A few days ago the Russian mainstream media were talking about all the agreements reached with Turkey during the most recent visit of the Prime Minister, hailing the accords as the latest Putinite achievement. Supposedly positive but vague results were achieved with respect to negotiations on the construction of the South Stream and Blue Stream gas pipelines; on the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline, as well as the construction of nuclear power stations. In covering the Turkey visit, they showed the joy of Turkish and Italian prime ministers in signing these deals, and the unintelligible babble of the Russian one, who was able to clearly express a thought about how the Turks - are "difficult negotiators."

But so many gas pipelines -

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Why would Turkey sign on to a massively expensive and redundant underwater pipeline that would eliminate the transit business at the lucrative but over-trafficked Bosporus Straits?  Because when it comes to Gazprom and Eni's South Stream, it is very different to say you support it than it is to actually build it.  Nabucco is likely to work, and looks like it will find the gas to fill capacity - but not before Ankara does everything possible to milk both sides for the maximum concessions.These editors at Zaman don't quite get the issue right, but there is enough perspective here to get an idea of the Turkish mentality on Russian energy politics (resentful of the perceived mistreatment ...

Given all the news this week of Russia and Italy's South Stream deal with Turkey in exchange for a nuclear power plant, I thought I would repost an article written by Robert Amsterdam last fall in Energy Risk on Turkey's political pipelines.

FROM OCT. 2008, ENERGY RISK:

Turkey's political pipelines

Turkey's strategic position at the crossroads of East and West has put it at the centre of a geopolitical tug of war, with energy supply a key driver. Robert Amsterdam examines the energy policies being brought to bear in the region

Turkey's role in global affairs is defined by its geostrategic importance as the bridge between Europe and the Near East. Following Russia's invasion and occupation of Georgia in August, which caused considerable energy supply jitters, Turkey was once again thrust into the spotlight as the European

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When I'm abroad, I often get asked who of the leaders of the Russian opposition I think stands out in some way. Usually I name Boris Nemtsov, Garry Kasparov, and Vladimir Ryzhkov. In doing so I always reiterate that I am not a political scientist, not a specialist, not an expert, and god knows not some kind of maven on the subject of Russian political reality... My opinion, it is absolutely subjective, as such I'll explain some of my perspectives before getting into this interview, so the reader knows what they are getting.

Если Вы хотите прочитать оригинал данной статьи на русском языке, нажмите сюда.

Personal impressions play a role: I am acquainted with Vladimir

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On the eve of the recent visit of Vladimir Putin to Helsinki, a presentation of my film about the Nord Stream gas pipeline took place there in the parliament of Finland. The crowd wasn't very large - maybe 30 people.  However among the small audience was one of Nord Stream's top representative in Finland, Sebastian Sass. Young, energetic, and self-assured to the point of cockiness, Sebastian had previously been an assistant to the former Prime Minister of Finland Paavo Lipponen.  Lipponen, as our readers are aware, is the second head of state to leave politics and end up employed (indirectly) by the Russian government.  His duties include serving as the main interlocutor between the pipeline project and the Finnish government, "in order

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Ariel Cohen has a piece on Eurasian pipelines in today's New York Times:

Despite the recession, Russia is moving with the Blue Stream and South Stream projects across the Black Sea to Turkey and Bulgaria in order to keep market share. Gazprom is enhancing its influence in Ankara at the highest levels.

Much-ignored, the role of Turkey in Eurasian energy transit is also crucial. Turkish intransigence has delayed and reduced in size the development of the Caspian off-shore Shah Deniz gas project.

Ankara has also placed daunting conditions of the construction of the proposed Nabucco gas pipeline from Turkey to Europe, which is meant to provide an alternative to Russian-controlled gas, linking the project with Turkey's membership in the European Union, acquiring large amounts of Azeri gas for re-export and using the line for Russian and Iranian gas.

Despite all these factors, the United States and Europe should not lose sight of the strategic ...