agencies with splintered and confusing jurisdictions. Perhaps the biggest complication was that many mortgage lenders did not fall under any agency's authority at all.

...

And for some more concrete examples of how deregulatory zeal had an effect, consider this account from the WSJ (March 22, 2007):

Regulators appointed by President Bush often have been more sympathetic to industry concerns about red tape than their Clinton administration predecessors. When James Gilleran, a former California banker and bank supervisor, took over the OTS in December 2001, he became known for his deregulatory zeal. At one press event in 2003, several bank regulators held gardening shears to represent their commitment to cut red tape for the industry. Mr. Gilleran brought a chain saw.

He also early on announced plans to slash expenses to resolve the agency's deficit; 20% of its work force eventually left. When he left in 2005, Mr. Gilleran declared that the OTS had "exercised increased diligence in its review of abusive consumer practices" while reducing thrifts' regulatory burden. But his successor, Mr. Reich, a former community banker, has reversed many of Mr. Gilleran's cuts. Citing "understaffing," he hired 80 examiners last year and plans to add 40 more this year. A spokeswoman for Mr. Gilleran, now chief executive of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle, said he wasn't available to comment.

So, from my perspective, locating the source of the current crisis in corruption/influence peddling surrounding Fannie and Freddie exhibits a misreading of recent history. (More important might have been lax monetary policy and the saving glut, and exemptions from capital requirements for certain investment banks... [see Ritholtz])

Second, how hard will the rescue be given the reckless decisions of the past? It seems that whatever entity is established to purchase these bad assets will require some fiscal outlay. Estimates are all over the place, given that there is so much uncertainty over how much the assets will be bought for and eventually sold; here is one account:

U.S. Debt May Grow $1 Trillion on Rescue, Barclays' Pond Says

By Sandra Hernandez

Sept. 19 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. may have to borrow an extra $700 billion to $1 trillion to fund the biggest rescue of the financial system since the Great Depression, according to Barclays Capital Inc.'s Michael Pond.

Federal takeovers of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and American International Group Inc.; the central bank's expansion of lending to financial firms; and a slowing economy will add $455 billion to the Treasury's borrowing needs, the New York-based interest-rate strategist estimated. Pond said Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's plan to rid banks of "hundreds of billions" of troubled assets would bring the amount to $700 billion assuming the plan costs $200 billion.

"We could easily add up to an additional trillion to the outstanding Treasury debt just from the initiatives announced over the past couple of weeks," said Pond, ranked the best Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities analyst in 2008 by Institutional Investor magazine.

The government's liabilities swelled in past weeks as policy makers sought to arrest a growing financial crisis by taking over financial institutions threatened by a shortage of capital.

The Treasury on Sept. 7 took over mortgage-finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and said it would buy mortgage-backed debt in the open market. The Fed this week boosted its Treasury auctions to bond dealers by $25 billion, loaned $85 billion to the insurer AIG, and quadrupled the amount of dollars foreign central banks can auction to $247 billion. Paulson today said the government will buy illiquid assets from banks' balance sheets and insure money-market mutual fund holdings.

Deficit Widens

"The odds of the deficit becoming enormous are certainly there," said Nils Overdahl, a bond fund manager in Bethesda, Maryland, at New Century Advisors, which oversees $500 million. "I suspect you will see issuance at a variety of maturities."

The deficit will likely widen to $650 billion in fiscal 2009 because of the U.S. rescue of Fannie and Freddie, analysts at JPMorgan Chase & Co. wrote in a Sept. 12 report.

Over the next decade, the gap between spending and receipts will swell to $5.3 trillion, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. analysts wrote Sept. 10, revising a previous forecast of $3.6 trillion. The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office forecast a record $438 billion deficit for 2009 on Sept. 9.

"The deficit will soar to enormous proportions,'' said Lou Crandall, the chief economist at Wrightson ICAP LLC in Jersey City, New Jersey. ``Even before this week's events, estimates based on visible factors were pointing to a deficit above $500 billion next year, with the prospect of billions of mortgage- backed securities on top of that."

See also this Bloomberg article.

Here, I want to return the issue I've brought up countless times before. We cut taxes, and we embarked upon a war of choice, and in addition to the opportunity and fiscal costs, this constrained our range of actions for the future. Even if you thought the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 "benefitted" the US economy on net, we know that the war in Iraq has cost on the order of $653 billion nominal dollars from FY03-FY0-09 [2] -- in current dollars that's even more given inflation. Those dollars could have been spent fixing the financial system. Now, we'll have to either borrow or tax to to finance the operation.

So, if you wanted the McCain extension of the Bush tax cuts, and the additional $1.3 trillion tax cuts, then you might wonder about the impact on US borrowing rates. If you were hoping for more domestic initiatives, perhaps to give tax relief to the lower and middle income households, or to invest in infrastructure, the borrowing constraints will be more binding than they otherwise would have been.

Perhaps that's obvious, but sometimes in the midst of crisis, the obvious bears repeating. Here's a picture to illustrate the budget balance outlook pre-intervention....

The purple square is just for illustrative purposes. If you think the Treasury will only have to borrow $350 billion in FY2009, then the orange square is relevant. Further, if we're lucky (and Brad Delong is right), in future years we will recoup all and more of these outlays, so the deficit will be smaller than otherwise. But, in the short run, we'll have to take a hit (of unknown magnitude) now and hope for the best.

Technorati Tags: , subprime, Fannie Mae, Freddie+Mac, and deregulation, Office of Thrift Supervision, and tax cuts.