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	<title>Stock Market News &#38; Stocks to Watch from StraightStocks &#187; bank bailout</title>
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		<title>Snapshot Observations on the Global Economic Crisis</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-lessons/snapshot-observations-on-the-global-economic-crisis/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-lessons/snapshot-observations-on-the-global-economic-crisis/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2009 18:59:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Robert Amsterdam</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Investing Lessons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Angela Merkel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Angela Merkel's government;]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bank bailout]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bank loans]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bank of england]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Brazil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[central bank]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chancellor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cnn]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[David Goldman;]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economist]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Electricity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gas and oil prices]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geir Haarde]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gordon Brown]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[guarantee bank assets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iceland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Monetary Fund]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Japan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mexican government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mexico]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Natural Gas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Obama administration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oil Exports]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[oil-driven economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Premier Wen Jiabao's government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[president]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Silva's administration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Taro Aso]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Bank of Japan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Time Warner]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[typical old-media fashion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U .S. Federal Reserve;]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Kingdom]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Wen Jiabao]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[wide scale insurance program]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[CNN Money is running an interesting feature by David Goldman entitled "10 countries, 10 solutions" which details the particularities of the global economic crisis facing 10 key countries. In typical old-media fashion, the layout makes no sense from a user-friendliness...]]></description>
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		<title>New Unemployment Claims Rise &#8211; Analyst Blog</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/stock-watch/new-unemployment-claims-rise-analyst-blog/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/stock-watch/new-unemployment-claims-rise-analyst-blog/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2009 15:12:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Dirk Van Dijk</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Market Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stocks to Watch]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Analyst]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bank bailout]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[food bank]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[food bank bailout]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kroger]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New York Times]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Salvation Army;]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[unemployment insurance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Wal Mart]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zacks Market Commentaries]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/23002/New+Unemployment+Claims+Rise+-+Analyst+Blog</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<br />
New claims for unemployment insurance rose last week to 584,000 -- an increase of 25,000. However, the 4-week moving average of this volatile series fell to 559,000, a decline of 8,250.<br />
<br />
As the chart below (from <a href="http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/">http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/</a>) shows, the 4-week average looks to be well past its peak both in terms of time (16 weeks) and level (almost 100,000 below peak levels). This is significant in that it makes it increasingly unlikely that April was a false peak. Also, note the relationship of past peaks to the blue recession bars.<br />
<br />
Historically, peaks in the 4-week average of new claims have come close to or at the end of recessions. As the experience of the last two recessions shows, though, it is not always a smooth decline, and the 4-week average can rise again, but as long as it doesn&#8217;t hit a new high for the cycle, it does not negate the end of recession signal.<br />
<br />
With this week&#8217;s reading being above the 4-week average (and last week&#8217;s being right at the 4-week average, as of now), it would not be surprising to see a small increase in the average next week. A new claims reading above 569,000 next week would bring this about. And that might be the start of something like the pattern we saw in the last two recessions, where claims stayed elevated for a long time after the recession was officially over, but never hit new highs -- sort of a mesa-shaped mountains.<br />
<br />
There was further good news as continuing claims for regular state unemployment benefits fell to 6.194 million, a drop of 54,000. That was somewhat offset by an increase in those getting emergency extended benefits of 24,500 to 2.657 million.<br />
<br />
It is hard to say, though, exactly why the continuing claims are coming down. If it is because people are finding new jobs, that is extremely good news. If it is because the benefits have simply run out, that is very bad news -- and points to a rise in poverty.<br />
<br />
It is hard to last long in this society with no income whatsoever coming in, which is essentially the fate of those whose benefits expire before they find new jobs. It is possible that many of them have turned to the underground economy, but more likely they are just going to have to cut back their consumption even more. The have probably long ago switch from shopping at <strong>Macy&#8217;s </strong>(<a href="http://www.zacks.com/stock/quote/m">M</a>) to <strong>Wal-Mart </strong>(<a href="http://www.zacks.com/stock/quote/wmt">WMT</a>); now they will have to shop at the Salvation Army and go to the food bank rather than <strong>Kroger&#8217;s </strong>(<a href="http://www.zacks.com/stock/quote/kr">KR</a>). <br />
<br />
The unemployment report that is due out on Friday, August 7th will help shed some light on which path away from continuing claims people are taking. If it is because people are finding new jobs it will be a very positive sign for the economy. However, one of the more noteworthy features of this recession has been the very long duration of unemployment once people get their pink slips.<br />
<br />
The median duration of unemployment in June was 17.9 weeks, a level that has completely shattered the old records, up from just 10.3 weeks at the start of the year. If that level continues to rise in next week&#8217;s employment report, it will be evidence that people are leaving the continuing claims pool for the &#8220;wrong" reason.<br />
<br />
The second graph shows the history of the mean and median unemployment duration. Since both tend to peak well past the end of recessions I suspect that more people are leaving the continuing claims pool for the &#8220;wrong" reasons.<br />
<br />
While the stimulus package has helped somewhat (see today&#8217;s New York Times) we may need a food bank bailout to follow the big bank bailout. That would help people who are in real need, and would cost taxpayers far less.<br />
<br />
<img src="http://www.zacks.com/images/upload_dir/1248962367.jpg" alt="" /><br />
<img src="http://www.zacks.com/images/upload_dir/1248962402.jpg" alt="" /><br /><a href="http://register.zacks.com/ucd/step1.php?ALERT=YAHOO_ZR&#38;d_alert=rd_final_rank&#38;ADID=GENSYND_ZER&#38;t=M">Read the full analyst report on "M"</a><br /><a href="http://register.zacks.com/ucd/step1.php?ALERT=YAHOO_ZR&#38;d_alert=rd_final_rank&#38;ADID=GENSYND_ZER&#38;t=WMT">Read the full analyst report on "WMT"</a><br /><a href="http://register.zacks.com/ucd/step1.php?ALERT=YAHOO_ZR&#38;d_alert=rd_final_rank&#38;ADID=GENSYND_ZER&#38;t=KR">Read the full analyst report on "KR"</a><br /><a href="http://www.zacks.com">Zacks Investment Research</a><br />]]></description>
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		<title>Did the ECB Save COMEX from Gold Default?</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/gold-markets/did-the-ecb-save-comex-from-gold-default/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/gold-markets/did-the-ecb-save-comex-from-gold-default/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2009 13:07:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Alex Stanczyk</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Gold Markets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Alex Stanczyk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Angela Merkel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Avery Goodman;]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bank]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bank bailout]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bank speculators;]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bundesbank]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[central bank]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central Bank Gold]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[commodities futures trading commission]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deutsche Bank]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Eastern Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Central Bank]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Federal Reserve System]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gold short sellers;]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Ireland]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[long buyers;]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[particular bank;]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[printing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Real Estate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Real Estate Bubble]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Short Sellers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Spain]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[yellow metal]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.rapidtrends.com/blog/?p=1313</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Avery Goodman
On Tuesday morning, gold derivatives dealers, who had sold short in the face of a fast rising gold price, faced a serious predicament. Some 27,000 + contracts, representing about 15% of the April COMEX gold futures contracts remained open. Technically, short sellers are required to give “notice” of delivery to long buyers. However, in [...]]]></description>
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		<title>Another Day, Another Trillion Dollars</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/another-day-another-trillion-dollars/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/another-day-another-trillion-dollars/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2009 22:48:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Bill Bonner</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Market Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Andrew Lilico;]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Baltimore]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bank]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bank bailout]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bill gross]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Connecticut]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[contrarian profits]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dow 30]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[e-letter]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Federal Reserve System]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Times]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Frank Rich;]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geithner;]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[House of Representatives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Herald Tribune]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[leftist newspaper;]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Liberation;]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[London]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[obama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[printing money]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[wall street]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zimbabwe]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.contrarianprofits.com/?p=15215</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[pAnother day…another bailout…another rally on Wall Street… And another milestone on the road to ruin./p
p“Geithner plan welcomed,” says the headline story in today’s Financial Times./p
p“Stocks rally on news of toxic assets proposal,” continues the commentary./p
pStocks did indeed rally. The Dow rose 497 points…putting some bounce back in the bounce. We’ve been expecting a healthy rebound. Normally, after such a long and steep sell-off, you can expect a rebound that recovers 30%-50% of the losses. We have not had such a rebound…yet. Maybe this is it./p
pOtherwise, the financial news is mixed. House sales in February were unexpectedly high. Then again, prices continued to fall./p
pAMEX looks like it is going to be downgraded…as credit card debt now looks as though it could#8230;/p]]></description>
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		<title>Finally, the plan … sort of</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/finally-the-plan-%e2%80%a6-sort-of/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/finally-the-plan-%e2%80%a6-sort-of/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2009 10:43:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Prieur du Plessis</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Market Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bank bailout]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bank rescue package]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bill king]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Emerald Isle;]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[richard russell]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sp 500]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Timothy  Geithner;]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.investmentpostcards.com/2009/02/11/finally-the-plan-sort-of/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner yesterday disappointed the markets with the lack of detail on the Financial Stability Plan. This post considers the reaction of stock markets and asks the question: "where to now?".

Please visit my website (by cl...]]></description>
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		<title>Spain&#8217;s Recession Deepens</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/global-economics/spains-recession-deepens/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/global-economics/spains-recession-deepens/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2009 19:58:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Edward Hugh</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bank]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bank bailout]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bank of Spain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Edward Hugh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gdp]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gross Domestic Product]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Spain]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8991369883287712098.post-1124144038894185537</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[by Edward Hugh: Barcelonabr /br /Spain's economy is now most evidently, and totally and completely officially, in its first recession since 1993. The final confirmation of this came yesterday when the Bank of Spain released a href="http://www.bde.es/informes/be/boleco/2009jan/coye.pdf"its quarterly report/a on the Spanish economy. According to the bank, gross domestic product fell by 1.1% in the final quarter of 2008 (over the previous quarter), following a 0.2% decline in the third quarter. GDP fell year on year by 0.8%.br /br /br /br /pa href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SYGrCxKfh7I/AAAAAAAAMaY/mL2jc8x2bF4/s1600-h/spain+GDP.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5296702700809848754" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 192px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SYGrCxKfh7I/AAAAAAAAMaY/mL2jc8x2bF4/s400/spain+GDP.png" border="0" //abr /Basically the report confirms a href="http://spaineconomy.blogspot.com/2008/12/as-spanish-unemployment-rises-sharply.html"my analysis in this post/a which suggested that while technically speaking the recession started on 1 July 2008, the contraction really started in July/August 2007, and it should have been really obvious to everyone by September of that year that the party was well and truly over./ppAccording to the Bank of Spain the main component driving the contraction in the second half of last year was household consumption, with the contraction in household expenditure accelerating in Q4 when compared with Q3. In particular, household consumption fell at a year-on-year rate of something over 1.5% in 2008 Q4, which meant that - taking the year as a whole - it was private consumption which contributed the most to the slowdown in GDP, to a greater degree even than the decline in residential investment (which was nonethelessdown 10% over the year). /ppbr /The slide in corporate investment also intensified in Q4, in large part as a result of the worsening economic outlook, the sluggishness of demand and the increasing uncertainty, all of this against a backdrop of financing conditions which were completely unfavourable to new business projects. As a result investment in equipment fell off markedly, by more than 7% year-on-year./ppbr /On the other hand the contribution of net external demand to GDP growth was positive in 2008 for the first time since 1997, and added at 0.7 percentage points, which compares with a negative contribution of 0.8 percentage points in 2007. This "improvement" was almost totally the result of a decline in imports, which fell much more sharply than exports.br /br /As a result of the recessionary environment, employment dropped by 0.5% in 2008 (which compares with an increase of 3.1% in 2007) and the unemployment rate climbed to an 11.3% average for the year as a whole (13.9% in Q4), according to the Labour Force Survey figures. /ppInflation slowed dramatically inthe last quarter of the year, with the CPI rising at a 4.1% for the year as a whole (up from the 2.8% average in 2007), although in the second half of the year it fell significantly, hitting a years low of 1.4% in December, the lowest figure since 1998. Indeed the HICP differential with the eurozone average ended the year negative on a negative footing (-0.1%) – the first time this has happened since the start of EMU. My guess is that we may well see a spike in inflation in January - due to the foolish increases in administered prices - after which we should steadily head deeper and deeper into price deflation territory.br /br /The drop in household consumption and fixed capital investment was also to some extent offset by a surge in government spending. The government sector sustained aggregated domestic consumption in 2008, with government consumption increasing at a 5% rate over the year a whole. As a result public finances deteriorated rapidly, and moved from a surplus of 2.2% of GDP in 2007, to a deficit of approximately 3.4% of GDP in 2008. The public debt ratio was up by 3.3% in 2008 and reached 39.5% of GDP. For 2009, the government now envisages a further increase in the deficit - at the moment estimated at 6% of GDP - although since this estimate is based on a forecast contraction of only 1.9% of GDP over the year and this is likely to be a strong underestimate (see below), the deficit could be 7% or 8%, even if there are no additional funds which need to be spent on the bank bailout (unlikely to be realistic, since more money than currently budgeted for may well be needed, as we are seeing in one country after another). If we get price deflation to boot, and thus a reduction in nominal GDP, then debt to GDP could easily be up by a full 10 percentage points in 2009.br //ppa href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SYGsfq5wVAI/AAAAAAAAMao/fxEn6GAWW2c/s1600-h/spain+GDP+2.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5296704296856867842" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 243px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SYGsfq5wVAI/AAAAAAAAMao/fxEn6GAWW2c/s400/spain+GDP+2.png" border="0" //abr /So what about the rate of contraction? Well at the present time, as I indicate above, the Spanish economy is contracting at an annual rate of 4.4%. Now, if we look at the manufacturing PMI (see below), we can see that this coincides with a monthly average reading of around 30 on the index over the quarter. So we could say that a reading of 30 means a contraction of about 5% a year (to begin to calibrate for the future) but this is probably an underestimate, since we have seen a sharp increase in government spending (which is not sustainable at this pace, or better put, we may sustain the present levels, but we simply can't keep increasing by 5% a year, so the impact of government spending will start to wane) plus we have seen, as mentioned above, a significant positive impact from the trade balance - estimated to have been of the order of 1.7 percentage points in Q4 (in other words without this favourable movement in nthe balance the contraction rate would have been much larger)./ppSo really, without these two factors - the imports slowdown and the increase in government spending - we could easily have been talking about a contraction at an annual rate of 7% plus, which is, well, very, very large. But this is what a 30 manufacturing PMI reading might mean as we go forward, so we had just better hope that the index starts to tick up, hadn't we. The next results (for January) are out next week. Watch this space.br /br /a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SYGrUGUt8JI/AAAAAAAAMag/jlVZVbaWfc4/s1600-h/spain+PMI.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5296702998547656850" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 219px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SYGrUGUt8JI/AAAAAAAAMag/jlVZVbaWfc4/s400/spain+PMI.png" border="0" //abr /br /br //p]]></description>
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		<title>Why Latvia Needs To Devalue Soon &#8211; A Reply To Christoph Rosenberg</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-in-europe/why-latvia-needs-to-devalue-soon-a-reply-to-christoph-rosenberg/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-in-europe/why-latvia-needs-to-devalue-soon-a-reply-to-christoph-rosenberg/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Jan 2009 17:28:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Manuel Alvarez-Rivera</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1443720106009957151.post-4880981900387477966</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The IMF Senior Regional Representative For Central Europe and the Baltics, Christoph Rosenberg, recently a href="http://www.rgemonitor.com/euro-monitor/254975/why_the_imf_supports_the_latvian_currency_peg"took me to task on RGE Monitor about my Latvian devaluation proposal/a (as did a href="http://www.rgemonitor.com/economonitor-monitor/254905/devaluation_in_latvia_why_not"RGE's own Mary Stokes/a), and I would like now to take a closer look at some of the points they raise.br /br /In the first place, I would like to say that I obviously regard both Chrisoph and Mary as excellent economists, and I was in no way refering to them when I said that arguing in favour of sticking to the present currency peg constitutes trying to justify “virtually the unjustifiable” according to “the implicit consensus among thinking economists.” I do still hold that the consensus is with me, but that certainly does not mean I regard those who differ from me as "unthinking", and certainly hope I didn't give the impression that I was. And with that little "mea culpa", let combat begin.br /br /And what better way to do this than by looking at Christoph's own arguments, (see below, and I hope I am being fair), although before I actually get into this part, let me "fast forward" to what I see as the three central issues involved: the timing and duration of the correction (that we all agree is needed), the role of Latvia's special demographics, and the distribution of the impact of the eventual debt restructuring between external stakeholders (the EU fiscal structure and the foreign banks) and Latvian state finances.br /br /strongV Shaped or U Shaped?/strongbr /br /As I see it, some of the force of Christoph and Mary's argument lies in the idea that there is little possibility of Latvia being able to succesfully carry out a V shaped correction at the present time due to the hostile global environment, thus it is better (my words not theirs') for Latvia to "mark time" to some extent between now and (say) 2012 (when possibly the external environment will be returning to some sort of normality, again my feeling, not theirs), and I understand the force of this point, I really do, it's just that I don't think Latvia's social fabric will be able to withstand the sort of pressure it is going to be put under (and a href="http://www.rgemonitor.com/euro-monitor/255121/violence_erupts_in_latvia"Edward Harrison has already highlighted this part/a, as I have in my longer post a href="http://globaleconomydoesmatter.blogspot.com/2009/01/long-and-difficult-road-to-wage-cuts-as.html"on the difficulties associated with introducing generalised wage reductions/a). The IMF report on the Stand-By Arrangement stresses time and again that political consensus is vital to carrying through the proposed "fixed-peg correction", and yet it seems as if a href="http://www.rgemonitor.com/euro-monitor/255306/political_unrest_on_the_rise_in_economically_troubled_hotspots"we are already running into difficulties on this front/a.br /br /br /Also, and to try to keep this simple and as non-technical as possible, we are simply dealing here with trade offs, trade offs between the accumulation of bankruptcy and non-performing loans on the one hand, and the attraction of new FDI for manufacturing industry and getting growth through exports moving on the other. The trick is to get the balance right.br /br /Now the U shaped recovery puts greater weight on the former, while the V shape one puts it on the latter, and I think the choice is as simple as that really. But I would also add in a further factor (to be explored a little more below), and this is the cost of waiting (there is strongalways/strong a cost to waiting) in terms of the demographic transition Latvia is living through (I am thinking about both out-migration and the impact of population ageing and Latvia's declining potential labour force). I suspect that part of the difference between us lies in the fact that Christoph and I attach different values to the cost of waiting in the Latvian case, and the roots of this difference lie, at least in part, on the differing theoretical frameworks we are using. To be blunt, I do not live in what I consider to be the rather timeless and abstract world of neo-classical steady-state growth and convergence theory (for all of which we have precious little meaningful empirical evidence across the EU27), but in the real historical time of ageing and shrinking populations, non-linear growth trajectories and windows of opportunity.br /br /Latvia has between now and 2020 to get rich before it gets starts to accumulate so many age-dependency-related on-costs that it may, if it doesn't put in a well-founded spurt now, quite simply never close the gap. So Latvia is living in real historical time, and not an abstract theoretical one, and in the former, if you don't seize the opportunities you are offered with both hands, then you may well simply end up as tyre rubber on the highway of history, enjoying momentary fame only to end up as a historical irrelevance. So although history doesn't simply keep repeating itself in a simple circular (or Poincaréan) fashion, tragedy is always tragedy, whether it is the first, second, third or nth time round.br /br /But perhaps "marking time" isn't really a fair analogy either, since obviously Christoph feels that the time in question can be put to good use - implementing structural reforms, rewriting the bankruptcy law to make debt restructuring easier, reducing wages and prices, etc, etc - but my worry is that all this will take place against a strongly contractionary atmosphere, with strong reductions not only in real GDP but also in nominal GDP - I mean if we are talking about a 5% plus contraction in real GDP, and (let's say, just as an example) a 3% reduction in the general price level, then we are talking about a drop of about 8% in the nominal value of GDP in 2009, and about another very large one in 2010, so let's be clear, these are contractions of a large order of magnitude (not far off the US 1930 - 33 ones) and my most serious doubt is about the ability of the Latvian social consensus to hold together through this, especially if there is no visible improvement in general conditions as a result. You need some sort of carrot, and not just good will.br /br /strongWage freezes Are more Palatable than Wage Cutsbr //strongbr /Now it may seem strange to adduce arguments from evolutionary psychology (not Evolutionary Psychology, please note) in a debate about macro economic policy, but I do feel that years and years of evolution have left us with a kind of asymmetric bias which means while we definitely (always and everywhere) don't like to see our wages and salaries actually cut, we have much less resistance to them being eaten away by price inflation (again, this is the whole point of Keynes's little tract "How To Pay For The War" - its just that this war is an economic and not a military one). So politically, it is easier in principle to maintain consensus around a devaluation which followed by tight controls on income, than it is to cut people's salaries outright. Another example which illustrates my point here comes from the recent German experience, where real wage deflation was effected over a number of years (1995 - 2005), and export competitiveness restored, by maintaining a wage freeze, and getting people (during the most significant part of this process) to agree to work more hours for the same money. But to do this in Latvia you need to be able to expand output and add jobs, which is why devaluation is, in my opinion, highly desireable. You cannot expect people to work for the same money and longer hours, and agree to the chap working next to them being dispatched off to the employment offices, things just aren't that simple in the real world.br /br /br /The bicycle is must easier to keep stable if you peddle forwards.br /br /strongThe Demographics Clinch It/strongbr /br /br /br /br /pa href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SU6x87sGovI/AAAAAAAAL1k/EnvJlub7-Io/s1600-h/latvia+population.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5282355073325114098" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 174px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SU6x87sGovI/AAAAAAAAL1k/EnvJlub7-Io/s320/latvia+population.png" border="0" //a /pbr /pSo this brings me to the biggest problem I have to the whole U shaped correction idea in the Latvian context. I will readily agree with Christoph when he says that the Latvian labour force is extremely nimble, and indeed it is especially so when it comes to packing its bags and heading off in the direction of the frontier in search of work abroad. In fact it is so nimble that it manages to do this without the Latvian statistical office even noting that the people have gone, that's how nimble they are.br //ppSo this is the outcome I really fear most, the one which means that when Latvia does eventually start to recover, this recovery will only take place with a time lag, and in the wake of an expansion in some key West European (and especially Nordic) economies, which will mean that their will be another loss of workforce in the slipstream their take off will create, a loss which can become a very serious drag on future growth, and indeed may well restrict even further the inflation-free level of sustainable growth for the entire Latvian economy. The chart below, which compares the Irish and the Latvian wage distributions comes from an earlier period (and indeed was prepared by the IMF itself), but it does give some idea of the problem, since there is a clear wage slope running across Europe from east to West, and much needed Latvian workers have an unfortunate tendency of trying to climb their way up it.br /br /(please click over image for better viewing)br /br //pa onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/RnrXR5IXIbI/AAAAAAAAAWE/wd9rpOvxEmQ/s1600-h/latvia+and+Ireland+wages.jpg"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5078608232207294898" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: pointer; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/RnrXR5IXIbI/AAAAAAAAAWE/wd9rpOvxEmQ/s400/latvia+and+Ireland+wages.jpg" border="0" //abr /So the situation envisaged in the "fixed-peg correction" - namely a period of negative economic growth and substantial wage contraction - will probably only produce yet another round of out-migration (although this time, in all probabity, it won't be to Ireland) which will in turn makes the domestic wage correction even more difficult to implement (another kind of 'vicious loop'). It is interesting to note that the IMF were raising this sort of issue with the Latvian authorities during the earlier overheating phase, but the Latvian solution (which prevailed at the time) was really to tolerate higher than desireable wage increases in order to disuade Latvians from leaving. So there is prior evidence that whatever the promises (and even, lets be generous, the good intentions) local governments find it very hard to stand in the path of their voters when these want social improvemnt, and indeed such vulnerability could come from the most compassionate and noble of motives, the problem is these are simply misplaced.br /br /strongDebt Restructuring A key Problem/strongbr /br /Here (see below) is the IMF Structural Roadmap a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=22586.0"as it appears in the latest report/a, and as can be seen, there is a heavy emphasis on the legislative changes needed to carry out the debt restructuring, which gives some idea of the important role this played in the decision making process.br /br /blockquote• Cabinet of Ministers to adopt decision that reforms controls over budget execution (December 31, 2008).br /• Adopt operational guidelines clarifying procedures for provision of emergency liquidity assistance (December 31, 2008).br /• National Tripartite Co-operation Council will establish a Committee to Promote Wage Restraint (January 31, 2009).br /• Review and, if necessary, revise regulations on emergency liquidity support (January 31, 2009)br /• Complete focused examination of the banking system (March 31, 2009).br /• Develop comprehensive debt restructuring strategy (April 30, 2009).br /• Amend banking laws to give FCMC, BoL and Government powers to restore financial stability in case of systemic crisis (June 30, 2009).br /• Adopt an amendment to the Budget and Financial Management law to strengthen financial responsibility, transparency and accountability (June 30, 2009).br /• Amend insolvency law to facilitate orderly and efficient debt restructurings (June 30, 2009)./blockquotepI have to say that I am really rather surprised at a numberof the things I found on reading a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=22586.0"the IMF report /ain detail. In particular I discovered that the true size of the 2009 annual fiscal deficit is going to be 17.3% and not the "mere" 4.9% that appears in the final budget accounts. This is not a problem of "massaging" (I am not suggesting that) but a by-product of the cost of bank restructuring - which involves recapitalisation and the acquisition of "troubled assets" - and these costs, under the new accounting rules, are classified as held to maturity, and not marked to market in terms of their valuation, nor, under the present convention do such liabilities appear as part of the headline fiscal deficit number. /ppNonethless Latvia's gross public debt is now set to rise, and dramatically. It is set to go up from 8.3% of GDP in 2007, to 14.3% in 2008 and to an estimated 46% in 2010. And this is all basically to pay for the bank bailout (which is estimated by the IMF to be likely to cost of $1.868 billon in 2009) and not in order to address issues in the broader economic crisis.br /br /The worrying part of all this is that if we don't get the best case scenario, and find ourselves, for example) not with a U- but with an L- shaped non-recovery, then this debt to GDP (and indeed even the annual fiscal deficit itself) may start to head above the EU 60% and 3% rules in 2011 or 2012, thus putting in jeopardy the IMF's own exit strategy for Latvia of eurozone membership. The IMF themselves go to some length to point out that the best case outcome critically depends on maintaining a political will which (as we are starting to see) may not be so strong as they were lead to believe at the time of making the agreement.br /br /The problem is that Latvia, apart from the internal credit boom, and the consequent housing bust and real economy contraction which follows (and which all three Baltic states "enjoyed" actually stands out from its Baltic peers in that it also became something of an offshore financial centre during the boom years. That is to say, there are shades of the Iceland or UK problem in the Latvian situation. I quote the IMF document:br /br /"Finally, standard debt sustainability analysis may not capture all of Latvia's characteristics, given its dependence on foreign bank borrowing for credit intermediation and its role as an offshore financial centre. First, Latvia's net foreign debt is much lower (around 70 percent of GDP), as it reinvests many of the non-resident deposits in assets overseas. The value and liquidity of these assets then becomes key. Second, much of its foreign borrowing is backed by domestic assets. Thus external debt sustainability will depend on whether these assets recover value and will be able to generate future returns to service the debt."br /br /As I read it, this means that Latvia is a miniture version of Iceland or the UK, and that as well as a macro consumption boom/bust disaster there is a non-domestic-loan recovery problem inside the banking system of some magnitude. As the IMF itself says the value and liquidity of Latvia's overseas assets is one of the "keys" to the problem. The other "key" depends on whether or not domestic assets recover their earlier value, an outcome which given even the internal price deflation strategy proposed by the IMF seems fairly unlikely, at least over the relevant time horizon./ppThe bank restructuring component is so expensive largely because the Latvian owned Parex bank (assets equivalent to more than 20% of GDP) was taken over by the government following a run on deposits and the consequent need to avoid default on the 775 million euros ($1 billion) of syndicated credits due in 2009. In fact the problems at Parex were one of the main reasons Latvia went to the IMF and EU for financial help in the first place - since in theory the issuers of the syndicated credit had the right to demand repayment of the debt immediately following a change in ownership at the bank, and the government needed the institutional support to be able to renegotiate and rollover the debt.br /br /As a result the Latvian authorities have been able to issue guarantee for the refinancing of isyndicated loans of EUR775 million due in 2009 (EUR275 million in February and EUR500 million in June). The credit ratings agencies, and in particular Fitch, believe that in the current global economic climate a rapid future sale of the bank difficult and that the government will have increasing difficulty in the future refinancing the syndicated loans. Moreover, the risk of further deposit withdrawals from Parex bank, especially by non-residents, will continue despite the effective nationalisation of the bank.br /br /The new Parex chairman Nils Melngailis was a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/privateEquityFinancialServicesAndRealEstate/idUSLB33129320081211"quoted recently as saying/a that the bank's value was anywhere between 2 lats ($3.65), the price the state paid to buy out the two previous owners, and 600 million euros. /ppIf all this is correct, then my guess is that we could even be eventually looking at the possibility of a Latvian sovereign default. I mean, personally speaking, I am pretty sure the medicine the IMF are administering just won't work (for the reasons I am putting forward) and that things will deteriorate. But sovereign default something I would never have imagined before I started digging a bit deeper into the whole situation. And the IMF should seriously be thinking about this. Latvia's level of public debt was previously very low, and then whooosh. Fitch seem to share this view, since they have maintained their negative outlook following last November's downgrade./pblockquoteFitch Ratings has today downgraded the Republic ofLatvia's long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)to 'BBB-' (BBB minus) from 'BBB', Long-term local currency IDRto 'BBB' from 'BBB+' and Country Ceiling to 'A-' (A minus) from'A'. The Short-term foreign currency IDR is affirmed at 'F3'.In addition, Fitch has placed Latvia's sovereign ratings onRating Watch Negative (RWN)./blockquotepbr /br /br //pa href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SX-IRFyv1dI/AAAAAAAAMZo/x_gK48k2DvA/s1600-h/latvia+median+age.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5296101514005173714" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 224px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SX-IRFyv1dI/AAAAAAAAMZo/x_gK48k2DvA/s400/latvia+median+age.png" border="0" //abr /br /Soon enough Latvia will have to face all the on-costs of pensions, health etc for the growing numbers of old people as the median age rises (see chart above). Claus Vistesen and I are busily trying to "calibrate" things here, since notionally Latvia's median age is a lot younger (41) than that of Japan, Italy or Germany (43). But then, on the other hand, Latvians live on average ten years less. So people stop working earlier, and since the really large health care costs are during the last 5 years of life, and this doesn't change substantially if those involved are between 65 and 70 or between 80 and 85. So there is an ageing "calibration" issue here - one which non of the multilateral agencies involved have yet taken on board as far as I can see. Also we need to move the saving and borrowing age ranges around a bit when we come to think about the life cycle (to adjust for shorter working lives etc).br /br /And this "just where is all the money from the loans going" issue is a much bigger question than simply a Latvian one. The IMF original loan to Hungary, for example, included HUF 600 billion (about 20% of the total loan) to be allocated to bank bailout plans, 50% of which was earmarked for capital injections while the other 50% was to be used for state guarantees for commercial banks. The government later boosted this HUF 300 billion guarantee fund to HUF 1,500 billion, however today it has been announced that more of the IMF loan facility may be used to back loans right up to the 1,500 billion HUF level - which surely gives us an indication of the severity of the problems they are having. But what concerns us here is that as a result of these and other measures Hungarian debt to GDP is now projected to rise (Januarry 2009 EU Commission forecast) from approximately 65% in 2009 to 79% in 2010, and of course there can be downside (or if you prefer, upside) on this. So both Hungary and Latvia look dead set to me to receive further credit downgrades, downgrades which will only serve to materially worsen the situation. And thus there is a considerable danger of a self-perpetuating downward spiral, especially if due to the weighting towards the bank problems the present package of measures simply don't work. People are vastly overestimating the power of longer term structural reforms in the context of such a sharp downturn. All very troubling.br /br /br /strongDeflation A Problem?/strongbr /p/ppAlso, there is another fundamental reason for devaluation, and that is the ability to regain control over an independent monetary policy, since handling a sharp and sudden deflationary shock may well be much harder with a fixed-wheel lock-in to the ECB benchmark rate. Ben Bernanke himself gave us a good example of how the sort of debt deflation process to which Latvia is going to be subjected works in practice, and why it is so dangerous in a modern economic context) a href="http://www.princeton.edu/svensson/und/522/Readings/Bernanke.pdf"in an early paper he wrote on Japan/a.br /br /emTo take an admittedly extreme case, suppose that the borrower’s loan (taken out prior to 1992) was still outstanding in 1999 , and that at loan initiation he had expected a 2.5% annual rate of increase in the GDP deflator and a 5% annual rate of increase in land prices. Then by 1999 the real value of his principal obligation would be 22% higher, and the real value of his collateral some 42% lower, then he anticipated when he took out the loan. These adverse balance-sheet effects would certainly impede the borrower’s access to new credit and hence his ability to consume or make new investments. The lender, faced with a non-performing loan and the associated loss in financial capital, might also find her ability to make new loans to be adversely affected. This example illustrates why one might want to consider indicators other than the current real interest rate—-for example, the cumulative gap between the actual and the expected price level—-in assessing the effects of monetary policy. It also illustrates why zero inflation or mild deflation is potentially more dangerous in the modern environment than it was, say, in the classical gold standard era. The modern economy makes much heavier use of credit, especially longer term. Further, unlike the earlier period, rising prices are the norm and are reflected in nominal-interest-rate setting to a much greater degree. Although deflation was often associated with weak business conditions in the nineteenth century, the evidence favors the view that deflation or even zero inflation is far more dangerous today than it was a hundred years ago./embr /br /And it seems Lavia is now about to enter a sustained period of price and wage deflation (and thus loan to income inflation) with no monetary and no fiscal tools to attack the problem.br /br //ppstrongOK, Now for Christoph's pointsbr //strongbr /1/ ema devaluation in Latvia would have severe regional contagion effects/em. I think that on this point we are all in basic agreement. On my view, the EU and the IMF need a coherent common strategy to address the whole situation in the East (at least across those countries who form part of the EU), and I think we are rapidly getting past the point where problems can be dealt with on a piecemeal basis. I mean. clearly some of the points here post date our earlier debate, but part of the foundation of my initial argument was that the whole situation was at risk of becoming so serious that nothing less than a concerted regional initiative would have the credibility and the robustness to work. It may be that outright eurosisation of the entire group maybe the only viable way to go, but I need to argue this separately and substantially, so I will not go into this further here). But, be that as it may, the leading question is that even if eurosiation is to be contemplated, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Bulgaria all need to come of their pegs and lower the parity at which they would enter, and even if the situation in each case is different, the problem is going to be the same, so my underlying point would be better to do this in a cordinated way, and indeed the decision by the Hungarian government to come off their band back in May could be seen as a first step in just this direction.br /br /This is doubly the case since when we talk about regional consequences, we can also talk about the regional effects of a strong devaluation of the UK pound, the Swedish krona, the Russian ruble, the Ukrainian hryvnia, the Czech koruna, the Hungarian forint, and the Polish zloty. Basically the economies in all the aforementioned countries all face a similar problem - domestic demand is down and they need to export, and they are all addressing this by the application of a mixture of devaluation and price deflation, and basically I don't see why the Baltics should be so different, and why we (or at least the IMF, the WB and the EU) don't treat the three Baltic states as one single group here.br /br /3/ emLatvia’s preference for the peg is strongly supported by all foreign stakeholders, including the EU and its Nordic neighbors..........it seems unlikely that they will cut their losses and pull out, as Japanese banks did during the Asian crisis./em Well, this is certainly the case, but it is not at all clear that these stakeholders could not be brought over to a devaluation strategy. There is currently a lively debate going on in Sweden about just how much responsibility the Swedish government and monetary authorities should accept in the context of what is happening in the Baltics (a href="http://www.balticbusinessnews.com/Default2.aspx?ArticleID=74b58ea8-76b7-46ed-acb2-286631e4a81bamp;open=sec"see here/a, and a href="http://www.balticbusinessnews.com/Default2.aspx?ArticleID=bdd51c19-f912-4a0f-b57c-d007fb49426c"here/a), and more significantly, the a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews/idUSLI39362320081218"Group Of Ten West European banks /awith most exposure to the CEE economies has started to lobby for an initiative from the ECB and the EU Commission to address the problem of the inevitable bank losses (since I take it we are agreed that the defaults will be no less on the internal deflation approach, and may well, as Krugman suggests, be greater as those who have borrowed in local currency are also forced into default).br /br /4/ emA devaluation would not significantly reduce Latvia’s external financing needs./em I am not sure about this. Obviously a devaluation which was sharp enough to remove all further worries about future devaluations would take a lot of pressure off the country's reserves. The shrinkage in the CA deficit would also, as you say, help a little, as would the fact that internal saving would start to improve domestic liquidity.br /br /While it would shrink the current account deficit further, private sector roll-over rates might not improve because the higher external debt to GDP ratio would likely result in credit agency downgrades to junk status and trigger the immediate repayment of most syndicated loans. I completely accept this point, but assume that the devaluation strategy would need to be accompanied by a loan restructuring package. Evidently this will be necessary in any event, on the devaluation variant they restructuring will come sooner, but against the difficulties this may present for a Latvian legal framework which is ill equipped to address the problems which will arise can be offset the advantages of getting all the bad news out of the way early.br /br /5/ emthere are advantages to a U-shaped adjustment via factor price compression over the V-shaped recovery that is often associated with a devaluation...../emChristoph makes the entirely valid point thatem /emLatvia’s banks (both domestic and foreign owned) and its legal system are at this point quite uprepared for the sort of stress a comprehensive debt restucturing process would put them under. By drawing the process of bankruptcies and nonperforming loan accumulation out a bit, Christoph argues, the authorities may well buy time to improve the country’s insolvency regime, strengthen banks’ capital base and allow private debt restructuring.br /br /Well, this is essentially the same set of issues as in argument 4. There are advantages in drawing out the bankruptcy process, but against these advantages need to be offset the problems posed by reform fatigue, as people are asked to sacrifice over a long period with no visible benefits to see for their effort. And there is no guarantee that the towel won't simply have to be thrown in at the end of the day on the U shaped recession, with a hasty devaluation being carried out, and the U being converted into a UL, with the bounce back only coming much later.br /br /6/ emit is questionable whether a devaluation would quickly boost exports, given the global environment and the structure of its exports/em. emRe-orienting the economy towards tradables will require structural reforms which are envisaged in the program/em. Basically, I think we are back to the "waiting room" approach again here. Export lead growth is not really a credible option at the moment, so the argument goes, given that the external conditions are extremely unfavourable, and that Latvia's economy is dominated by non-tradeables, financial services and construction. All of this is undoubtedly true, but my argument is that you have to start somewhere, and may own view is that it is better to start tomorrow, rather than the day after, and I think the key to breaking the logjam is attracting greenfield site FDI, but to do this you need to get your operating costs down, and the V shape correction achieves this outcome quicker than the U shaped one.br /br /7/em Latvia has a very flexible economy, especially a quite nimble labor market/em. Really I don't know what to make of this argument, since if this is the case, why was it not more evident during the years of dramatic wage inflation. Wage cuts of up to 25 percent do seem, as Christoph says, large, but so does the tripling of nominal wages between 2001-07 (doubling in real terms), and unless we get to grips with why all that happened in the first place (that is we take a good look at what may be the real Latvian capacity growth rate without inward migration) then I feel I remain unconvinced that we are suddenly about to see a newborn agility in the Latvian labour market. What I see are rather labour market rigidities, and a resistance to change.span style="FONT-STYLE: italic"/p/spanblockquotespan style="FONT-STYLE: italic"Some analysts called for expanding inward migration to alleviate shortages and dampen wage pressures. However, policymakers generally considered that this would have the effect of replacing domestic low-cost workers with imported ones, thereby holding down wages and promoting further emigration./span emThe government argues that rapid wage convergence with western Europe is needed to check emigration./em - IMF Staff Report, 2006br //blockquotestrongConclusions And Exit Strategy/strongbr /br /pbr /So where does all this leave us? Well basically that what we have on our hands is one hell of a mess, and that here there are no easy solutions. Did anyone tell you we lived in an imperfect world? Well what is going on in Latvia is surely as good an illustration that you are likely to find that this is the indeed the case. There are no easy, quickfix, policy solutions, and I fully understand Christoph's dilemma, and the difficulty associated with decision taking in this case./ppBut, while nothing is guaranteed to work, some approaches may turn out to be better placed than others, and it is my considered opinion that the best way of addressing the Latvian problem is by trying to kick-start the economy via devaluation, and to then tackle the wage increase problem by explicitly opening Latvia's frontiers to external migrant labour (as, for example, the Czech Republic have, to some extent, done). Such devaluation, backed by imaginative enough greenfield site support from the government, could attract the FDI, and alongside it the migrants to provide the manpower for unskilled positions, with better educated Latvians being able to get involved in some of the higher value work. If something is not done to break the population vicious circle, and the meltdown in internal demand and property prices as young Latvians seek work elsewhere then the outcome is all too clear, although not for that any less tragic, as Krugman suggests./ppOf course, some may wish to object at this point that devaluation has the same effect on wages as wage cuts do, and they would be right, but the point is strongthe overall level of economic activity is greater on the V shaped approach/strong (this was Keynes', and is today Bernanke's, basic insight). Latvian GDP is about to be thrown, from a period of trying to operate above capacity, to one where for an extended period of time it will operate below capacity. This can never be a good solution. On the V shaped recovery scenario the strongtime path of GDP is higher/strong, and the possibility of finding remunerative employment for each and every individual Latvian is to that extent greater. More idle resources will be put to work at a time when there is huge slack in the global system, and energy and material costs are at very low levels. Investment (building factories etc, buying machinery and equipment) simply couldn't be cheaper . Putting the resources to work to make this possible quite simply can't be a bad thing, or so I contend, and certainly not if the alternative may be sitting back and waiting till you have a sovereign default coming crashing in on top of you. /ppI see plenty of work for Latvian parliamentarians (passing much needed laws etc) in the current proposals but I see comparatively few initiatives which will keep the idle hands of Latvia's valuable human resource base from freezing over. /ppLet us be clear, of course there is no single clear "cure all" remedy here, but I think we need to say strongly that the earlier attempt to stem the migrant out-flow by being lax on the wage inflation front was to invite disaster (and the disaster of course came), whereas now, excessively compressing wages as the solution will have the impact which was previously feared./pstrongExport Defeatism?br //strongbr /pOne of the biggest obstacles facing countries like Latvia at the present time (of course Latvia is far from being unique, Latvia is simply the "canary in the coalmine") is a kind of passive defeatism about exports. Of course, Christoph is completely right, the global environment coundn't be more unfavourable, but there really is plenty to be done, so why not keep warm during those long dark winters doing some of it. The EU Commission points out the problem in its latest forecast:/pblockquotepExports are still dominated by commodity products and re exports, with only limited evidence of moving up the technology ladder. Hence, export revenues are exposed to volatile global commodity price developments (mainly prices of wood and metals). Furthermore, unfavourable real exchange rate developments (based e.g. on unit wage costs in manufacturing) had a negative effect on the external competitiveness of the economy. However, a recovery of exports in the first part of 2007 was driven by manufactured goods which stood at odds not only with the above described problems of the supply side, but also with the reportedly very low increase in manufacturing output in the same period. The overall conclusion on progress in strengthening the supply side is therefore mixed, but it can be concluded that the current domestic cost developments pose serious challenges to producers of tradeable goods and services. EU Commission, January 2009 Latvia Forecastbr //p/blockquotebr /pFinally Christoph has one additional point which really serves as a conclusion and a monument to all this, and that is the idea that emLatvia has a clear exit strategy from its currency predicament: euro adoption./em /ppAs Christoph says, the Latvian authorities are determined to work to meet the Maastricht criteria in 2012. Certainly entering the euro zone will not do away - at a click of the finger - with the hard lifting necessary to address the competitiveness and high external debt problems (as he suggests in his a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2008/022008.htm"avoiding the Portuguese trap article/a, and I go through in my a href="http://globaleconomydoesmatter.blogspot.com/2009/01/portugal-sustains.html"Portugal Sustains post here/a). But it would offer support to a struggling Latvia and help bring back investor confidence. The point is, at which exchange rate should Latvia enter ERM2? Indeed, it is now apparent - if you read the a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=22586.0"IMF staff report on the standby arrangement/a, on their website, that they favoured an expansion of the band to 15% (which basically means 15% devaluation) and it was the EU itself who objected and pushed to retain the peg (see appendix below). It is not difficult to see the problems a Latvian devaluation might face in the light of the Parex related issues without direct euroisation (or EU fiscal support), but the thrust of my argument here has been that these difficulties (credit rating downgrades, sovereign default vulnerability) are going to come anyway. Indeed Latvia had its foreign-credit rating cut to Baa1 by Moodys on January 7 2009, the second such downgrade in three months, with the agency citing increased risks of a prolonged economic decline (read L shaped recession). /pblockquote“The downgrade reflects the further intensification of the economic adjustment in Latvia since October 2008,” said Kenneth Orchard, an analyst with Moody’s, in the statement. “The economic downturn is now expected to be deeper and more prolonged than previously assumed.” The risk of a “disorderly correction” to economic imbalances remains even after securing the 7.5 billion-euro ($10.2 billion) international aid package. “Government borrowing will rise significantly over the next few years to smooth the adjustment and prevent a major economic crisis,”/blockquotepBasically, the EU objected to the IMF proposal for emergency eurozone membership on the grounds that this would sat a precedent in other cases. But I really do feel that the Commission (and the ECB presumeably) are being ridiculously pig-headed here. We have an emergency on our hands, and exceptional measures are called for.br /br /It is impossible for me to go here into all the issues involved in collective membership of the eurozone for the EU12 states that are not already in, but let me just say we need a substantial rethink allround, involving:/ppa) Issuing EU bonds to collectively fund bank bailouts across the Union (East and West)br /b) Collective membership of the eurozone for those EU member states who want itbr /c) A new Lisbon Strategy and Stability and Growth Pact code involving much stricter conditions and stronger Commission powers and sanctions.br /br /c) is the necessary and prior condition for giving consideration to (a) and (b) and not the other way round. /ppFinally, thank you, one and all, who have struggled forward and reached this point. In particular thank you for being so patient with my verbal largesse. I am trying to contain it, I really am.br /br /strongAppendix: Extracts From IMF Staff Report On Latvian Request for Stand-By Arrangementbr //strongbr /emThe authorities and staff examined the merits of alternative exchange rate regimes. A widening of the exchange rate band to ±15 percent (as permitted under ERM2; currently Latvia has unilaterally adopted a ±1 percent band) would result in a larger initial output decline, since adverse balance sheet effects would reduce domestic demand. However, competitiveness would improve more quickly, reducing the current account deficit and fostering a more rapid economic recovery. The case for changing the parity would be stronger if it could be accompanied by immediate euro adoption. Technically, this would address many of the risks described above, and give Latvia deeper access to capital markets. With its negligible public sector debt, the government would also find it easier to borrow in euros on international capital markets. However, the EU authorities have firmly ruled out this option, given its inconsistency with the Maastricht Treaty and the precedents it would set for other potential euro area entrants./embr /br /br /emThe main advantage of widening the bands is that it should eventually deliver a faster economic recovery. Although growth would be depressed in the short run by balance-sheet effects (see below), the economy might then bounce back more sharply, and a Vshaped recovery would likely start in 2010. This reflects a faster improvement in competitiveness since high pass-through (reflecting Latvia’s openness to trade and liberalized movement of labor within the European Union) would be dampened by the negative output gap. Enhanced competitiveness would also reduce the current account deficit more quickly. This would come mainly from import compression, with a relatively slow response of Latvia’s underdeveloped export sector, especially as the external environment is not as supportive as in previous devaluation-induced recoveries as Argentina, Russia or East Asia.br /br /However, balance-sheet effects would cause a sharp drop in domestic demand. The net foreign currency exposure of Latvia’s private sector is around 70 percent of GDP, with the corporate sector’s foreign currency open position roughly double that of the household sector’s. A 15 percent devaluation against the euro would increase private sector net foreign currency exposure by 11 percent of GDP, two thirds in the corporate sector and one third in the household sector. Mismatches between owners of foreign currency assets and liabilities suggest that devaluation may cause substantial redistribution effects. Private consumption would fall by around 6 percentage points due to negative wealth effect as net foreign debt increases, house prices decline, debt service costs increase, and consumer confidence deteriorates. Experience of other countries suggests that a devaluation of this magnitude would lead to a 5 percentage point decline in private sector investment.br /br /Euroization with EU and ECB concurrence would also help address liquidity strains in the banking system. If Latvian banks could access ECB facilities, then those that are both solvent and hold adequate collateral could access sufficient liquidity. The increase in confidence should dampen concerns of resident depositors and also help stem non resident deposit outflows.br /br /br /br /However, this policy option would not address solvency concerns and has been ruled out by the European authorities. If combined with a large upfront devaluation, there would be an immediate deterioration in private-sector solvency, which could slow recovery. Privatesector debt restructuring would likely be necessary. Finally, the European Union strongly objects to accelerated euro adoption, as this would be inconsistent with treaty obligations of member governments, so this option is infeasible./em/p]]></description>
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		<title>Italy Slips Slowly But Steadily Into Its Worst Recession In Over 30 Years</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/global-economics/italy-slips-slowly-but-steadily-into-its-worst-recession-in-over-30-years/</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 16 Jan 2009 21:22:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Edward Hugh</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[By Edward Hugh: Barcelonabr /br /The Italian economy continued to contract sharply in the third quarter of 2008 as exports fell sharply - declining at the fastest rate in three years - under the impact of a global slump which weighed down on foreign demand for Italian products, and pushed the Italian economy into its worst recession since at least 1975. Sales of Italian goods abroad fell 1.6 percent from the previous quarter, their biggest decline since 2005.br /br /Pressure is of course on the government to offer a fiscal reponse to the problem, but given Italy's outstanding debt issues and the fact that a large part of the problem is long term structural and not cyclical it is hard to see much of note happening, and indeed Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti's statement this week that additional stimulus packages were pretty pointless could be read as more of an admission of impotence than anything else. What'smore the Italian government announced this week that its budget deficit for 2008 will be 52.9 billion euros, somewhat above the government’s earlier estimate which forecast a gap of 45.2 billion euros. It is not clear yet how this deficit overrun will actually affect the final % of GDP number for the deficit, since we still do not have an accurate 2008 GDP number for Italy yet. In any event speculation is rife about the future of the Italian bond spread and the danger of a credit rating downgrade. The Italian government went to market this week and sold 6.949 billion euros of five-, 20- and 30-year bonds. The 10-year Italian BTP/Bund spread was trading at around 144 basis points after Thursdays auctions compared with 141 basis points the day before.br /br /strongSevere Limits On Stimulus Packages and Bank Bailouts/strongbr /br /This week the government did  approve a further 16.6 billion euros in public works investments to try to boost economic growth, but little of this actually represents new spending. The projects include an additional 7.3 billion euros in public spending, together with 9.3 billion euros in private investment. Among other infrastructural works some of the additional funding will go toward building the “Moses” retractable dams that are designed to protect the city of Venice from flooding.br /br /This infrastructure package is in addition to the 5 billion euro stimulus package to help poor families, small businesses and boost bank capital that was agreed to by the Italian parliament earlier in the week. Under the bill a sum of around 2.4 billion euros will be used to help Italy’s poorest families and pensioners, including some one-off cash payments. Highway tolls will be frozen until April 30 and low-income Italians will benefit from tax breaks on utility bills. Small businesses will get a 10 percent break on a regional tax on condition they are already paying a national corporate income tax.br /br /Following warnings to a number of Eurozone government's over credit downgrades from rating agency Standard and Poor's this week Finance Minister Giulio Trementi said on Thursday that Italy won’t follow up its existing stimulus package with more cash injections . Italy currently has the highest debt level in the European Union, which was running over 105 percent of gross domestic product in 2008, according to a Bank of Italy statement today.br /br /Italy’s bank bailout is likely also to be pretty modest in comparison with what is going on elsewhere. The 20 billion-euro bank recapitalization plan will probably start operating next week, according to the news source Il Sole/24 Ore, but details are not available since the Finance Ministry is still “perfecting” the rules and regulations that go with it.br /br /p/pbr /pstrongBleak GDP Growth Outlook In The Short, Medium and Long Term/strongbr //pbr /pItaly's economy is expected to shrink by 2 percent this year, making the present contraction the worst in more than three decades, according to the latest forecast from the Bank of Italy. “Taking into account the government measures .... the economy will shrink by 2 percent and then expand 0.5 percent in 2010". The economy’s last annual contraction on this scale was in 1975.br //pbr /pThese central bank predictions are the worst to have come out on Italy to date, and significantly above the 1.3 percent contraction being forecast by employers organisation Confindustria and minus 0.6 percent prediction from retail lobby group Confcommercio. It is also a substantial downward revision since only six months ago the central bank was predicting growth of 0.4 percent. Ominously Confcommercio added that “Should the employment situation worsen, we will have to cut these estimates”. Clearly one of the big dangers with the current contraction in the industrial sector is that it lead to large a scale industrial layoffs, and that this then feed back pushing demand downwards./pThe Bank of Italy forecast was described as “realistic” by Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti even though his current government forecasts are for an economic expansion of 0.5 percent in 2009. These differences in forecasts are in fact very important, since the government budget is evidently anticipating far higher revenue levels and far lower social expenditure (on unemployment etc) than is likely to be the case.br /br /br /pa href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWzCVTQ4D0I/AAAAAAAAMI8/I8qm3Jb8DQI/s1600-h/italy+GDP.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5290817333457588034" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 158px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWzCVTQ4D0I/AAAAAAAAMI8/I8qm3Jb8DQI/s320/italy+GDP.png" border="0" //abr /br /br /strongFourth Recession In Seven Yearsbr //strongbr /The last GDP report from Italy's statistics office (ISTAT) confirmed that the euro-region’s third-biggest economy slipped into its fourth recession in seven years in Q3 2008. The economy shrank 0.5 percent in the three months through September after contracting 0.4 percent in the previous three months. Imports in Germany and France, Italy’s largest trading partners, declined in October, and the German import decline of 5.6% in November over October (following a decline of 3.7% in October over September) was the biggest slide in almost four years. As a result Italian year-on-year GDP shrank 0.9 percent in the third quarter.br /br /br /a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWzDX5Xc-PI/AAAAAAAAMJE/NaeIMrmksgo/s1600-h/italy+Q3+yoy.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5290818477557086450" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 183px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWzDX5Xc-PI/AAAAAAAAMJE/NaeIMrmksgo/s320/italy+Q3+yoy.png" border="0" //a/pbr /br /Italian imports fell 0.5 percent in the third quarter while consumer spending barely grew, increasing 0.1 percent in the quarter. Year on year household spending was down 0.6%.br /br /a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SXBkFA3fzCI/AAAAAAAAMKo/eWdCnkm15OU/s1600-h/italy+household+consumption.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5291839599455226914" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 239px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SXBkFA3fzCI/AAAAAAAAMKo/eWdCnkm15OU/s400/italy+household+consumption.png" border="0" //abr /Gross fixed capital formation was down 1.9% on the year - with the machinery and equipment component down 3.5%. Exports fell 3.1% on the year in price adjusted terms.br /br /a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SXCRdF5tLYI/AAAAAAAAMKw/BjyyTYU3zv8/s1600-h/italy+machinery+and+equip.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5291889491146780034" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 234px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SXCRdF5tLYI/AAAAAAAAMKw/BjyyTYU3zv8/s400/italy+machinery+and+equip.png" border="0" //abr /br /br /strongManufacturing Contractionbr //strongbr /br /And as we look forward all the short term data is deteriorating. Industrial production fell yet again in November with output dropping a seasonally adjusted 2.3 percent from October, while production adjusted for working days fell 9.7 percent when compared with November 2007, the biggest drop since 1991.br /br /a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SW4Gn7CIONI/AAAAAAAAMJ8/wyna4gq4fkg/s1600-h/italy+IP2.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5291173895138195666" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 202px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SW4Gn7CIONI/AAAAAAAAMJ8/wyna4gq4fkg/s400/italy+IP2.png" border="0" //abr /And if we look at the index, we can see that output has now been trending down since the end of 2006.br /br /a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SW4GizyGT1I/AAAAAAAAMJ0/qvIPsvUKpXI/s1600-h/italy+IP+1.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5291173807292567378" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 190px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SW4GizyGT1I/AAAAAAAAMJ0/qvIPsvUKpXI/s400/italy+IP+1.png" border="0" //abr /br /br /And survey data from December suggest the Italian manufacturing sector remained mired in recession as output, new orders, new export orders, backlogs, employment and purchasing activity all contracted. The headline seasonally adjusted Markit/ADACI Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) came in at 35.5 in December. Even though this was marginally up from the 34.9 recorded in November, it was the still second-lowest reading recorded in the history of the survey.br /br /a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SW0Jtry5EKI/AAAAAAAAMJM/xBr9l5yHdGE/s1600-h/italy+manufacturing+PMI.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5290895817685143714" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 169px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SW0Jtry5EKI/AAAAAAAAMJM/xBr9l5yHdGE/s320/italy+manufacturing+PMI.png" border="0" //abr /And it was the ninth consecutive monthly contraction in production volumes. In their report Markit state that the continued downturn in new business appeared to be the key driver, as firms reduced output in line with falling demand. Steep falls were reported in new business from both domestic and foreign markets. Overall, new order books fell for a 12th successive month, albeit at a slightly weaker rate than November’s series record. And perhaps most worryingly given Italy's need to export, new orders from export markets fell at the fastest pace in the survey history.br /br /Protracted falls in incoming work and production volumes resulted in a further month of job-shedding in December. Moreover, the rate of job losses was the fastest in the history of the series. There was also some evidence from those interviewed that redundancy programs had been implemented over the month and that the non-essential workforce had been reduced.br /br /br /blockquoteCommenting on the Italy Manufacturing PMI survey data, Andrew Self, economist at Markit Economics, said: “While December’s fall in output was less pronouncedbr /than November’s series record, the rate at which the manufacturing economy hasbr /contracted throughout Q4 is alarming. Italian manufacturers will hope that thebr /fiscal packages announced throughout Europe in December will mark the turningbr /point of the recession. However, with new orders still falling in domestic andbr /foreign markets the downturn looks set to continue into 2009.”/blockquotestrongThe Services Sector Also Continues to Contract/strongbr /br /pItaly's service sector also contracted sharply in December (for the 13th consecutive month), although as with manufacturing the rate was marginally slower rate than the record low hit in November, and the Markit Purchasing Managers Index edged up to 40.3 from 39.5 in November. Again this was still the second lowest level in the survey's 11-year history and well below the 50 divide between growth and contraction. /pbr /pa href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWNGCiaepwI/AAAAAAAAMB8/gD27CtZgpHo/s1600-h/italy+services+PMI.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5288147396874643202" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 170px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWNGCiaepwI/AAAAAAAAMB8/gD27CtZgpHo/s320/italy+services+PMI.png" border="0" //abr /The index has now not been above the 50 mark that separates growth from contraction since November 2007 and the latest survey, like its companion PMI for the manufacturing sector, offered no evidence whatsoever of recovery. /pbr /blockquote"December ... painted a gloomy picture of the Italian services economy as,br /throughout the final quarter of 2008, activity contracted at rates unprecedentedbr /in the 11-year survey history," said Andrew Self, economist at Markit Economics. /blockquotebr /pstrongRetail Sales /strongstrongContract For The 22nd Consecutive Monthbr //strongbr /Italian retail sales contracted for a 22nd month in December as the Bloomberg retail sales PMI rose slightlly - to 31.9 from 28.5 .The index, based on a survey of 440 executives prepared by Markit Economics, also showed annual sales fell at the fastest pace in the near five-year history of the data. /pa href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWNIknWqZeI/AAAAAAAAMCE/LQRK12XWCy8/s1600-h/italian+retail+sales.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5288150181339620834" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 165px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SWNIknWqZeI/AAAAAAAAMCE/LQRK12XWCy8/s320/italian+retail+sales.png" border="0" //abr /br /br /Declining sales prompted retailers to cut staff for a 12th consecutive month, the report also said, and the rate at which staff numbers were reduced was the fastest since Markit first compiled the data in January 2004. In the third quarter the number of Italians out of work rose and the unemployment rate held at two-year high of 6.7 percent. Joblessness will rise to 6.9 percent in 2008, the highest in three years, from 6.2 percent in 2007, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimated on Nov. 25.br /br /br /strongFalling Consumer and Business Confidence/strongbr /br /Italian business confidence fell to a record low in December, and the Isae Institute’s business confidence index dropped to 66.6 from a revised 71.6 in November.br /br /a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SW0Om2IR8FI/AAAAAAAAMJk/fTI44vke5GY/s1600-h/italian+business+confidence.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5290901197758263378" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 191px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SW0Om2IR8FI/AAAAAAAAMJk/fTI44vke5GY/s400/italian+business+confidence.png" border="0" //abr /br /blockquote“These figures are consistent with the picture of a deep recession inbr /manufacturing industry,” said Paolo Mameli, an economist at Intesa Sanpaolo inbr /Milan. “As there is usually a three-month gap between this data and thebr /industrial production, we forecast that the economy will contract further nextbr /year and won’t resume growing anyway until the last quarter of 2009.”br //blockquotebr /About 13 percent of Italian companies trying to get loans don't receive them, either because banks refuse to lend to them or because the costs involved are considered excessive by the company, Isae say in data which accompanies this months report.br /br /br /Italian consumer confidence also fell in December its level in four months on concern that the recession and the decline in industrial activity would increase unemployment, with the Isae Institute’s consumer confidence index falling to 99.6 from 100.4 in November.br /br /a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SW0T7ruNIxI/AAAAAAAAMJs/TQ8YpJvHk5Y/s1600-h/Italy+consumer+confidence.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5290907053299933970" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 189px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SW0T7ruNIxI/AAAAAAAAMJs/TQ8YpJvHk5Y/s400/Italy+consumer+confidence.png" border="0" //abr /br /br /strongInflation Falling Back But No Sign Of Deflation Yetbr //strongbr /pItaly’s inflation rate fell to its lowest level in 14 months in December, as energy costs fell sharply and the recession made it harder for retailers to raise prices. Consumer prices as measured by the EU's HICP rose 2.3 percent from a year earlier, compared with a 2.7 percent rise in November. When compared with November prices were down 0.2 percent.br /br //pa href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SXDXNK5UnCI/AAAAAAAAMK4/pxUul4D0zs8/s1600-h/italy+cpi.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5291966183423384610" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 218px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SXDXNK5UnCI/AAAAAAAAMK4/pxUul4D0zs8/s400/italy+cpi.png" border="0" //abr /br /strongSo Where Does That Leave US - With Very Little (If Any) Growth In the Future, That's Where It Leaves Us!br //strongbr /br /Unlike many other Eurozone economies, Italy's current contraction in activity is not a simple result of the global economic slowdown. Itay's problems are endemic, and ongoing: hence the four recessions in seven years. Trend growth in Italy has been slowing over the last few decades, and must now be near to zero. Which raises the question as to whether in the coming decade Italy's trend growth could turn negative, with GDP simply contracting from one year to the next.br /Obviously this possibility is only a theoretical one at the present time, but it is one which cannot be entirely included, especially when we look at how - despite all the promises that things would change - trend growth has steadily drifted to zero. Ceratinly also there are reasons to imagine that the productive capacity of the Italian population could drop as median population rises. Italy is currently among the three oldest societies on the globe - with median age of 43, and Germany and Japan being the other two - and as we saw at the start of this post, Italy has not been able to raise its export prowess in the way the other two have. And if it hasn't been able to do this over the last 15 years or so, what good reasons are there for thinking that Italy may start now?br /br /a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SXDaOmjAemI/AAAAAAAAMLA/bKx-PcHwk1M/s1600-h/italy+median+age.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5291969506560735842" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 226px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SXDaOmjAemI/AAAAAAAAMLA/bKx-PcHwk1M/s400/italy+median+age.png" border="0" //abr /br /Samp;P and Fitch last reduced Italy's credit rating in October 2006, with Samp;P reducing the rating to A+ (with negative outlook), the third-lowest of the eurozone countries after Greece and Slovakia, while Fitch dropped it to AA- from AA. Moody’s Investors Service rates Italian debt Aa2, with a “stable” outlook. In November 2005 the ECB announced that would not accept government paper (bonds) in the future from any country which did not maintain at least an A- rating from one or more of the principal debt assesment agencies. Which means of course that Greek sovereign bonds are  now very vulnerable to losing acceptable asset status in the longer run, but that Italy is not far behind. br /br /In fact back in  October last year, the ECB announced that the Eurosystem would lower the credit threshold for marketable and non-marketable assets from A- to BBB-, with the exception of asset-backed securities (ABS), and impose a haircut add-on of 5% on all assets rated BBB-. But it is important to bear in mind that this expansion of eligible collateral is temporary: “The list of assets eligible as collateral in Eurosystem credit operations will be expanded as set out below, with this expansion remaining into force until the end of 2009.”  While it is perfectly possible that  the ECB will extend this temporary relaxation of credit thresholds for the duration of the current crisis, the problem of default risk in the most vulnerable economies is likely to outlive the current crisis, and the ECB relaxation is unlikely to last indefinitely.br /br /The gap between the interest rates Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal must pay investors to borrow for 10 years and the rate charged to Germany has now ballooned to the widest since before they joined the euro. In the graph below you can see ten year bond spreads for Greek, Irish and Spanish government paper as compared with the benchmark German Bund.br /br /a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SXDvtLFDBhI/AAAAAAAAMLI/xQIjPN-Nyi8/s1600-h/ten+year+bonds+two.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5291993121507444242" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 214px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SXDvtLFDBhI/AAAAAAAAMLI/xQIjPN-Nyi8/s400/ten+year+bonds+two.png" border="0" //abr /br /The yield on Spain’s 10-year bond averaged 8.5 percent in the six years before it joined the euro and the gap with the equivalent German bond was 246 basis points. In the next eight years, the average yield fell to 4.5 percent and the spread to 13 basis points. That convergence is now being thrown into reverse. In the past week, Standard amp; Poor’s has downgraded Greece’s credit rating, and those of Portugal and Spain are also under threat. The difference between the Spanish and German 10-year bonds rose to 115 basis points today, the highest since 1997. The spread on Italy’s bond at 144 basis points was the most in 12 years and the Greek spread was the most since 1999.br /br /Different economists take differing views on the implications of this development. The LSE's Willem Buiter argues that the widening of the spreads is a good sign, as it shows that market mechanisms are finally working. In the past the problem had been the way that markets assumed for too long that governments would be bailed out if they defaulted. But RGE Monitor's Nouriel Roubini makes the very valid point that if financial markets get concerned about the risks of exits, a vicious circle of rising rates and poor debt dynamics may force exit regardless of the will to stay in. The effects can be very similar to a currency crisis or a self-fulfilling run on the government debt or the banking system. Basically, countries like Italy and Portugal have quite low trend growth rates as it is, if fiscal support is withdrawn and bond spreads rise this can easily produce a lose-lose dynamic which virtually forces default.br /br /And this is without any reference to the negative feedback effects that can be produced by the health and pension spending required to meet the needs of a rising elderly support ratio, and a lower productivity from a working population with a higher median age. All in all, a very difficult can of worms for everyone to get to work on.]]></description>
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		<title>Why We All Need To Keep A Watchful Eye On What Is Happening In Greece</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/global-economics/why-we-all-need-to-keep-a-watchful-eye-on-what-is-happening-in-greece/</link>
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		<pubDate>Sun, 14 Dec 2008 13:58:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Edward Hugh</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[by Edward Hugh: Barcelonabr /br /br /blockquoteIn view of Greece's EMU membership, the availability of external financing is not a concern, but the correction of cumulating indebtedness could weigh appreciably on growth going forward. While the risk of transmitting vulnerabilities to the euro area is very small reflecting Greece’s small relative size, large persistent current account deficits would increase the vulnerabilities to a reversal in market sentiment, leading to a corrective retrenchment of private sector balance-sheets in the face of rising indebtedness, and a possible appreciable rise in the cost of funding over time. These developments would have significant negative implications for growth.br /a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=21937.0"Greece: 2007 Article IV Consultation/a - IMF Staff Report/blockquotepbr /br //ppa href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SUEsR712NQI/AAAAAAAALuU/VGFiqyCyzBw/s1600-h/bond+spreads+2.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5278548924887872770" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; HEIGHT: 170px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SUEsR712NQI/AAAAAAAALuU/VGFiqyCyzBw/s320/bond+spreads+2.png" border="0" //abr /The above quited paragraph from the IMF is a very good example of what used to be the orthodox wisdom about Greece's economic imbalances - that given EMU membership the availability of external financing should not be a concern, and that the Greek economy is effectively too small for it to constitute a menace to the stability of the eurozone itself, even on a worst case scenario. Well, if we look at the growing yield spreads you can see in the chart above (please click for better viewing) the first premiss seems to be in real danger of falling, EMU membership no longer gives an automatic guarantee of oncost-free external financing, and if you look at the names of the other countries lining up in the queue behind Greece - Italy, Spain and Portugal in particular - you can begin to see the outline of a contagion mechanism whereby the coming to reality of the worst case Greek scenario might just extend itself into a problem of sufficient magnitude to transmit Greek vulnerabilities across and into the entire euro area. No one is too small to be a problem when it comes to financial crises, and if you think I am exaggerating just look at how the "pipsqueak" Baltic economies have paved the way and opened the door to much bigger problems right across Central and Eastern Europe even as I write. /ppBut just what are the problems Greece faces, and just what are the risks of transmission of these elsewhere?br /br /strongBank Credit Downgrades/strongbr /br /The first of the things which has changed since the IMF wrote the staff report I cite above (back in 2007) is the soundness and stability of what was then seen as being a very well funded and liquid banking system. Only last Friday Moody's Investors Service announced they had changed the outlook on the bank financial strength ratings (BFSRs) and long-term deposit and debt ratings of four Greek banks - to negative from stable. The banks in question are National Bank of Greece, EFG Eurobank, Alpha Bank and Piraeus Bank. This move follows decisions earlier in the week by EFG Eurobank and Piraeus Bank to participate in the Greek government's 28 billion euro (about 12% of GDP) bank bailout scheme the aim of which is to provide capital injections to the participating banks via the sale of preferred shares to the state, guarantees on debt issuance, and liquidity support. The decision by these two banks now brings to six the number of Greek banks who have decided to seek refuge in the government scheme, with the other banks being National Bank, Alpha Bank and the smaller ATEbank and Proton Bank.br /br /Piraeus Bank has said it will hold a shareholders' meeting on January 23 to seek approval for a 370 million euro issue of preferred shares to be sold to the state. Under the terms of the bailout plan, the Greek government may spend up to 5.0 billion euros (of the 28 billion euros total, or a little over 2% of GDP) on boosting bank capital ratios via the purchase of preferred shares. These shares will pay the government a 10 percent dividend, and banks using the facility will need to accept a state representative with a right to veto dividend policy and executive pay on their boards. Banks will also have the right to buy back the preferred shares no sooner than July 1, 2009.br //ppIn addition to the evident weaknesses which have now come to light in the Greek financial system, the other worrying development we are seeing in Greece at the present time - apart that is from the largescale social conflict that has been hitting the headlines in recent weeks - is the movement in what is know as the yield spreads. These spreads are the interest rate difference a national government has to pay for borrowing money (over ten years say) when compared with that paid by the (benchmark) German government. What this means is Greek government bonds are sold cheaper (ie the government receives less for them) than their German counterparts, but their yields are higher and this is because external investors increasingly see Greece as a less creditworthy country. If Greece itself was fully self sufficient in finance (like say Japan is) then this wouldn't present a problem for bond yields (as we can see in the case of an equally indebted Japanese govenment) since domestic investors could be relied on to buy up the bonds (in a process known as "home bias"), but Greece is not self sufficient, and has to depend on external finance to fund a current account deficit of around 15% of GDP. Thus the opening up in these spreads over the last two months most now constitute the biggest headache those responsible for managing European Monetary Union have had to face since the creation of the eurozone, since according to the well know neo-classical theory of contingent convergence they should be disappearing, and not increasing.br /br /But increasing they are, in what is only the latest example of reality defying received theory, and the Greek 10-year bond, for example, was yielding 4.89% at the close of European trading last Tuesday, while the 10-year German issue returned just 3.23%. The spread between Greek and German bonds has now more than doubled since October and indeed hit its highest level ever since the launch of the euro last Thursday - reaching 190 basis points, up from 168 before the rioting began.br /br /These widening spreads mean more expensive bond auctions for the Greek government, and this is just where the trouble comes, since Greece has a very hefty accumulated debt to continually refinance (around 90% GDP), and it is partly because investors don't see how a government with a damaged banking system and an economy which may soon start shrinking as the recession bites can shoulder the weight of this debt, especially given the evident difficulty faced by the Greek government in enforcing measures to reduce it, that the widening is occuring.br /br /strongTwin Deficit To Beat All Twin Deficits?/strongbr /br /br /Basically, if I could sum all this up in a nutshell I would ask, just why are we seeing rioting out on the streets of Greece, and calm placidity down there on the Spanish highway. Well, apart from the evident differences in national cultures (which I am certainly not in any way equipped to get into) I would say there is one single fact that marks out the difference: Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero can still sign any cheque he wants to to try to fend off the worst of the Spanish crisis, while Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis no longer can. Words of warnings left unheard are now coming home to roost and the Greek government's room for fiscal manoeuvre is very very limited indeed at this point. Undoubtedly time will also run out on the Spanish Prime Minister too if we continue on the present course (as a href="http://spaineconomy.blogspot.com/2008/12/just-how-strongly-will-spains-economy.html"I argue in this post/a) but my point here is that we should be aware that events in Greece, depending on how badly things go, or how quickly they go bad, could end up cutting the available time for Spain even further, via a nasty little process which is ferquently known to go to work during financial crises: regional contagion. /pp/ppWe have already seen just a process at work in Eastern Europe, following the ill-advised excursion of Russia's tanks through the Roki tunnel in early August, are we now about to see something similar happen in Southern Europe following the course of the ill-gotten police bullet which ripped life and lung out of a poor young 15 year old schoolboy in Athen's a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exarchia"Exarcheia/a district this week? Actually I doubt it, that is I doubt we are likely to see a similar chain reaction process just yet, but the severity of the social backdraft we have scene following the incident should serve as a warning to us all of just how delicate this situation now is, and just how easily things could be knocked off balance./ppThe core of the problem we have before us lies in the Greek twin defict - Greece has a very large and continuing current account defcit (around 15% of GDP, see chart below) and a very large accumulated government debt (around 90% of GDP, see second chart below).br /br /a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SULgVvTNVEI/AAAAAAAALwE/_HakFqvnpz8/s1600-h/greece+CA+deficit.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5279028377310549058" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 176px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SULgVvTNVEI/AAAAAAAALwE/_HakFqvnpz8/s320/greece+CA+deficit.png" border="0" //abr /br /Part of the reason for the recent surge in Greek external debt has been a rapid rise in domestic investment which was not matched by a similar increase in national saving - in fact household savings have been more or less stagnant - and this has meant that the gap between national saving and investment has been steadily growing since 2001 - increasing from 10.5% of GDP in 2001 to nearly 15% in 2006. Most of the additional gap has been due to a rise in net indebtedness by the household sector. To a large extent the decline in household saving and the increased demand for housing as a private investment vehicle can be explained by the increased access to and demand for credit in the context of financial liberalization and the lower interest rates which have followed from Greece's euro participation. Undoubtedly during the years in which Greece "enjoyed" negative real interest rates, it seem a much more attractive proposition to buy a piece of property whose price it was imagined would "never fall" rather then watch savings steadily lose their value in time deposits which were effectively being ravaged by infaltion attrition. On the other hand it is worth bearing in mind that gross Greek household debt - at a little over 40% of GDP - never reached the heady levels attained in Spain of around 90% of GDP.br /br /In contrast, the Greek corporate sector has been running a net savings surplus throughout the entire period (and this of course is another big difference from Spain), with rising saving repeatedly exceeding investment. This notable increase in corporate saving has largely been the result of the strong profitability in the shipping and financial sectors, and it is this profitability which is now, suddenly, under threat in the current downturn.br /br /Greek government debt, on the other hand is somewhere in the region of 90% of GDP, while the deficit is currently somewhere around 3% of GDP, but none of us (including the European statistics agency Eurostat or the EU Commission) can really be too sure of all this, since the goalposts seem to be being constantly moved in more than the football stadia down in Greece, and while it would be an exaggeration to say the data changes on a weekly basis, sometimes it seems we are not so far away from that point. Such shortcomings in Greek public finance statistics (and economic data from Greece generally I would say, if you look at all the regular omissions in the Eurostat short term data relases) are by now a reasonably well-known problem - the general government deficit for 2007 has only in the last month been revised upwards yet one more time - from 2.8% to 3.5% of GDP (much to the furor and chagrin of the EU Commission, since this put Greece in technical breach of its committments to the Commission, yet one more time), while for 2008, the official public deficit target has already been revised up by 0.75% of GDP, compared with the initial budgetary target of 1.6% of GDP, and of course with the historic record to go by and bank bailouts and the economic slowdown to think about, it hardly seems to be credible that this year will be strongthe/strong year, the year we finally make it back under the 3% deficit limit on a consolidated basis. The latest upward adjustment in the forecast reflects expenditure overruns of 1% of GDP and revenue shortfalls of 0.5% of GDP, although at the present time these are supposedly being partially compensated for by a series of measures implemented in September (with unknown outcome at the time of writing, but with an evident adverse impact on Greek public opinion if the images on our TV screens are anything to go by). /ppThe September package consisted of both revenue enhancing and public consumption cutting measures with a projected budgetary impact of some 0.75% of GDP - and hence in part of course the recent furor on the Greek street. If the intended outcome were to be achieved - something which is, as I say, very unlikely under the present economic circumstances and given the government's track record - then the Greek government deficit for 2009 would be somehwere in the region of 2.5% of GDP. But the point about all this rigmorole, is that the end result of all this coming and going, and too-ing and frowing down the years is that Greece is still not completely out of its EU excess deficit procedure, and this at the end of what has been one hell of a "good times" boom, so what can we seriously expect now that the bad time have most definitely come?br /br //pa href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SUJzAc76i0I/AAAAAAAALv0/Wrl9L5OiyZk/s1600-h/greece+two.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5278908164836330306" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: pointer; HEIGHT: 171px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SUJzAc76i0I/AAAAAAAALv0/Wrl9L5OiyZk/s320/greece+two.png" border="0" //abr /br /br /Greek consolidated debt has been steadily coming down, as can be seen in the above chart (the brown line, right hand scale, please click on image for better viewing) but the problem that is facing decision makers is, will getting to grips with the heart of the financial problem imply measures which once more reverse this trend, and if it does, just how will the ratings agencies respond, and assuming we already know the answer to the last question, what will this mean for the yield spread?br /br /span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold"Greek Economic Performance/spanbr /br /blockquoteThe Greek economy has been buoyant for several years, and the gap in real per capita income between Greece and the EU–15 has narrowed significantly. Real GDP growth averaged 4.25 percent during 2000–06, and is estimated at 4 percent in 2007. Solid gains in employment and handsome real wage increases have underpinned strong consumption growth. Rapid credit expansion that followed financial sector liberalization and the drop in interest rates associated with euro adoption have fostered rising residential investment by households, while strong profitability has fueled corporate sector investment. However, the external sector has been a drag on growth; external imbalances have remained large throughout and widened.br /a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=21937.0"Greece: 2007 Article IV Consultation/a - IMF Staff Report/blockquotepRecent Greece economic performance, as measured in terms of growth in per capita income and GDP (see chart below) has been - as the IMF indicate - strong, with average annual growth running at a little over 4%, but looking at the macro imbalances which have been accumulating, we need to ask ourselves, as in the case of Spain, will there be a payback to be made for all of this good news?br /br //ppa href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SULfW0LJ1SI/AAAAAAAALv8/a8S5MuD9xRo/s1600-h/greek+GDP.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5279027296287184162" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 176px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SULfW0LJ1SI/AAAAAAAALv8/a8S5MuD9xRo/s320/greek+GDP.png" border="0" //a/pp/ppIf we examine the inflation chart (see below), we will find that Greek annual inflation has also been hovering around the 4% mark since the start of the century, a clear two percentage points above the ECB inflation target, and also two percentage points over the ECB policy rate during the key period from June 2003 and December 2005 (when the rate was held at 2% offering monetary conditions which were far too loose for several key members of the eurozone and in the process fuelling housing bubbles in a number of zone member states). Thus with GDP running way above what might be considered a reasonable trend level, interest rates were being adminstered at what was a real rate of minus 2%, despite the evident inflationary symptoms that there was significant "overheating" going on. Thus the Greek economy was given a pretty significant monetary stimulus during what could only have been perceived as the height boom, and at a time when the fiscal stance was also very expansionary. If any of this could work, then we would have to admit that most of what we claim to know in terms of economic theory was simply wrong - although the ECB at the point may simply have taken the IMF view that "the risk of transmitting vulnerabilities to the euro area is very small reflecting Greece’s small relative size". However since I certainly do not think that Greece is "too small to matter" and since I also think the part of our current body of economic knowledge about what you should and shouldn't do during overheating episodes is among the most tried and tested portions of our theoretical heritage,the Greek economy now seems likely to suffer from some rather severe macro problems in the course of the unwind of this particular binge, and I doubt the knock-on effects from the unwind for the rest of the eurozone will simply be too benign to notice.br /br //ppa href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SULjB2Rck5I/AAAAAAAALwM/QNNSrcv1MjM/s1600-h/greek+inflation.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5279031334119707538" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 176px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SULjB2Rck5I/AAAAAAAALwM/QNNSrcv1MjM/s320/greek+inflation.png" border="0" //a We might, of course like to ask ourselves whether it wasn't a pragmatic case of "simply nothing to be done"? I would argue that there most certainly was something to be done, and it was on the fiscal side, since interest rate policy was effectively under ECB control. The Greek government, on noting the signs of overheating should have moved to a restrictive fiscal stance - in other words it should have been running a surplus, and a big one, of possibly 2% or 3% of GDP - but as we have seen, just the opposite was the case, and at the same time as monetary policy was excessively accommodative fiscal policy was busy pumping in even more juice./ppAnd so it went on, until it simply couldn't go on any more, which is where we are now, and why Prime Minister Karamanlis cannot simply keep signing the cheques to buy social peace and satve off the downturn, although it is quite clear that this evident reality still hasn't been gotten across to Greece's two largest union federations who last week held a nationwide general strike to protest a set of government's remedial policies which, if they are anything, are already too little and too late. To give you a flavour of what is involved, here is a selection of some of the reforms that are currently causing so many problems.br /br /strongThe Much Needed Pension Reform/strong /pblockquoteUnless the social security system is fundamentally reformed, the long-term costs of population aging are expected to threaten the sustainability of the public finances. The completion of the actuarial studies of the major pension funds has been further delayed, and the authorities are proceeding with a narrowly focused reform agenda which is nonetheless already drawing considerable protest. They have ruled out reduction of the replacement rate and increases in the contribution rates. Instead, the focus is on obtaining efficiency gains through the merger of pension funds, tightening provisions for early retirement (the list of “heavy and unhealthy” occupations and the disability pension code would be reformed toward this end), increasing the incentives for people to stay employed longer, and tackling contribution evasion. In the absence of an assessment of the cost savings, it was not clear to what extent the current reform proposals would suffice to restore the pension fund to financial viability.br /a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=21937.0"Greece: 2007 Article IV Consultation/a - IMF Staff Report/blockquotebr /br /br /Despite strong opposition from the main trade organisation unions, the Greek parliament last March approved a law which aimed at a long overdue overhaul of the country's ailing social security system whose longer run actuarial deficits are now estimated to be running at more than twice Greece's 240 billion euro GDP. Experts predict a collapse of the system in 15 years unless something is done to prevent this and have warned that even the current reforms may not be enough to guarantee the system. We should remember that Greece has long running low fertility (around 1.3tfr) and has a rapidly rising population median age. The working age population is soon set to start declining as a proportion of the total population. Many of Greec's working population, however, simply do not understand this rather harsh and complex reality, and are angry about being asked to increase pension contributions for what they feel may well be reduced pension entitlements later, especially at the present time as they are already feeling the pinch of the global economic downturn. The changes included merging the country's myriad 133 pension funds to form a mere 13, raising retirement ages, eliminating special and supplementary pensions, and introducing incentives to encourage people to work additional years.br /br /strongPrivatisations To Pay Down Some Of The Debt/strongbr /br /Greece's New Democracy government has already auctioned stakes in Greece's largest ports in Piraeus and Thessaloniki, and sold a stake in telecoms company OTE. It has also pledged to push ahead with the privatization of several state-owned companies, such as Olympic Airways and Postal Savings Bank. Other assets to go on the auction block may include Athens International Airport. These sales have been pushed forward despite strong opposition by unions who fear job losses and wage reductions, but really - apart from the competitiveness arguments which underpin such moves - the government really have little alternative since something or other has to be sold here.br /br /strongWages and Salaries/strongbr /br /blockquoteWage moderation and enhancing wage flexibility are important challenges. The authorities will continue with the policy of containing increases in basic wages of government employees and are hoping for a favorable signaling effect on private sector wage settlements. However, in recent years, wage increases in the private sector have been relatively large and often exceeded productivity growth.br /a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=21937.0"Greece: 2007 Article IV Consultation/a - IMF Staff Report/blockquotepbr /One of the key areas of controversy in recent weeks has been a law which effectively ends the employees' right to collective wage contracts (Spain, be warned) and which won approval in the Greek parliament last August. The government said it wanted to clean-up debt-ridden state companies and overhaul protective employment laws in an attempt to attract more foreign investment. The Finance Minister Alogoskoufis recently told parliament the reform should be pushed ahead "for the sake of the Greek economy and society," since higher wages have added to state companies' debts, which ordinary Greeks had to cover with their taxes. /ppstrongAre We A Bunch Of Hypocrites In Southern Europe?/strongbr /br /br /One question I often ask myself when speaking with Spanish government employees who timidly ask me the predictable "crisis, what crisis? Can't you see, all the bars are still full!" question is just what is meant by that much used and little understood word "solidarity". We are proud to note down here in Southern Europe that we have a complex set of collective institutions which are driven by objectives of "social solidarity", not like those nasty little anglo saxon types (you know, the "neo-liberals") who live up north. But why is it, I ask myself, that I don't here this "crisis, what crisis" stuff from those working in the private sector, who spend the best part of the day at the present time looking across the factory or office floor at their colleagues and asking themselves who it is who will find themself going out of the door this week?/ppSolidarity means, if it means anything, that everyone shoulders some part of the burden in difficult times, and that people behave responsibily with their national resources and heritage, and accepting that when there is no money to pay for something, then there simply is no money to pay for it. If you find yourself having to depend on the stringent demands of others from outside your country, then the best thing you can do is to get your country out of the debt which is the cause of the problem, and then you can freely decide your own future for yourself. But while I can well understand how a relatively poor country like Ecuador gets itself into such a dependence-based mess, I am at a loss to understand how comparatively rich countries like Spain, Greece and Portugal have allowed things to come to the pass they have now come to, or how their citizens have let them get to the point they are at now./ppOne good example of the ways you get into such difficulty comes from Spain where the government now wants power companies to pay off one third of the latest tranche of a multi-billion euro deficit which has been created by utilities charging small consumers less than the cost of generation. At the present time, and following the partial deregulation of Spain's electricity sector, the government continues to set tariffs for small consumers. This deficit is estimated by the Spanish energy regulator CNE to be running at 5 billion euros for 2008 alone.br /The government has no immediate plans to oblige utilities to pay for a further third of the 11.2 billion euros of tariff deficit accumulated pre 2008, since this deficit is provided for in Spansih law and appears on the companies' books as a long term credit which they are expected to eventually claw back gradually through their customers. The government has been trying to finance this deficit through quarterly debt auctions, but these have met with mixed results, and the government had to declare null and void an attempted sale of 3.85 billion euros of debt amid market turbulence in back in September. The scandalous part about all this isn't that the government could use any funds it could raise at auction for other and better purposes right now, rather it is the fact that this 5 billion euro debt which has been incurred in 2008 by selling energy to customers below cost has only been adding to the hole in the current account deficit, since the energy it pays for effectively needs to be imported.br //ppOne key feature in all this woe has to be a political process that is extremely ineffective, and driven by the fact that no one likes to hear bad news, and that the last thing a politician is able to say is tighten-up your belts now lads and lasses, we are in for a rough ride. But isn't this just how the IMF gets such a bad name for itself, since the IMF doctors get called in just where the domestic political process breaks down, and where local politicians haven't the ability to stand up in front of their citizens and say, it's going to have to be like this, I'm afraid. Isn't this what just happened in Ukraine, Hungary and Latvia? And then people say, those "nasty folk" at the IMF, they cut pensions everywhere they go, and wages are down 8% in Hungary, and 15% in Latvia once the IMF get to run the show. That is the IMF make for a convenient scapegoat, but people seldom ask themselves why wages needed reducing, or why there is no money to pay the pensions. Oh, I know.................br /br /strongThe Greek Economy Is Slowing Rapidly/strongbr /br /Greek economic growth is now slowing rapidly. Quarter on quarter growth in Q3 2008 was 0.4%, and almost all the growth the economy has been getting this year (including that sharp spike you can see in Q2 in the chart below) comes from earnings from shipping services, earnings which are now falling dramatically as global trade starts to contract. The economy is expected to decelerate further in Q4, and may even contract slightly, with a best case scenario of remaining around the stationary level. Thus the Greek economy should start contracting - and thus formally enter recession in Q1 2009, at the latest.br /br //pa href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SUPBeiBC2RI/AAAAAAAALwc/DDvebeXuHOo/s1600-h/greece+gdp+qoq.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5279275918479776018" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 183px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SUPBeiBC2RI/AAAAAAAALwc/DDvebeXuHOo/s320/greece+gdp+qoq.png" border="0" //abr /br /Given the difficulties Greek banks are having in raising finance in the global financial and capital markets, the ensuing tightening credit conditions are bound to lead to a further slowdown in private consumption. Government consumption is expected to move more or less in line with GDP, while public investment is expected to rebound in 2009, largely reflecting an accelerating pace in the implementation of EU Structural Funds. Household borrowing has - as we have noted - increased at a rapid rate between 2003 and 2007, but during 2008 the rate of increase has been slowing steadily (see chart below).br /br /This reality is reflected in the recent statement by central bank govenor George Provopoulos that he hoped the bank bailout plan would be able to keep the country's credit expansion pace at 10 percent next year (down from around 18.1 percent currently). Even were this to be achieved (which is far from clear), as we have seen in Spain it will lead to a sharp contraction in an economy which had grown accustomed to new credit generation at twice that rate, and especially given the governments inability to step in and offer any fiscal support.br /br /a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SUPrrCp1pEI/AAAAAAAALwk/YFFkT5I3Wxw/s1600-h/greece+household+credit.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5279322312887608386" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 178px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SUPrrCp1pEI/AAAAAAAALwk/YFFkT5I3Wxw/s320/greece+household+credit.png" border="0" //abr /br /In addition, the Greek construction sector - which, it should be noted, never became so bloated as a share of GDP as it did in Spain and Ireland (where it hit around 11%) - has now been slowing since Q3 2007, when it hit around 7.5% of GDP, and was down to 5.4% in Q3 2008, and was dropping year on year at an annual 6.7% rate in September 2008 according to the latest data from the national statistics office.br /br /Industrial output is also now falling, by 4.5% in October, and the November manufacturing PMI registered a series low of 42.3 indicating even faster contractions in the pipeline. Greek industry has been getting some uplift from the economic boom in South Eastern Europe, and since that is now well and truly over, we should expect the manufacturing downturn to be sharp and sustained.br /br /br /In the shipping sector, a significant jump in world freight rates and a rise in shipping volumes on the back of a hefty increase in world demand for oil and other minerals both boosted the sector’s profitability, and increased it's importance in GDP growth (indeed growth in the last couple of quarters has been virtually all about shipping). This favourable position has now very much turned. George Economou, Greek shipping billionaire and Chairman and CEO of DryShips recently characterized the current collpase in the Baltic Dry Index (of bulk charter cargo rates) as something like "a nuclear explosion" for those in the shipping industry. The index, which measures world shipping charges for raw materials, has plummeted from a high of 11,793 in May to 672 (see chart below), its lowest level since soon after the index was established, back in 1985. Daily-rental rates for the largest Capesize category of carrier have plunged from $234,000 just two months ago to $2,320, a fall of a staggering 99%. br /br /a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SUUbDmPpE_I/AAAAAAAALxM/zOWaNNpcB64/s1600-h/baltic+two.png"img style="display:block; margin:0px auto 10px; text-align:center;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;width: 320px; height: 171px;" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SUUbDmPpE_I/AAAAAAAALxM/zOWaNNpcB64/s320/baltic+two.png" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5279655886781486066" //abr /br /Even more worrying for the mid-term outlook is the rush to cancel orders of new ships. In November, New York–based Genco Shipping and Trading willingly agreed to say adios to a $53 million deposit simply to get out of a half-a-billion-dollar deal to buy six new vessels. Clarkson Plc, the world's largest shipbroker, announced that while 378 ships were ordered during October 2007, only 37 were ordered in October 2008.  And back in Greece Kriton Lendoudis, managing director of Athens-based Evalend Shipping Co., estiamets that in Greece there are currently some 100 applications by shipowners to lay up their vessels. Lendoudis concludes, "The next 24 months do not look very optimistic." It's hard to disagree.br /br /So my feeling is that - taking all the above elements into account -  we should expect Greek economic performance to deteriorate at a rate and to an extent which may surprise the casual observer of economic events. Those who have already been following closely what has happened in countries like Spain, Latvia and Romania should, however, be fully prepared for what is now to come. The first signs are there, in the EU confidence chart I close with (below). As can be observed, a slow and steady deterioration has suddenly, after the summer, changed course, and become a sharp downturn. I fully expect that we will now see this general shift in confidence find its reflection in the real economy data that comes rolling in over the next three or four months.br /br /a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SULlsu3wRRI/AAAAAAAALwU/pEPZC6uZ72E/s1600-h/greece+EU+sentiment+index.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5279034269890528530" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 190px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SULlsu3wRRI/AAAAAAAALwU/pEPZC6uZ72E/s320/greece+EU+sentiment+index.png" border="0" //a]]></description>
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		<title>Another Jobs Record, Huge Deficits, Oil and Gold Forecasts, The Auto Bailout and More!</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/another-jobs-record-huge-deficits-oil-and-gold-forecasts-the-auto-bailout-and-more/</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Dec 2008 14:51:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Contrarian Profits</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.contrarianprofits.com/?p=10013</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[pJob market takes another turn for the worse… unemployment data at 26-year high#8230; Government solution:spend… budget and trade deficits swell more than expected#8230; Byron King on falling oil demand… and what it means for long-term investors#8230; Gold soars… Ed Bugos with some fresh price targets#8230; Signs of the times… Chinese bank opens in U.S., world’s biggest LBO collapses#8230; Plus, a href="http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/author/chris-mayer/"  class="alinks_links"Chris Mayer/a on the automaker bailout/p
ul/ul
p class="BodyCopy" align="left" strongAmericans filed over 573,000 jobless claims last week — the most since 1982./strong /p
p class="BodyCopy" align="left"The Labor Dept. also said the number of people collecting unemployment reached a 26-year high too, 4,429,000. /p
p class="BodyCopy" align="left"Unfortunately, we’re just getting started if a study released this morning by UCLA is accurate. The Anderson School of Management predicts we will see negative GDP for the#8230;/p]]></description>
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		<title>The Manipulation of Gold Prices</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/gold-markets/the-manipulation-of-gold-prices/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/gold-markets/the-manipulation-of-gold-prices/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 05 Dec 2008 01:01:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Alex Stanczyk</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.rapidtrends.com/blog/2008/12/04/the-manipulation-of-gold-prices/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[An excellent article posted at Seeking Alpha
The Manipulation of Gold Prices
by: James Conrad December 04, 2008
There is no other leveraged commodity market where short sellers increase their positions, materially, as the price rises, and increase them even more when prices are exploding, except gold and silver. The reason traders don’t normally do that is that [...]]]></description>
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		<title>Why Gold Will Soar As Fiat Currencies Crumble</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/why-gold-will-soar-as-fiat-currencies-crumble/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/why-gold-will-soar-as-fiat-currencies-crumble/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Dec 2008 14:58:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Contrarian Profits</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.contrarianprofits.com/?p=9467</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[pThe short-term path of gold is still unclear says strongDavid Galland/strong. But its a good sign that demand for physical gold soars when prices tip towards $750 an ounce. And this threshold is likely to creep upwards as the US dollar loses its worth, and foreign governments convert currency reserves for the precious metal./p
pThis from a href="http://www.moneymorning.com"  class="alinks_links"Money Morning/a:/p
blockquotepOf late, I have read a number of analysts, Jim Rogers even, who have expressed the view that gold could dip to the mid- to low $600 level./p
pIt could happen, but I think not. Already, buyers of physical gold are finding anything near $700 to be cheap and are helping to build a floor under the monetary metal. On that topic, a friend sent#8230;/p/blockquote]]></description>
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		<title>Gold is a “Buy” at  $750 or Less … But in the Low $600 Range, it Will be an Absolute Steal</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/gold-markets/gold-is-a-%e2%80%9cbuy%e2%80%9d-at-750-or-less-%e2%80%a6-but-in-the-low-600-range-it-will-be-an-absolute-steal/</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Dec 2008 09:30:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Money Morning</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/?p=3530</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[By David Galland
  Editor, The Casey Report
    
  Of late, I have  read a number of analysts, Jim Rogers even, who have expressed the view that  gold could dip to the mid- to low $600 level.
It...

Money Morning is here to help investors profit handso...]]></description>
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		<title>Repsol, Lukoil and Sacyr Vallhermosa Also Try Their Hand At Happy Families</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/global-economics/repsol-lukoil-and-sacyr-vallhermosa-also-try-their-hand-at-happy-families/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/global-economics/repsol-lukoil-and-sacyr-vallhermosa-also-try-their-hand-at-happy-families/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 23 Nov 2008 16:14:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Edward Hugh</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8991369883287712098.post-8095413603097220572</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[by Edward Hugh: Barcelonabr /br /blockquote“Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”br /Tolstoy/blockquotebr /Well this strongis/strong an interesting little fable of modern family life, even if all the families involved may not be ones which many of my readers would normally wish to belong to.br /br /As is now reasonably well know Russian private oil company Lukoil is currently making a bid for the shares in Spanish energy company Repsol which are owned by the deeply indebted Spanish property company Sacyr Vallhermosa.br /br /Shares in what is Spain's fifth biggest builder, and which currently occupies the somewhat ignominious position of being Spain's worst-performing stock this year, jumped the most in two years last Thursday (20 November) on reports they were about to sell their 20 percent stake in Repsol YPF to the Russian oil company OAO Lukoil. Sacyr, which said last week it was in talks over the possible sale of the stake, rose as much as 14 percent after EFE newswire identified Lukoil as a possible bidder. Lukoil is also reportedly willing to buy a further 9% of Respol stock owned by Criteria Caixacorp, the investment company established by Catalan savings bank La Caixa.br /br /In fact Sacyr spent 6.5 billion euros building up their the Repsol holding, between October and December 2006, paying an average of 26.71 euros a share for the stake. It is estimated that the proposed sale of the shares may fetch 20 percent to 30 percent more than their current market value of 4.9 billion euros. To give an idea of what this means, we might bear in mind that Repsol shares closed in Madrid on Thursday at 13.61 euros, and rose 2.3% on Friday, while the Spanish newspaper El Economista reported that Lukoil was offering Criteria and the other shareholders 28 euros a share for the combined stake which constitues just under 30 percent of Repsol. An offer at this price would value the combined stake at about 10.2 billion euros, and would mean that Sacyr would walk away covering their initial investment almost completely, which in these hard times must seem almost incredible. I mean, you might like to ask yourself just why it is that Lukoil is able and willing to pay so much. Certainly Russian investors were asking just this very question since Lukoil shares dropped on the news - falling 4.6 percent to 778.74 rubles on the Micex stock exchange in Moscow on Friday (for my explanation of the apparent analogy more on this topic below).br /br /But before going further there is perhaps one other little detail which is worth including at this point, and that is that since the combined stake of Sacyr and Criteria falls just short of the 30% mark which would give Lukoil effective control of the energy company (and make it obligatory to make a takeover offer to the other shareholders I think) it should not surprise us to find that the midewives of the deal are busy trying to identify those extra few shares which would push Lukoil over the 30% stake mark, and various names are being bandied around - like Mutua Madrileña (who have a two percent stake) or even La Caixa itself, since they effectively control another 6.1% of Repsol through their subsidiary company Repinves.br /br /strongIt's The Income Balance That Matters, Silly!/strongbr /br /Now before we go into all the gory little details as to why exactly it is that Sacyr Vallehermosa find themselves so pressed to sell, perhaps a little of the background macroeconomics would not go amiss here.br /br /Basically, as I a href="http://spaineconomy.blogspot.com/2008/11/spanish-crisis-in-nutshell.html"explain in more detail in this post/a, the principal problem facing Spain's economy at the present time is financing the large external deficit, which has been running at around 8-9,000 million euros a month (8 to 9 billion in anglo saxon language, or around 10% of GDP) for most of this year. This deficit was previously financed by an inflow of mortgage funding when external investors were willing to supply this, but since these investors became increasingly nervous following the US sub prime turmoil in August 2007, Spanish banks have had problems funding the deficit (and funding mortgages) as we have been seeing via the dramatic slowdown in the Spanish economy that this reluctance to lend has produced.br /br /Now.......br /br /The principal way to resolve this external deficit is to have a major macroeconomic correction such that exports start once more to be larger than imports, but this process is a huge and painful one, and it is not surprising that the patient, lead by the country's government, and the prime minister, is extremely reluctant to enter the operating theatre. So we struggle on, month by month, but the monthly deficit still has to be paid. And this is where the sale of Repsol to Lukoil comes in. The issue is not that Lukoil being a non-Spanish company is a disadvantage (which is why the a href="http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iAkHk7fw1xGSq1kl9YDf6ge3eepA"sort of criticism of the proposed deal which is coming from the PP/a is also completely out of touch with reality), but rather that it is absolutely essential to find an external buyer to raise more liquidity for the Spanish banking system, and if no other bidder is in a position to pay Sacyr what they need to make the sale viable for them, then Lukoil it is, "por las buenas o por las malas", as they say in Spanish. When you are up against the wall, and the only question is "do I shoot you today or tomorrow", the answers you give are not always coherent and well-thought-out ones.br /br /However, just how dangerous trying to handle the Spanish problem in this way actually is, can be seen from the fact that one of the country's flagship companies is effectively being sold off for less than two monthly installments on the current account deficit (the August deficit was 6 billion euros). The problem really is that Sacyr has to sell (see more details below) but there is no ship left among what used to be called the "new Spanish armada" who still has the creditworthiness needed to be able to buy. Gas Natural (who were one of the last stalwarts) had their Long-term Issuer Default rating of 'A' and Short-term IDR of 'F1' placed on Rating Watch Negative by Fitch last July after they announced they would need a new 19 billion euro syndicated loan to finance their acquisition of a sizeable chunk of energy company Fenosa from another debt laden Spanish construction giant ACS.br /br /Essentially going about things in this way eventually becomes totally unsustainable. Let me explain a little more. It is important to understand that the external accounts of a country are divided into two parts - a current account and a financial account - rather like the finances of a houshold can be divided into long term and a short term components like the acquisition of a property and the monthly mortgage installments which finance it. Well basically the structure of national financing isn't that different. Spain Incorporated can raise funds on the capital account by selling the shares of Repsol to an external purchaser, but we should never forget that these shares will then pay dividends, and these dividends will subsequently show up on the current account under the monthly income balance heading.br /br /Now normally, in a developed economy, the income balance should hover around the neutral zone, as external investments attract income, while FDI etc from abroad carry associated outflows. Indeed I would say that the normal difference between a developed and a developing economy is in the underlying dynamics of the income section of the current account.br /br /Well......br /br /It is precisely when we come to examine this aspect of the Spanish case that we see the extent of the hole that has just been blown in the flagship's main bulkhead, since the income balance (which was never perfect) has been turning steadily negative (which was only to be expected with all those loans coming in) since the early years of this century, and now runs at a monthly outflow of 3 billion euros, or thereabouts. That is to say, the first 3 billion of any goods and services surplus which Spain eventually does manage to generate will be earmarked to pay interest and dividends on loans and shares previously sold to finance the property and merger boom. So roll your sleeves up lads and lasses, since there is a lot of sweating to be done to work off all this accumulated excess fat. Or maybe you would prefer to try a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liposuction"liposuction/a?br /br /br /pa href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SSkjtZwvxCI/AAAAAAAALh0/wzYdEIMWblc/s1600-h/spain+income+account.png"img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5271784101730305058" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; CURSOR: hand; HEIGHT: 213px; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SSkjtZwvxCI/AAAAAAAALh0/wzYdEIMWblc/s320/spain+income+account.png" border="0" //abr /br /And of course, the more we go down the road of selling off the country's underlying assets (and, of course there is plenty more to come here, see below on Acciona, Endesa and Enel, or think of the recent agreement to sell Iberia to British Airways due to Caja Madrid's urgent need for liquidity - Caja Madrid is Iberia's largest single shareholder) to pay for petrol for all the SUVs we have been buying with the loans we sold, the worse the long term position becomes.br /br /br /strongSacyr In Danger Of Having To Make Firesales/strongbr /br /Rumours have been growing in investor circles of late that Sacyr Vallehermoso could be in such a tight financialcorner that it may forced into fire sales as time passes, if it fails to find buyers for assets it has put on offer to try to cover the massive debts it has hanging over it. Sacyr's share price has lost 69 percent of its value since the beginning of the year - as compared to a 39-percent slump in Spain's main IBEX stock index.br /br /br /Like many Spanish builders, Sacyr borrowed heavily during the final years of the boom in an attempt to diversify out of residential property as the nine-year-long domestic housing boom clearly started to wind down. But as in so many other cases, those who buy near the end of a wave buy dear, and risk, if things don't go right, having to sell cheap, very cheap, unless of course a gleaming white knight in shining armour like Lukoil gallantly comes to your rescue (or is it so gallant, see below). Sacyr had net debt of 18.3 billion euros at end-June, or eight times market value. The ratio of net debt to net equity was 5.3, outweighing peers like Ferrovial at 3.9 and ACS at 1.2.br /br /Sacyr thus announced on September 12 that it was putting assets up for sale, including its toll road unit Itinere and the 20 percent stake it has in Repsol YPF, all part of a major effort to pay down some of the debts. However, outside Lukoil no firm expressions of interest have materialized, and analysts are suggesting that this is because the prices being asked are far too high, as evidently it is hard to get good prices for assets in a bear market accompanied by a credit crunch. But this raises of course, the not simply incidental issue of why exactly it is that Lukoil is willing to pay so much over the going market rate, but we will get to that part later./ppSacyr did have around 347 million euros of debt maturing in the second half of 2008, but they have so far managed to refinance this, although there are somewhere in the region of another 2 billion euros worth set to expire in 2009, and worries about the difficulties which are likely to be associated with this process during the deep recession which Spain is now entering are putting a lot of pressure on the company.br /br /br /Sacyr has been attempting to cover next year's debt haemorrage using a mixture of renegotiation, housing sales, dividend payments and the possible sale strategic assets, like its road toll unit Itinere. Citi infrastructure fund had been reported to be showing some interest in a possible purchase of Itinere, but there has been no concrete evidence of progress.br /br /Press reports and analysts say the asking price for Itinere is in the region of 3.9 billion euros plus debt, and this sum is 400 million euros greater than the value of Itinere's failed initial public offering last April. Analysts tend to be rather dismissive of this kind of approach in the present climate./pblockquote"They were unable to do an IPO at 3.5 billion euros and four months later theybr /want to sell it for 3.9 billion? It's a joke," said an analyst at a major bankbr /who asked not to be named./blockquotepbr /Apart from the asking price there are also clauses in existing Itinere loans that require a renegotiation of terms if it changes ownership, which also are reported to present a stumbling block to any Citi-type deal.br /br /br /But the main problem which Sacyr faces right now is the current performance of Repsol itself, since the 5.1 billion euro bank loan which partially funded their purchase of the Repsol stake was guaranteed with Repsol shares, and on a margin trade basis. So when Repsol's share price falls, Sacyr must stump up more guarantees, putting further strains on the group's liquidity. And, of course, Repsol shares have been having a very hard time of it recently, evening fell by as much as 20 percent in a single day on October 22 over concerns about the energy company's exposure to Argentina, which is itself getting into ever deeper water with the international investment community: a further Argentine default would be the last thing that Repsol (and naturally Sacyr) need right now. Subsequently Repsol stock has regained some of the lost ground (and is now trading at around 15 euros) but this is still a far cry from the 26.7 euros a share Sacyr paid in 2006.br /br /Sacyr has so far pledged 40 percent of its rental property business Testa as additional collateral for debt taken out to buy the Repsol stake, and Goldman Sachs in a recent note suggest that as long as Repsol's share price remains above 12.9 euros per share, Testa will cover the collateral under current terms, but in Sacyr's present state that is a very wobbly if. And if Testa shares become no longer sufficient, then Sacyr will have to reconvene with banks to discuss alternative collateral, and this they need like a hole in the head, hence all the haste and attention being lauded on the Lukoil suitor.br /br /Analysts are agreed the longer it takes to sell assets to shore up its balance sheet, the more worrying Sacyr's borrowing levels will become and the greater the risk of fire sales.br /br /br /Spain's leading water company Aigues de Barcelona (Agbar) has also expressed an interest in the water division of Valoriza part of Sacyr's environemntal division. Valoriza is valued at around 1 billion euros. Agbar and Sacyr do not seem to be in actual talks at the present time, since the sum involved is insufficient to materially change the main problem, and Sacyr is more focused on Itinere and its Repsol stake. The Spanish newspaper Expansion reported that the sale process of Valoriza is being handled by Italy's Mediobanca and that as well as Agbar interest has been shown by Veolia which is a former partner of another Spanish builder - FCC - and operates in the environmental services business in Spain.br /br /Any eventual sale of these units would not be the first such move by Sacyr to keep moving ahead by selling assets, since back in April Sacyr sold its stake in French builder Eiffage, following a bungled takeover bid, and in the process cutting its borrowing by 6 percent.br /br /br /Sacyr representatives also recently met with lenders on its Repsol loan - who are lead by Banco Santander - to discuss the collateral clauses in their agreement. In principle under the original terms of the loan up until December 21 Sacyr have to put up collateral equal to at least 105 percent of the total loan, after that date this figue increases to 115 percent. In addition the interest rate on the loan rises to 1.10 percentage points more than euribor benchmark rates from the present 1 percentage point after the same date, and this is another reason why Sacyr would like to see their Repsol stake turned into history before xmas.br /br /The company has already pledged the maximum amount, 1.275 billion euros, of shares from its property unit Testa Inmuebles en Renta SA allowed under the terms of the loan. Sacyr began using Testa stock in January after Repsol, whose shares were initially assigned as collateral, declined below the 20 euro a share watermark, according to a regulatory filing Sacyr made on January 23 2008. Repsol fell to 12.92 euros on Oct. 28, the lowest in more than five years, and are down 40 percent over the past year. Sacyr has fallen 71 percent this year, the largest fall of any of the 35 most-traded stocks included in Spain's IBEX Index. /ppstrongSo What About Lukoil, Why Should They Be So Interested In Repsol?/strongbr /br /On the face of it the justification for Lukoil's interest in Repsol is not as self-evident as it at first appears, but then little in modern Russia ever is./ppLukoil has itself been struggling from a liquidity crunch back home in recent months, as the price of oil has dropped and lack of investment by the Russian oil majors means that field depletion is leading to ever lower levels of domestic output. Indeed the price of Urals crude, which is Russia's principal export blend, was down 68 percent from the July peak last week, hitting the "bargain basement" level of $44.80 a barrel./ppLukoil, which already owns refineries in Bulgaria and Romania, agreed in June to pay 1.35 billion euros to buy into an Italian refinery with partner ERG SpA. Lukoil, which has $1.9 billion in debt and loans scheduled to mature this year (although obligations will drop to $609 million in 2009 and $525 million in 2010) had only $1.66 billion in available cash at the end of June. So what is going on here?/ppWell, as I have said, Russia is facing its own credit crunch and construction slump, and as a result Vladimir Putin did recently introduce his own $180 billion dollar bank-bailout and loan guarantee scheme. Could it be that Lukoil want, in some shape and form or another, to take advantage of this potential funding to acquire the Repsol stake? Well, there are reasons for imagining that there might be a very strong incentive we haven't yet touched on for them to do just this. The principal reason among such reasons (or the bitter and compelling inner logic of the issue) was basically put under the spotlight by the recent announcement (and large gaffe) made by central bank Chairman Sergey Ignatief when he said that Russia's currency (aka the ruble) had a "certain tendency toward weakening'' . Since the ruble normally trades in a tighly controlled trading band this widely interpreted as meaning that the ruble is about to be devalued, and while estimates of the extent of the devaluation vary, something in the 15% to 20% range would be a good guess, I think./ppViewed in this light, a loan of some 6 or 7 billion euros (denominated in rubles) under the Putin bank bailout and credit guarantee scheme wouldn't look to be too bad a proposition, especially if it was subsequently to be repaid in rubles following a substantial devaluation. (I mean I don't think I will get here into any rather Machiavellian type of speculation about how a hypothetical demand for 7 billion euros from the central bank foreign exchange reserves - which are of course a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchiveamp;sid=aR_rE_uKvhts"under considerable pressure right now/a - would effectively constitute a very large "devaluation put", and offer us all the hallmarks of being a self-fulling declaration of intent). And don't start imagining that such an idea is very far fetched, since IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus effectively had to resign at the end of the 1990s following continuing scandals about IMF support loans being diverted into currency speculation. And that such activity is not entirely dead in today's Russia was confirmed by last week's threat by a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchiveamp;sid=aTZFxMOewjZU"First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov/a that Russian banks who convert government aid into foreign currency rather than lending to troubled companies would risk losing access to state funding . /ppObviously, in addition to any incidental gains they may make in the forex markets, Lukoil would also gain access to Repsol's extensive refining capacity - 1.23 million barrels a day according to their website - which includes five refineries in Spain, three in Argentina and one in Peru. Repsol also has holdings in another refinery in Argentina and two more in Brazil. And indeed the deal has a certain logic from the Repsol point of view, since the tie-in with Lukoil would give access to Russian supplies while the company currently relies on South America for about 95 percent of its present oil reserves. But then, as is normally the case, nothing in life ever comes free, and in this case the strings attached are important ones, very important ones./ppstrongSpain's Builders Up To Their Eyes In Debts/strong/ppbr /Obviously Sacyr is far from being alone in its current "tight fix". Acciona SA, is another Spanish builder struggling under the weight of a growing mountain of debt. Acciona came to international prominence when it bought joint control of power company Endesa SA last year together with Italy's Enel SpA. Well, the Madrid-based builder said July 30 that first-half net income fell 15 percent to 314 million euros as the takeover had increased debt costs, with Acciona net debt rising to 17 billion euros in Q2, up from 10 billion euros a year earlier. Acciona has recently stated it is in talks with creditors in an attempt to refinance the debt it contracted to make the purchase of the Endesa stake, but strongly denied that it has already committed to selling the stake in 2010. This denial followed a report on Spanish financial website El Confidencial that Acciona has assured its creditors that it will exercise an option it has to sell the 25 percent stake in Endesa to Italian partner Enel in 2010.br /br /Despite the denial the decision to sell would be a logical one, and appears as if it may well form part of an agreement Acciona have reached with a group of banks lead by Banco Santander not to link Endesa's share price to the collateral required for the 7.1 billion euro in loans it received for the stake buy, as previously agreed. The 2 loans were due to have expired on 31 December 2012, but Acciona was obviously anxious to get the conditions changed./pblockquote"Acciona has not committed to exercising the March 27, 2010 put option but thatbr /does not mean that the company will not exercise it on that date or at a laterbr /date," the Spanish builder said in a statement to the stock market regulator. /blockquotepUnder the previous contract Acciona needed to give additional guarantees in the case that Endesa stock fell below 25 euro per share and this had been the case since October 6. Such guarantees -or margin calls - disappeared under the new contract. In exchange the new contract increased interest rates on the entire sum of the debt - doubling the premium when compared with the previous rate of 60 basis points over Euribor. Thus we find ourselves in exactly the same position vis-a-vis margin calls as Sacyr has with Repsol. The 21 syndicated banks behind the principal Acciona loan include Santander, ING, La Caixa, RBS, Caja Madrid, Calyon and Natixis, and the loan effectively financed the original 25 percent stake that Acciona took in Endesa following a 42.5 billion euro bidding contest in alliance with Italy's Enel which currently owns some 70 percent of Endesa. At the time Enel and Acciona came out in front of competing bids from Germany's E.ON EONG.DE and Catalonia-based Gas Natural.br /br /br /Back in July the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera reported that Enel was in talks to buy out Acciona for 10 billion euros, adding the point that any such deal would needs the approval of Spanish prime minister Jose Luis Zapatero - so Zpt is going to be busy, a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchiveamp;sid=aUXnCHZ4Tqc0"since he has already flown to St Petersburg/a. Corriere also suggested that Endesa's development was currently being paralysed by an ongoing dispute between the two principal shareholders. The paper stated that there was an urgent need to find a solution to overcome the repeated obstacles raised over Endesa board decisions by Jose Manuel Entrecanales, who is chairman of both Acciona and Endesa. Enel has plans to expand Endesa outside of Spain, while Acciona is simply looking to sell its stake to pay down some of its 18 billion euros of debt, according to the paper.br /br /Valuation of Acciona's stake in Endesa depends on valuation of Endesa's wind power generating plants, which Acciona would like to acquire. Any finally agreed exit price for Acciona would also need to take account of the put option it holds to sell the Endesa stake by October 2010 to Enel at a price of 10 billion to 12 billion euros.br /br /br /Meantime another Spanish building dynosaur - Ferrovial - labours on with its heroic attempt to try to sell its Stanstead airport holding in the UK - but at least in this case the asset being disposed of does not form part of Spanish national patrimony. The Spanish builder that spent $20 billion buying the British Airports Authority is taking longer than anticipated to sell London's Gatwick airport because of the global financial crisis, according to its Chief Financial Officer Nicolas Villen. /pblockquote``It's difficult to say where we are in this crisis,'' Villen said in anbr /interview in New York late on Nov. 14. ``In this financial crisis it will alwaysbr /be more difficult for potential bidders of this asset to obtain financing. So Ibr /think it's going to be a lengthier process than usual.''br //blockquotepBAA currently provides poor service and has failed to plan for extra capacity, according to a recent report from the U.K. Competition Commission, adding a recommendation that the company be stripped of the capital's Gatwick and Stansted airports and either Glasgow or Edinburgh in Scotland. Both Heathrow and Gatwick had a drop in traffic of about 0.5 percent in the first nine months of the year, described by Villen as a "moderate decline" when compared with earlier economic crises, when traffic fell by 3 percent or more. /ppFerrovial had a third- quarter loss of 17 million euros, which compared with a year earlier profit of 49.6 million euros. The company's total debt fell 5.4 percent from a year earlier to 28.6 billion euros in September.br /br /Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas (or FCC) - Spain's third largest builder - on the other hand had net debt of 8.51 billion euros at the end of the first quarter, 54 percent more than a year earlier, and up from 7.97 billion at the end of 2007./ppstrongAnd It's The Same Picture Among Property Developersbr //strongbr /Spanish property group Tremon last week became the first major property developer to follow in the footsteps of a href="http://spaineconomy.blogspot.com/2008/07/spanish-builder-martinsa-fadesa.html"Martinsa Fadesa/a, and file for administration after failing to meet debt payments, causing a fall in the shares of those banks which have total exposure of around 1 billion euros to the company. Tremon is thus the second large Spanish property group to seekbr /administration this year following the July decision of Martinsa Fadesa. Among Tremon's biggest creditors are Banco Popular, which has an exposure of around 200 million euros exposure, unlisted savings bank Bancaja with 100 million and Banco Pastor which has 95 million. /pblockquote"Our debt is up to 1 billion euros, and more than 90 percent is held by abr /pool of 16 banks. Administration was filed last thing on Friday," saidbr /lawyer Angel Romero, who is acting as Tremon's spokesman./blockquotepOther Spanish property companies with large debts are Metrovacesa (6.991 billion euros), Colonial (10.086 billion euros) Realia (2.26 billion euros) and Reyal Urbis (4.672 billion euros)br /br /br /Spanish property firm Metrovacesa recently stated they expect to meet the terms of a 3.2 billion euro syndicated loan by the end of the year. At the end of September, Metrovacesa's core earnings were 2.13 times its financial costs, below the minimum limit of 2.25 times the company is obliged by creditors to meet by the end of 2008. Among other conditions attached to Metrovacesa's 3.2 billion euro loan is that the company maintain its 6.9 billion euros of debt at no more than 55 percent of asset value. The company said its debt stood at 54.4 percent of assets on Sept. 30 when it published its third-quarter results. If Metrovacesa does not comply with the conditions of the syndicated loan, the banking syndicate can order its immediate repayment and order the company to talk to its creditors.br /br /Spanish stock market regulator CNMV last week requested Metrovacesa to provide it with details on where it stands with repaying the syndicated loan, as well as with refinancing 810 million pounds worth of borrowing with HSBC, the money was used to buy the bank's London offices. Metrovacesa stated in reply that the company was still in talks with several financial entities over refinancing the HSBC debt, which falls due at the end of November, but had yet to reach a deal. /ppReal estate company Reyal Urbis also recently reached a deal with creditors to refinance debt of 3.006 billion euros. In a statement to the Madrid stock exchange regulator, Real Urbis stated it had obtained two new credit lines which gave it "the necessary liquidity for its operative management". The new deal refinances two syndicated loans signed in 2005 and 2006 in addition to other loans and debt issues. Under the new financing terms, the company has been able to postpone the next payment on its debt until October 2011 and signed up to twice-yearly payments after that date until 2015. Thus it seems there is a tendency to postpone into the future - to 2011 at least - and then perhaps at that point a critical moment will be reached in all this, assuming that is that it doesn't come before, which if we look at the very dramatic state of the contraction in the Spanish economy is a possibility which certainly can't be excluded./ppIn 2015 - should we get that far - the company will then have to pay off the remaining 40 percent of the debt. One of Spain's largest developers, formed through the merger of Urbis and Reyal in 2007, Reyal Urbis said it had net debt of 5.5 billion euros when it reported its first-half results. /ppAnother Spanish real estate company, Colonial, recently reported a nine-month net loss of 2.475 billion euros after taking charges for plunging asset values. The loss compared to a profit of 356.9 million euros for the same period last year. Group sales for the nine months to end-September dived 23.7 percent to 472.8 million euros, but still the "walking dead" real estate firm managed to put through a debt restructuring in September. Funding banks had previously taken partial control of Colonial earlier this year when some of its shareholders failed to meet obligations. Residential land sales fell by over a half in the fisrt nine months of 2008 and Colonial's net debt stood at 8.975 billion euros as of the end of September. /ppstrongAnd As Spain's Government Sells Bonds......br //strong/ppSpain's government still effectively seems to be in denial about where all of this more or less inevitably leads, and is still trying to keep alive the ailing builders and property developers on an emergency life support ("reanimator") system by selling government debt to guarantee the ever more risky private variant. Thus last Thursday (20 November) the (previously-postposed) first special "reverse auction" was held and the Spanish government bought 2.115 billion euros of bank assets out of a maximum possible of 5 billion euros. Spain's Economy Ministry said a total of 4.562 billion euros of assets had been offered. Spain's Fund for Acquiring Financial Assets (FAAF) held the reverse repo auction for investment grade, 2 year asset-backed-debt issued after Aug 1 2007. It plans to purchase up to a further 5 billion in 3-year mortgage-backed debt in December.br /br /The government has said it plans to buy up to 50 billion euros in bank assets in 2008 and 2009 to provide a market for longer-term bank debt which institutions cannot sell to investors or the European Central Bank. The head of the State Credit Institute (ICO) Aurelio Martinez argued after the auction that some banks may have felt inhibited from participating due to fear of being stigmatised. FAAF received 70 bids worth 4.56 billion euros from 28 banks. Of those, 51 bids from 23 different banks were accepted, the rest were rejected after failing to meet criteria ranging from their size and interest rate to the participation of the bank in lending markets. Questions are being raised by analysts about the effectiveness of the fund given the limits on how much banks can sell, the stigma attached to sales, and the comparative ease of borrowing more anonymously from the European Central Bank./ppThe other side of this particular coin is however the little question of just how all this bank funding is going to be paid for. To some extent this became clearer this week since the day before the auctions the Spanish government previously paid its first visit to debt markets for funds in connection with the programme, and the first programme-specific auction was duly held on Wednesday 19th November. Remarkably the sale generated quite strong demand and even revealed comparatively stable spreads. Indeed demand was such that the Spanish treasury was able to issue 200,000 euros more in debt than initially anticipated in the special 4.4 billion euro sale to cover bank asset acquisitions. /ppThat outcome is especially surprising as it compared with a disappointing demand in a sale of new 10-year German bunds held the same day, and which met fewer bids than the sum issued. Amazingly even the spreads remained stable. Investor appetite may be cautious in view of the high levels of uncertainty surrounding sovereign issues and debt levels over the next few years, and may be showing a preference over debt with a somewhat shorter maturity horizon. Anecdotal evidence (as encountered by the author of the present post) also suggests that many Spanish people may be seeing treasuries as a "safe haven" against a banking system where lack of reliable information makes them nervous about using deposit accounts./ppSpain has said it plans to issue issue up to the full 50 billion euros earmarked for this kind of bank support in public debt (thus raising around 5% of GDP in new debt) over the next two years. Spain's deepening economic problems has caused the spread between 10-year Spanish bonds and the benchmark German bund to widen to 60 basis points in October from 8 bps a year earlier. /ppThe much smaller yield differential on shorter term debt was reflected in a yield of 2.7 percent on the Spanish two-year debt sold on Wednesday which compared favourably with a rate of 2.71 percent in the secondary market the previous day. This paper traded in a band of 2.503/687 on Thursday in the secondary market and its spread against comparative German debt remained steady at 25 basis points. /ppSpain is to hold further auctions December and January to sell bonds and bills. Of course it is not clear who exactly is buying this paper. If it is the Spanish themselves then it will be of little avail (as per the above external financing argument), but Industry Minister Miguel Sebastian did tell Reuters on October 20 that Spain was appealing to Arab sovereign wealth funds to buy the bonds. With what success we have no idea./pp/pp.....strong...The Government Deficit Rises Sharplybr //strong/ppAs a result of all this selling Spain's budget numbers are deteriorating fast and could hit the EU 3 percent fiscal deficit limit as early as by the end of this year, according to a statement from central bank governor Miguel Angel Fernandez Ordoñez before the Spanish Senate last week. The limit itself is only a technicality at this point in time, but it is astonishing to learn that in the space of less than one year Spain will have gone from a budget surplus equal to 2 percent of GDP to a deficit of 3 percent. This is a shift of 5 percentage points in a year, and of course, if this continues into 2009 and 2010, then the debt to GDP levels will start to shoot up rapidly.br /br /Fernandez Ordoñez may well not tell you (a href="http://spaineconomy.blogspot.com/2008/11/fernandez-ordoez-says-no-deflation-in.html"as I say here/a) the whole truth, but he normally does tell you the truth and nothing but the truth, andn he is thus fast becoming one of the main sources of reliable information in what is now a worm-infested Spanish communications system (just as another piece of anecdotal evidence here, I was to have travelled to the Basque Country tomorrow to appear on a regional TV programme about the merger between local cajas Kutxa and BBK, but the programme was cancelled - for the second time now - for the simple reason that the production team could find absolutely no one apart from me who was willing to talk in front of the cameras about this kind of topic. Thus hundred of Tertulias, thousands of empty words, and little in the way of cool clear light on the subject. The wheels of metaphysics turn round and round, but I see no motion in the drive shaft...). Anyway, Fernandez Ordoñez has been quick to pick up on the fact that the government's present forecast of 1 percent growth next year — unveiled just weeks ago in the 2009 budget — is already well out of date and the budget provisions need to be revised accordingly, and on the basis of much more realistic economic forecasts. If they don't start to do this, then the spreads will inevitably only start to rise further and faster as investors get more and more paniky about the actual underlying debt dynamics in the absence of any kind of realistic information./pblockquote"We must make a downward revision of prospects for economic growth in the nextbr /few quarters," Fernandez Ordoñez said. /blockquotepI think everyone now accepts what Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero explicitly said last Thursday: namely that Spain will inevitably exceed the European Union budget deficit limit as it tries to spend its way out of recession. EU budget rules specifically allow for countries to breach the deficit limit of 3 percent during exceptional circumstances, and Zapatero rightly said such conditions existed in Spain, where the economic contraction is about to become much sharper than elsewhere in Europe. /pblockquotep"Whether it (the deficit) goes to 3.5 or 4 or 4.2, we will have to wait to seehow the economy develops," Zapatero said during a press conference. "The Spanish government is not going to resign itself to recession, we're going to try to grow and provide jobs,' he said. "We're going to use the public deficit to keep social promises"/p/blockquoteOf course, Zapatero is right here, Spain does need to use its fiscal leverage - Spain's debt to GDP ratio was around 20 percentage points below the EU average at the start of 2008 - to address the probelms. But just one more time Bank of Spain Governor Miguel Angel Fernandez Ordonez is also right in urging Zapatero to show some sort of fiscal prudence and hold back some public funds in case (I would say for when) conditions get even worse. Ordonez is explicitly expressing his fears that a focus on short-term, emergency measures, without a total restructuring plan, may rule out deeper structural labour and service market overhaulswhich will be needed in the future to raise competitiveness and promote long-term growth.br /br /I will be even more explict. As I have argued here, and in numerous other posts, the present Spanish depression is being caused by deep-seated structural problems, and not by transitory cyclical ones. Thus, using fiscal policy as if this was simply a classical problem of the business cycle is a big mistake, on my view, and is needlessly using up vital ammunition which will be badly needed to take us through the battlefields which lie ahead.br /br /We are now facing an economic slump of unprecendented proportions in Spain, and more than likely an ongoing problem a href="http://spaineconomy.blogspot.com/2008/11/inflation-is-dead-in-spain-fasten-up.html"of outright price deflation/a. To fight this combination using the traditional fiscal and monetary policy tools simply will not work - they are likely trying to drain an ocean with a teaspoon. We need new tools, fresh thinking, and a complete change of course. And the sooner we get them the better.br /br /Well, this has been a very lengthy post. If anyone else has actually arrived this far, I can simply thank you for your patience and your perseverence. You are undoubtedly the kind of enduring person the new Spain is going to badly need. I hope you have learnt as much in reading this as I have learnt in the doing the background research which was necessary for writing it.]]></description>
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		<title>Gold in the Low $600s?</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/gold-in-the-low-600s/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/gold-in-the-low-600s/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2008 18:27:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Contrarian Profits</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.contrarianprofits.com/?p=8847</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Of late, I have read a number of analysts, Jim Rogers even, who have expressed the view that gold could dip to the mid- to low $600 level.  Could happen, but I think not. Already, buyers of physical gold are finding anything near $700 to be cheap and so are helping to build a floor under the monetary metal. </p>
<p>On that topic, a friend sent this item along last week… <em></em></p>
<p><em></em></p>
<ul style="20px;"><em>(Gulf News Nov 12) Riyadh: There has been an unprecedented demand for gold in the Saudi market recently, with over 13 billion Saudi riyals (Dh12.75 billion) being spent on the yellow metal during the last two weeks.</em><em>Demand is expected to rise still higher as more investors turn to gold as&#8230;</em></ul>]]></description>
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		<title>Paulson Throws the Markets a Curve</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/paulson-throws-the-markets-a-curve/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/paulson-throws-the-markets-a-curve/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Nov 2008 16:24:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Contrarian Profits</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Market Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Addison Wiggin]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.contrarianprofits.com/?p=8422</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Paulson throws the markets a curve&#8230;  Goldman says to buy the yen&#8230;  RBA intervenes to protect the AUD$&#8230;<br />
China provides support to commodities&#8230;                             And Now&#8230; Today&#8217;s Pfennig!<br />
Good day&#8230; Chuck is out today, so I get the opportunity to share some of my thoughts on the markets. As many of you know, I spent most of last week in Washington DC giving presentations at the Money Show. On the way to the hotel, the cab driver who had noticed my <a href="http://www.everbank.com" class="alinks_links">EverBank</a> luggage tag asked if I was a banker. He said he had seen a lot of us lately. I guess I was one of the few bankers flying into Washington DC who wasn&#8217;t heading over to the Treasury Dept. to get some&#8230;</p>]]></description>
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		<title>Even Obama Can’t Fix The Economy</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/even-obama-can%e2%80%99t-fix-the-economy/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/even-obama-can%e2%80%99t-fix-the-economy/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Nov 2008 12:53:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Contrarian Profits</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Market Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.contrarianprofits.com/?p=7991</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>President elect Barack Obama is expected to move quickly to try and revive the US economy. <strong>Theo Casey</strong> says a new fiscal stimulus will be targeted at job creation and infrastructure building instead of free handouts. However, it still won&#8217;t stop the recession. And it will add even more zeros to Treasury debt.</p>
<p>This from Fleet Street Invest:</p>
<blockquote><p>As investors, we must take a step back from the spectacle of this historic event and ask a more pressing question. What does this mean for the world economy and the world’s stock markets?</p>
<p>First the economy&#8230;</p>
<p>Almost 70 per cent of Americans named the economy as the number one motivation behind their vote.</p>
<p>A vote for a man that has so much influence on us all.</p>
<p>After all,&#8230;</p></blockquote>]]></description>
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		<item>
		<title>Why Today’s Crisis Is More Like 1919 Than 1929</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/why-today%e2%80%99s-crisis-is-more-like-1919-than-1929/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/why-today%e2%80%99s-crisis-is-more-like-1919-than-1929/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 Nov 2008 18:54:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Justice Litle</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Market Commentary]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.contrarianprofits.com/?p=7903</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Mainstream media is full of &#8216;Great Depression&#8217; comparisons to today&#8217;s credit crisis. But <strong>Justice Litle</strong> says there are actually many similarities to be found a decade earlier. In 1919, there was a stock market crash, commodity slump, and a major bank bailout. But there is some hope: out of all that misery, the &#8220;roaring twenties&#8221; were born.</p>
<p>More from Justice in <a href="http://www.taipanpublishing.com" class="alinks_links">Taipan</a> Daily:</p>
<p> </p>
<blockquote><p>The 1920s – widely known as “the roaring twenties” – were a  time of great dynamism and change in the United States. </p>
<p>The decade earned its nickname and then some. Car ownership  took off&#8230; movies and radio captivated the nation&#8230; and the stock market went  through the roof. </p>
<p align="center"></p>
<p><br />
</p>
<p>The Dow went from a trough of 63.90 in 1921 to a peak&#8230;</p></blockquote>]]></description>
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		<title>Four “Safe Haven” Markets For U.S. Investors</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/four-%e2%80%9csafe-haven%e2%80%9d-markets-for-us-investors/</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 08:00:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Martin Hutchinson</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/?p=2923</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[By Martin Hutchinson
    Contributing Editor
Money Morning/The Money Map Report
It must now be horribly clear to everybody with an  investment portfolio &#8211; indeed, to anyone who watches the...

Money Morning is here to help investors profit handso...]]></description>
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		<title>RA&#8217;s Daily Russia News Blast &#8211; Oct. 24, 2008</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-in-russia-stocks/ras-daily-russia-news-blast-oct-24-2008/</link>
		<comments>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-in-russia-stocks/ras-daily-russia-news-blast-oct-24-2008/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Oct 2008 08:00:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Robert Amsterdam</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2008/10/ras_daily_russia_news_blast_oc_31.htm</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.robertamsterdam.com/blast102408.jpg"><img alt="blast102408.jpg" src="http://www.robertamsterdam.com/blast102408-thumb.jpg" width="210" height="145" align="right" hspace="5"/></a><strong><em>TODAY: Medvedev says Russia can emerge stronger from crisis; Duma approves bank bailout; the S&#38;P casts a wary eye; Interior Ministry disputes journalist's death in Georgia; Georgia decries Russian troop build up in Ossetia; and Kangaroos cower from Russian schoolchildren.</em></strong>

Russian markets may be down 70 percent since May, but on a video posted on his website, President Medvedev <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE49M7RN20081023">assures</a> the world Russia can "<em>avoid banking, forex or debt crisis and go through today's difficulties without losing the potential we have created</em>." Whatever you want to call the current economic situation, it's clear the VEB has been thrust into the role of <a href="http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/600/42/371893.htm">savior</a>. The Duma, meanwhile, approved a plan to allow the Russian government to spend more than $18 billion bailing out Russian banks. But despite the overtures to project confidence, Standard &#38; Poor's <a href="http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/600/42/371907.htm">downgraded</a> Russia's sovereign credit rating to negative, and <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/3248672/Russian-default-risk-tops-Iceland-as-crisis-deepens-financial-crisis.html">cautioned</a> that "<em>the ongoing concentration of the financial system in state hands</em>" had become a political risk. Perhaps it's not a <a href="http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12436213">financial crisis</a> or "<em>Kremlinomics</em>" that's to blame, but rather, <a href="http://www.kommersant.com/p-13434/world_economic_crisis_Belarus/">corruption in the West</a>.]]></description>
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		<title>India&#8217;s Ship IS Battered By The Global Storm, But She Will Survive!</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/investing-in-india-stocks/indias-ship-is-battered-by-the-global-storm-but-she-will-survive-2/</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Oct 2008 12:36:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Edward Hugh</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8991369883287712098.post-1528446214904854007</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[by Edward Hugh: Barcelona<br /><br />India is in the middle of a storm at the moment, there can be no doubt about that. But the important point to note is that this storm is not of India's making. The financial turmoil in a number of key developed economies, and above all the United States, is sending shock waves across the global economy, and as is normal, when the earth trembles, it is the most fragile who notice it most. India's economy may be fragile in the sense that it is very vulnerable to what is colloqially known as global risk sentiment, but it is not fragile in terms of being susceptible to having its growth trajectory knocked completely off course. India may be shaken, but her economy will not be broken.<br /><br /><strong>Emerging Market Bonds</strong><br /><br />Emerging-market bonds had their worst week in four years this week as the deepening credit crisis raised global recession concerns and slammed the brakes on demand for higher-yielding securities. The extra yield investors demand to own developing-nation bonds rather than U.S. Treasuries surged 62 basis points, or 0.62 of a percentage point, this week to 4.41 percentage points, according to data derived from the JPMorgan Chase EMBI+ index. The increase is the biggest since May 2004 and leaves the so-called spread at its widest since June of that year. The spread has now swelled 1.42 percentage points since the end of August.<br /><br /><p><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeF-5-hTZI/AAAAAAAAK-I/slQhMEwnAFQ/s1600-h/jp+morgan2.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeF-5-hTZI/AAAAAAAAK-I/slQhMEwnAFQ/s320/jp+morgan2.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br />Investors remained wary of emerging-market debt as evidence mounted that most of the major major economies - the U.S., the UK, Japan and the Eurozone - are sliding into recession. This realisation has triggered a major exit from commodities, which are a significant source of export revenue for a large number of developing nations. In particular bonds extended losses on the perception that the $700 billion U.S. bank bailout would not work miracles and thus many developed economies will be struggling to digest the impact of the credit blow-out for some time to come.<br /><br /><br />Until credibility is restored, we will not see people investing in the numbers that emerging economies like India and Brazil badly need to see. But at the same time, we might ask ourselves, at theis moment in time if they don't invest in India and Brazil, then where are they going to invest? The problem is that in the present global environment people are not simply not willing to take assume what is perceived as "risky" without being paid a large - and from the emerging economy point of view - damaging premium. Of course, the situation is also confused since people are no longer clear what constitutes "risky" and what doesn't - the German government, for example, yesterday found itself forced to offer a blanket guarantee of all domestic bank deposits to head off any risk of flight from German bank accounts. </p><p>One result of all this nervousness is that the cost of protecting developing nations' bonds against default has been steadily rising. Five-year credit-default swaps based on Argentina's debt climbed 44 basis points to 12.55 percentage points last week, the highest since at least June 2005. That means it costs $1.255 million to protect $10 million of the country's debt from default. Credit-default swaps, contracts conceived to protect bondholders against default, pay the buyer face value in exchange for the underlying securities or the cash equivalent should a company fail to adhere to its debt agreements.<br /><br /><br /><strong>Emerging Market Stocks</strong><br /><br />Emerging-market stocks also fell substantially last week, experiencing their the biggest weekly decline in seven years, led by the banks and energy companies. The MSCI Emerging Markets Index dropped 2.3 percent on Friday to 741.73, following a 3.4 percent decline on Thursday. The index lost 10 percent on theweek, the most since the September 2001 terrorist attacks.<br /><br /><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeJMbeM4zI/AAAAAAAAK-Q/qUb9e8aW-IE/s1600-h/MSCI2.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeJMbeM4zI/AAAAAAAAK-Q/qUb9e8aW-IE/s320/MSCI2.png" border="0" /></a><br />Turkey's benchmark index fell the most in three weeks, losing 4.2 percent to 34,553 in the first trading day since Sept. 29. Russia's Micex Index slumped 5.3 percent, extending its annual loss to 51 percent. India's Sensex index slid 4.1 percent to 12,526.32. Reliance Industries Ltd., India's biggest company by market value, slumped 7.6 percent, to its lowest in a year.<br /><br /><strong>Inflation Falls</strong><br /><br />But while India's financial system has been taking a beating, Indian inflation, almost un-noticed -slipped back to a 13-week low in late September, giving the central bank some breathing space to keep interest rates unchanged and lossen the liquidity strings when it next meets at the end of this month. Wholesale prices rose 11.99 percent in the week to Sept. 20 from a year earlier after gaining 12.14 percent in the previous week, the commerce ministry said in a statement in New Delhi on Thursday.<br /><br /><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeLgg4yv0I/AAAAAAAAK-Y/I0ypF9PmDKs/s1600-h/india+inflation.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeLgg4yv0I/AAAAAAAAK-Y/I0ypF9PmDKs/s320/india+inflation.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br />Reserve Bank of India Governor Duvvuri Subbarao is under pressure to boost money supply as a local stock sell-off triggered by the global credit crunch has drained funds from the banking system, increasing borrowing costs. Subbarao will undoubtedly seek to steer a middle course, since, given that inflation is still double the central bank's target he will not want to seem to be "soft", while on the other hand he will want to be prudent and will try to head off an excessively rapid credit tightening on the back of the global crunch. In addition, the peak of global inflation has now undoubtedly past, and we are now likely to see growing deflationary (rather than inflationary) headwinds as capacity levels exceed demand across the whole global economy and commodity prices tumble, as <a href="http://www.rgemonitor.com/emergingmarkets-monitor/253856/the_global_economy_and_her_financial_markets__is_deflation_the_next_macro_story">Claus Vistesen explains in this excellent and timely post</a>. </p><p>The Indian central bank had been busy tightening, and had raised the cash reserve ratio, or the proportion of deposits that lenders maintain with it as reserves, by 400 basis points to 9 percent during the period between December 2006 and July 2008 in an ongoing battle to contain inflation. The bank will make the outcome of its next meeting in Mumbai known on Oct. 24, but we can be pretty sure that the "bias" will now have shifted towards loosening liquidity conditions rather than tightening them, as the priorities have changed, and the big priority now is to avoid any systemic bank problems, to keep the cost of borrowing for Indian companies down, and to prevent consumer credit slowing too dramatically. </p><p>The Indian banking system has been under increasing strain in recent days, and one symptom of this is that the rate at which Indian banks lend to each other reached an 18-month high of 17.5 percent on Oct. 1. Indian banks borrowed an average 413 billion rupees a day from the central bank in September, almost twice the amount in August, further indicating a shortage of funds in the banking system.<br /><br /><br /><strong>Commodities Down</strong><br /><br />Commodities, as measured by the Reuters/Jefferies CRB Index of 19 raw materials, tumbled 9.9 percent last week, the most since at least 1956.<br /><br /></p><p><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeEMtA__oI/AAAAAAAAK-A/G4HKG-PuiFo/s1600-h/reuters2.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeEMtA__oI/AAAAAAAAK-A/G4HKG-PuiFo/s320/reuters2.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br />Crude oil has lost 12 percent during the week, the most since 2004. The contract for November delivery traded at $94.47 a barrel, up 0.5 percent, as of 12:11 p.m. London time. Copper fell as much as 3.1 percent to $5,670 a ton on the London Metal Exchange, the lowest since February 2007 and was down 12% on the week. </p><p>Such downward movement in commodity prices has a double-edged impact on emerging economies. On the one hand inflation, which has in large part been driven up by rising commodity prices, will reduce significantly, but on the other hand many emerging economies are dependent on revenue from commodity sales to finance growth and development. Really this is a situation which will sort the "men" from the "boys", since those emerging economies which are really going to emerge will be in a position to switch the driving force of growth from commodity and agricultural dependence to industrialisation and domestic investment and consumer demand. It is my firm belief that India is now decidedly inside the group which is in the process of making this transition.<br /><br /><br /><strong>Stocks Down</strong><br /><br />Indian stocks fell during the week, with the benchmark Sensex stock index declining to its lowest in 18 months. The Bombay Stock Exchange's Sensitive Index, dropped 529.35, or 4.1 percent, to 12,526.32, its lowest since April 2, 2007. The index posted its second weekly decline, falling 4.4 percent. The S&#38;P CNX Nifty Index on the National Stock Exchange fell 3.4 percent to 3,818.30. The BSE 200 Index declined 3.8 percent to 1,515.29. Nifty futures for October delivery fell 2.9 percent to 3,853.<br /><br /><br />Overseas investors bought a net 845 billion rupees ($18 million) of Indian stocks on Sept. 30, trimming their net outflow this year from equities to $9.1 billion, the nation's stock market regulator said.<br /><br /><br /><strong>Forex Reserves</strong><br /><br />India's foreign exchange reserves fell marginally by USD 153 million to USD 291.819billion for the week ended September 26 from USD 291.972 billion in the previous week. Reserves had jumped by USD 2.511 billion in the previous week. Foreign currency assets (FCA), during the week, dropped to USD 282.652 billion from USD 282.811 billion a week ago, according to data issued by the RBI on Friday.<br /><br /></p><p><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeOy1ti8MI/AAAAAAAAK-o/9xcUHlG7ee4/s1600-h/India+Fx.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeOy1ti8MI/AAAAAAAAK-o/9xcUHlG7ee4/s320/India+Fx.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br /><br /><strong>Rupee</strong><br /><br />India's rupee slumped to the lowest since 2003, adding to speculation investors will take continue taking money out of the currency. The currency completed its eighth weekly loss, the longest drop since December 2005. The rupee was down 1 percent on the day to 47.085 per dollar, the lowest since June 2003, as of the 5 p.m. close in Mumbai on Friday. The currency lost 1.15 percent this week. </p><p><br /></p><p><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeN9-KnOfI/AAAAAAAAK-g/An3iwx9gUhg/s1600-h/rupee.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeN9-KnOfI/AAAAAAAAK-g/An3iwx9gUhg/s320/rupee.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br /><br /><br /><strong>September Global Manufacturing PMI Shows Sharp Contraction</strong><br /><br />September seems to have been the ultimate "mensis horribilis" for industrial output internationally - and thus it is only natural to assume that Indian industry was also adversly affected - with global manufacturing activity contracting for the fourth consecutive month, and output falling to its weakest level in over seven years according to the <a href="http://www.ism.ws/ISMReport/content.cfm?ItemNumber=18594">JP Morgan Global Manufacturing PMI</a>, which at 44.2 hit its strongest rate of contraction since November 2001, down from 48.6 in August (Please see the end of this post for some information about countries included and the JP Morgan methodology).<br /><br /><br />According to the JP Morgan report the retrenchment of the manufacturing sector mainly reflected marked deteriorations in the trends for production, new orders and employment. The declines in output and new work received were the second most severe in the survey history, while staffing levels fell at the fastest pace for over six-and-a-half years. The Global Manufacturing Output Index registered 42.7 in September, well below the 48.5 posted for August.<br /></p><p>The sharpest decline in production was recorded for Spain, followed by the US, Japan and then the UK. Although the Eurozone Output Index sank to its second-lowest reading in the survey history, it was above the global average for the first time in four months. Within the euro area, France and Spain saw output fall at survey record rates, while in Italy and Ireland the contractions were the second and third most marked in their respective series. Germany, which until recently was the main growth engine of the Eurozone, saw production fall for the second month running and to the greatest extent for six years. Manufacturing activity in Japan fell to the lowest in over 6- years with the Nomura/JMMA Japan Purchasing Managers Index declining to a seasonally adjusted 44.3 in September from 46.9 in August.<br /></p><p>At 40.8 in September, the Global Manufacturing New Orders Index posted a reading well below the neutral 50.0 mark. JP Morgan noted that the trends in new work received were especially weak in Spain, the UK, France and the US, with the all bar the latter seeing new orders fall at a series record pace (for the US it was the strongest drop since January 2001). The downturn of the sector led to further job losses in September, with the rate of reduction in employment the fastest since February 2002. Conditions in the Spanish, the UK and the US manufacturing labour markets were especially weak.<br /><br />Russian manufacturing shrank for a second month in September, and in so doing registered its first back-to-back contraction since November 1998, as companies cut jobs and growth in new orders slowed, according to the latest VTB Bank Europe Purchasing Managers Report. The PMI came in at a seasonally adjusted 49.8, compared with 49.4 in August. The August reading was the lowest figure in three and a half years, according to the bank statement. On such indexes a figure above 50 indicates growth while one below 50 indicates a contraction.<br /><br /><br /></p><p><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SORxT5yx5OI/AAAAAAAAIBk/5bkoOr8XzAQ/s1600-h/russia+manufacturing.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SORxT5yx5OI/AAAAAAAAIBk/5bkoOr8XzAQ/s320/russia+manufacturing.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br /><br />Manufacturing in China contracted for a second month in August, underscoring the risk of a slump in the world's fourth-biggest economy. The Purchasing Managers' Index was a seasonally adjusted 48.4, unchanged from July, the China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing said today in an e-mailed statement.<br /><br /><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOklWJTTwRI/AAAAAAAALAY/gTVSVV4JoKY/s1600-h/china+PMI.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOklWJTTwRI/AAAAAAAALAY/gTVSVV4JoKY/s320/china+PMI.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br /><br />Brazil's industrial output fell a seasonally-adjusted 1.3 percent in August, the largest monthly drop this year, bolstering expectations the central bank will ease monetary tightening in response to slowing economic growth. On an annual basis, output rose 2 percent, the slowest pace since March, according to data from the national statistics agency in Rio de Janeiro.<br /><br /><br /></p><p><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOkn-3DAZsI/AAAAAAAALAg/dyZ5ENeIllQ/s1600-h/brazil+industrial+output.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOkn-3DAZsI/AAAAAAAALAg/dyZ5ENeIllQ/s320/brazil+industrial+output.png" border="0" /></a></p><p>And the situation seems to have deteriorated further in August, since the headline seasonally adjusted Banco Real Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) registered a 25-month low of 50.4, down from 51.1 in August.<br /><br />So basically this is where we get to learn what a global credit crunch means in terms of output and economic growth.<br /><br /><strong>India's Industrial Output Weakens Too</strong><br /><br />India's industrial output growth bounced back again in July (the last month for which we have official data), reaching a five-month year on year expansion rate high of 7.1%. This follows a noted slowdown where output only rose by 5.4 percent gain in June, and 4.1% in May, according to data from the Central Statistical Organisation.<br /><br /><br /><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SMprbPaY1xI/AAAAAAAAH1M/9wx_GldKlg4/s1600-h/india+ip.jpg"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SMprbPaY1xI/AAAAAAAAH1M/9wx_GldKlg4/s320/india+ip.jpg" border="0" /></a> But if we come to look at the manufacturing PMI we will see that India's manufacturing output has also slowed somewhat, and expanded at its slowest pace in 14 months in September according to the ABN AMRO Bank purchasing managers' index. The PMI reading - which is based on a survey of 500 companies operating in India - fell to a seasonally adjusted 57.3 in September from 57.9 in August. This reading was the lowest since July 2007. Still 57.3 still suggests Indian industry continues to grow quite vigoursly, although the report did highlight the fact that the drop in the index was mainly the result of a decline in growth of new orders, and implied a deterioration in demand conditions, both locally as well as in export markets.<br /><br /><br /><strong>Current Account and Trade Deficit</strong><br /><br />The Rupee has also been dropping in reaction to India's deteriorating current account situation. The current account deficit rocketed to $10.7 billion in the three months from April to June, up from a $1.04 billion gap in the previous quarter,according to data from the Reserve Bank of India last week. </p><p>India's trade deficit almost doubled to a record in August as a surge in crude oil prices increased the import bill and overseas sales of goods slowed. The trade deficit widened to $13.9 billion from $7.2 billion a year earlier, according to data from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Imports grew 51 percent, the fastest gain in seven months, to $29.9 billion, while exports expanded 27 percent to $16 billion. </p><p>A near doubling of oil prices has boosted import costs, since India relies on overseas purchases for three-quarters of its energy needs. India paid an average $8 billion a month this year for oil imports, up from $5.5 billion in 2007, as crude oil costs surged to a record $147 a barrel on July 11. In India's case the 35 percent drop in oil prices we have seen since July has been partially offset by the decline in the rupee to a five-year low. </p><p>India's oil imports in August rose 77 percent to $10.9 billion as refiners paid more for crude oil purchased overseas. Non-oil imports gained 40 percent to $18.9 billion. Imports in the five months ended August 31 rose 38 percent to $130.3 billion from $94.6 billion a year ago. That took the trade deficit to $49.2 billion, compared with $34.5 billion in the same period a year earlier. Overseas sales of Indian goods in the five months to August 31 grew 35 percent to $81.2 billion, compared with $60.1 billion, the statement said.</p><p><strong>India and Brazil Critical Weathervanes</strong><br /></p><p>What I have been arguing in this post is not that everything about India's economy is perfect - far from it, but neither is it the "perfect storm" disaster which current knee jerk reactions among international investors would seem to suggest. The problems which are hitting the Indian economy at the moment, from the rapid rise in inflation to the sudden withdrawal of sentiment have a common origin: the dynamics of the global economy, and it is to these we must now look if we are to be able to sort the wood from the trees about what happens next. Basically, when the dust settles, I think it will be apparent that there are few economies left sufficiently well standing (not Russia certainly, and probably not China, given the export dependence on the developed economies) and with sufficient energy to bounce back. Many may be sceptical that Brazil and India are going to lead the coming charge (this recession cannot, after all, last forever), but I ask you, if it isn't Brazil and India, who is it going to be?<br /><br /><strong>JP Morgan Global Manufacturing PMI Methodology</strong><br /><br /><br />The Global Report on Manufacturing is compiled by Markit Economics based on the results of surveys covering over 7,500 purchasing executives in 26 countries. Together these countries account for an estimated 83% of global manufacturing output. Questions are asked about real events and are not opinion based. Data are presented in the form of diffusion indices, where an index reading above 50.0 indicates an increase in the variable since the previous month and below 50.0 a decrease.<br /><br />The countries included are listed below by size of global GDP share, and the figures in brackets are the % og global GDP in each case (World Bank Data).<br /><br />United States (30.5), Eurozone (18.7), Japan (13.9), Germany (5.6), China (4.9),United Kingdom (4.5), France (4.0), Italy (3.2), Spain(1.9), Brazil (1.9),India (1.7), Australia (1.3), Netherlands (1.1), Russia (0.9), Switzerland (0.7), Turkey (0.7), Austria (0.6), Poland (0.5), Denmark (0.5), South Africa (0.4), Greece (0.4), Israel (0.3), Ireland (0.3), Singapore (0.3), Czech Republic (0.2), New Zealand (0.2), Hungary 0.2.</p>]]></description>
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		<title>India&#8217;s Ship IS Battered By The Global Storm, But She Will Survive!</title>
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		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Oct 2008 14:11:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Edward Hugh</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[by Edward Hugh: Barcelona<br /><br />India is in the middle of a storm at the moment, there can be no doubt about that. But the important point to note is that this storm is not of India's making. The financial turmoil in a number of key developed economies, and above all the United States, is sending shock waves across the global economy, and as is normal, when the earth trembles, it is the most fragile who notice it most. India's economy may be fragile in the sense that it is very vulnerable to what is colloqially known as global risk sentiment, but it is not fragile in terms of being susceptible to having its growth trajectory knocked completely off course. India may be shaken, but her economy will not be broken.<br /><br /><strong>Emerging Market Bonds</strong><br /><br />Emerging-market bonds had their worst week in four years this week as the deepening credit crisis raised global recession concerns and slammed the brakes on demand for higher-yielding securities. The extra yield investors demand to own developing-nation bonds rather than U.S. Treasuries surged 62 basis points, or 0.62 of a percentage point, this week to 4.41 percentage points, according to data derived from the JPMorgan Chase EMBI+ index. The increase is the biggest since May 2004 and leaves the so-called spread at its widest since June of that year. The spread has now swelled 1.42 percentage points since the end of August.<br /><br /><p><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeF-5-hTZI/AAAAAAAAK-I/slQhMEwnAFQ/s1600-h/jp+morgan2.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeF-5-hTZI/AAAAAAAAK-I/slQhMEwnAFQ/s320/jp+morgan2.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br />Investors distanced themselves from emerging-market debt as the evidence mounted that major economies - the U.S., the UK, Japan and the Eurozone - are sliding into recession and this triggered a major exit from commodities, which is a significant source of export revenue for a large number of developing nations. In particular bonds extended losses on the perception that the $700 billion U.S. bank bailout would not work miracles and thus many developed economies will be struggling to digest the impact of the credit blow-out for some time to come.<br /><br /><br />Until credibility is restored, we will not see people investing in the numbers that emerging economies like India and Brazil badly need to see. In the present environment people are not simply not willing to take assume what is perceived as "risky" without being paid a large - and from the emerging economy point of view - damaging premium. As a result the cost of protecting developing nations' bonds against default has been steadily rising. Five-year credit-default swaps based on Argentina's debt climbed 44 basis points to 12.55 percentage points last week, the highest since at least June 2005. That means it costs $1.255 million to protect $10 million of the country's debt from default. Credit-default swaps, contracts conceived to protect bondholders against default, pay the buyer face value in exchange for the underlying securities or the cash equivalent should a company fail to adhere to its debt agreements.<br /><br /><br /><strong>Emerging Market Stocks</strong><br /><br />Emerging-market stocks had the biggest weekly decline in seven years last weeks, led by banks and energy companies. The MSCI Emerging Markets Index dropped 2.3 percent on Friday to 741.73, following a 3.4 percent decline on Thursday. The index lost 10 percent on theweek, the most since the September 2001 terrorist attacks.<br /><br /><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeJMbeM4zI/AAAAAAAAK-Q/qUb9e8aW-IE/s1600-h/MSCI2.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeJMbeM4zI/AAAAAAAAK-Q/qUb9e8aW-IE/s320/MSCI2.png" border="0" /></a><br />Turkey's benchmark index fell the most in three weeks, losing 4.2 percent to 34,553 in the first trading day since Sept. 29. Russia's Micex Index slumped 5.3 percent, extending its annual loss to 51 percent. India's Sensex index slid 4.1 percent to 12,526.32. Reliance Industries Ltd., India's biggest company by market value, slumped 7.6 percent, to its lowest in a year.<br /><br /><strong>Inflation Falls</strong><br /><br />But while India's financial system has been taking a beating, Indian inflation, almost un-noticed -slipped back to a 13-week low in late September, giving the central bank some breathing space to keep interest rates unchanged and lossen the liquidity strings when it next meets at the end of this month. Wholesale prices rose 11.99 percent in the week to Sept. 20 from a year earlier after gaining 12.14 percent in the previous week, the commerce ministry said in a statement in New Delhi on Thursday.<br /><br /><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeLgg4yv0I/AAAAAAAAK-Y/I0ypF9PmDKs/s1600-h/india+inflation.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeLgg4yv0I/AAAAAAAAK-Y/I0ypF9PmDKs/s320/india+inflation.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br />Reserve Bank of India Governor Duvvuri Subbarao is under pressure to boost money supply as a local stock sell-off triggered by the global credit crunch has drained funds from the banking system, increasing borrowing costs. Subbarao will undoubtedly seek to steer a middle course, since given that inflation is still double the central bank's target he will not want to seem to be "soft", while on the other hand he will want to be prudent and will try to head off an excessively rapid credit tightening on the backs of the global crunch. In addition, the peak of global inflation has now undoubtedly past, and we are now likely to see growing deflationary headwinds as capacity levels exceed demand across the whole global economy, as <a href="http://www.rgemonitor.com/emergingmarkets-monitor/253856/the_global_economy_and_her_financial_markets__is_deflation_the_next_macro_story">Claus Vistesen explains in this excellent and timely post</a>. </p><p>The central bank has raised the cash reserve ratio, or the proportion of deposits that lenders maintain with it as reserves, by 400 basis points to 9 percent since December 2006 to contain inflation. The bank will make the outcome of its next meeting in Mumbai known on Oct. 24. </p><p><br />The rate at which Indian banks lend to each other climbed to an 18-month high of 17.5 percent on Oct. 1 as investors hoarded cash. Indian banks borrowed an average 413 billion rupees a day from the central bank in September, almost twice the amount in August, further indicating a shortage of funds in the banking system.<br /></p><p>Essentially the wholesale price index fell because of a decline in the prices of farm products such as cereals, fruits and vegetables. The index of primary articles, that includes food items, dropped 0.2 percent, while the indices of manufactured and fuel were unchanged in the week to Sept. 20, today's report said.<br /><br /><strong>Commodities Down</strong><br /><br />Commodities, as measured by the Reuters/Jefferies CRB Index of 19 raw materials, tumbled 9.9 percent last week, the most since at least 1956.<br /><br /></p><p><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeEMtA__oI/AAAAAAAAK-A/G4HKG-PuiFo/s1600-h/reuters2.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeEMtA__oI/AAAAAAAAK-A/G4HKG-PuiFo/s320/reuters2.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br />Crude oil has lost 12 percent during the week, the most since 2004. The contract for November delivery traded at $94.47 a barrel, up 0.5 percent, as of 12:11 p.m. London time. Copper fell as much as 3.1 percent to $5,670 a ton on the London Metal Exchange, the lowest since February 2007 and was down 12% on the week. </p><p>Such downward movement in commodity prices have a double edged impact on emerging economies. On the one hand inflation, which has in large part been driven up by rising commodity prices, will reduce significantly, but on the other hand many emerging economies are dependent on revenue from commodity sales to finance growth and development.<br /><br /><br /><strong>Stocks Down</strong><br /><br />Indian stocks fell during the week, with the benchmark Sensex stock index declining to its lowest in 18 months. The Bombay Stock Exchange's Sensitive Index, dropped 529.35, or 4.1 percent, to 12,526.32, its lowest since April 2, 2007. The index posted its second weekly decline, falling 4.4 percent. The S&#38;P CNX Nifty Index on the National Stock Exchange fell 3.4 percent to 3,818.30. The BSE 200 Index declined 3.8 percent to 1,515.29. Nifty futures for October delivery fell 2.9 percent to 3,853.<br /><br /><br />Overseas investors bought a net 845 billion rupees ($18 million) of Indian stocks on Sept. 30, trimming their net outflow this year from equities to $9.1 billion, the nation's stock market regulator said.<br /><br /><br /><strong>Forex Reserves</strong><br /><br />India's foreign exchange reserves fell marginally by USD 153 million to USD 291.819billion for the week ended September 26 from USD 291.972 billion in the previous week. Reserves had jumped by USD 2.511 billion in the previous week. Foreign currency assets (FCA), during the week, dropped to USD 282.652 billion from USD 282.811 billion a week ago, according to data issued by the RBI on Friday.<br /><br /></p><p><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeOy1ti8MI/AAAAAAAAK-o/9xcUHlG7ee4/s1600-h/India+Fx.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeOy1ti8MI/AAAAAAAAK-o/9xcUHlG7ee4/s320/India+Fx.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br /><br /><strong>Rupee</strong><br /><br />India's rupee slumped to the lowest since 2003, adding to speculation investors will take continue taking money out of the currency. The currency completed its eighth weekly loss, the longest drop since December 2005. The rupee was down 1 percent on the day to 47.085 per dollar, the lowest since June 2003, as of the 5 p.m. close in Mumbai on Friday. The currency lost 1.15 percent this week. </p><p><br /></p><p><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeN9-KnOfI/AAAAAAAAK-g/An3iwx9gUhg/s1600-h/rupee.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOeN9-KnOfI/AAAAAAAAK-g/An3iwx9gUhg/s320/rupee.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br /><br /><br /><strong>September Global Manufacturing PMI Shows Sharp Contraction</strong><br /><br />September seems to have been the ultimate "mensis horribilis" for industrial output internationally, with global manufacturing activity contracting for the fourth consecutive month, and output falling to its weakest level in over seven years according to the <a href="http://www.ism.ws/ISMReport/content.cfm?ItemNumber=18594">JP Morgan Global Manufacturing PMI</a>, which at 44.2 hit its strongest rate of contraction since November 2001, down from 48.6 in August (Please see the end of this post for some information about countries included and the JP Morgan methodology).<br /><br /><br />According to the JP Morgan report the retrenchment of the manufacturing sector mainly reflected marked deteriorations in the trends for production, new orders and employment. The declines in output and new work received were the second most severe in the survey history, while staffing levels fell at the fastest pace for over six-and-a-half years. The Global Manufacturing Output Index registered 42.7 in September, well below the 48.5 posted for August.<br /></p><p>The sharpest decline in production was recorded for Spain, followed by the US, Japan and then the UK. Although the Eurozone Output Index sank to its second-lowest reading in the survey history, it was above the global average for the first time in four months. Within the euro area, France and Spain saw output fall at survey record rates, while in Italy and Ireland the contractions were the second and third most marked in their respective series. Germany, which until recently was the main growth engine of the Eurozone, saw production fall for the second month running and to the greatest extent for six years. Manufacturing activity in Japan fell to the lowest in over 6- years with the Nomura/JMMA Japan Purchasing Managers Index declining to a seasonally adjusted 44.3 in September from 46.9 in August.<br /></p><p>At 40.8 in September, the Global Manufacturing New Orders Index posted a reading well below the neutral 50.0 mark. JP Morgan noted that the trends in new work received were especially weak in Spain, the UK, France and the US, with the all bar the latter seeing new orders fall at a series record pace (for the US it was the strongest drop since January 2001). The downturn of the sector led to further job losses in September, with the rate of reduction in employment the fastest since February 2002. Conditions in the Spanish, the UK and the US manufacturing labour markets were especially weak.<br /><br />Russian manufacturing shrank for a second month in September, and in so doing registered its first back-to-back contraction since November 1998, as companies cut jobs and growth in new orders slowed, according to the latest VTB Bank Europe Purchasing Managers Report. The PMI came in at a seasonally adjusted 49.8, compared with 49.4 in August. The August reading was the lowest figure in three and a half years, according to the bank statement. On such indexes a figure above 50 indicates growth while one below 50 indicates a contraction.<br /><br /><br /></p><p><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SORxT5yx5OI/AAAAAAAAIBk/5bkoOr8XzAQ/s1600-h/russia+manufacturing.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SORxT5yx5OI/AAAAAAAAIBk/5bkoOr8XzAQ/s320/russia+manufacturing.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br /><br />Manufacturing in China contracted for a second month in August, underscoring the risk of a slump in the world's fourth-biggest economy. The Purchasing Managers' Index was a seasonally adjusted 48.4, unchanged from July, the China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing said today in an e-mailed statement.<br /><br /><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOklWJTTwRI/AAAAAAAALAY/gTVSVV4JoKY/s1600-h/china+PMI.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOklWJTTwRI/AAAAAAAALAY/gTVSVV4JoKY/s320/china+PMI.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br /><br />Brazil's industrial output fell a seasonally-adjusted 1.3 percent in August, the largest monthly drop this year, bolstering expectations the central bank will ease monetary tightening in response to slowing economic growth. On an annual basis, output rose 2 percent, the slowest pace since March, according to data from the national statistics agency in Rio de Janeiro.<br /><br /><br /><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOkn-3DAZsI/AAAAAAAALAg/dyZ5ENeIllQ/s1600-h/brazil+industrial+output.png"><img style="center" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ngczZkrw340/SOkn-3DAZsI/AAAAAAAALAg/dyZ5ENeIllQ/s320/brazil+industrial+output.png" border="0" /></a><br /><br />So basically this is where we get to learn what a global credit crunch means in terms of output and economic growth.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><strong>Current Account and Trade Deficit</strong><br /><br />The Rupee has also been dropping in reaction to India's deteriorating current account situation. The current account deficit increased to $10.7 billion in the second quarter of 2008 from a $1.04 billion gap in the previous quarter,according to data from the Reserve Bank of India last week. </p><p>India's trade deficit almost doubled to a record in August as a surge in crude oil prices increased the import bill and overseas sales of goods slowed. The trade deficit widened to $13.9 billion from $7.2 billion a year earlier, according to data from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Imports grew 51 percent, the fastest gain in seven months, to $29.9 billion, while exports expanded 27 percent to $16 billion. </p><p>A near doubling of oil prices has boosted import costs, since India relies on overseas purchases for three-quarters of its energy needs. India paid an average $8 billion a month this year for oil imports, up from $5.5 billion in 2007, as crude oil costs surged to a record $147 a barrel on July 11. In India, the 35 percent drop in oil prices since July has been partially offset by the decline in the rupee to a five-year low. India's oil imports in August rose 77 percent to $10.9 billion as refiners paid more for crude oil purchased overseas. Non-oil imports gained 40 percent to $18.9 billion. Imports in the five months ended August 31 rose 38 percent to $130.3 billion from $94.6 billion a year ago. That took the trade deficit to $49.2 billion, compared with $34.5 billion in the same period a year earlier. </p><br /><br /><p><br />Overseas sales of Indian goods in the five months to August 31 grew 35 percent to $81.2 billion, compared with $60.1 billion, the statement said.<br /><br /><br />Overseas sales of Indian goods in the five months to August 31 grew 35 percent to $81.2 billion, compared with $60.1 billion, the statement said.<br /></p><br /><br /><p>India's current account deficit widened to a record in the three months to June as a surge in crude oil prices increased the nation's import bill. The shortfall, the amount by which imports exceed exports, remittances and other income from abroad, increased to $10.72 billion from a $1.04 billion gap in the previous quarter, the Reserve Bank of India said in a statement in Mumbai. Analysts expected a deficit of $11.52 billion. </p><br /><br /><br /><strong>JP Morgan Global Manufacturing PMI Methodology</strong><br /><br /><br />The Global Report on Manufacturing is compiled by Markit Economics based on the results of surveys covering over 7,500 purchasing executives in 26 countries. Together these countries account for an estimated 83% of global manufacturing output. Questions are asked about real events and are not opinion based. Data are presented in the form of diffusion indices, where an index reading above 50.0 indicates an increase in the variable since the previous month and below 50.0 a decrease.<br /><br />The countries included are listed below by size of global GDP share, and the figures in brackets are the % og global GDP in each case (World Bank Data).<br /><br />United States (30.5), Eurozone (18.7), Japan (13.9), Germany (5.6), China (4.9),United Kingdom (4.5), France (4.0), Italy (3.2), Spain(1.9), Brazil (1.9),India (1.7), Australia (1.3), Netherlands (1.1), Russia (0.9), Switzerland (0.7), Turkey (0.7), Austria (0.6), Poland (0.5), Denmark (0.5), South Africa (0.4), Greece (0.4), Israel (0.3), Ireland (0.3), Singapore (0.3), Czech Republic (0.2), New Zealand (0.2), Hungary 0.2.<br /><br /><p></p>]]></description>
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		<title>Bailout Bill Turns Taxpayers into Campaign Donors</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/bailout-bill-turns-taxpayers-into-campaign-donors/</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Oct 2008 19:42:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Snyder</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Market Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Andrew Snyder]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bank bailout]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bill Turns Taxpayers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Capitol Hills]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[contrarian profits]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Senate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[serious accounting changes]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[<p>The $700 billion bank bailout has passed Congress. Except now it's more like a $850 billion bill. <strong>Andrew Snyder</strong> says corrupt politicians have tacked on countless spending and tax initiatives with the sole purpose of boosting their political capitol in the run-up to elections. The shortcomings of the plan, of course, remain unchanged...<!--more--></p>
<p>This from Today's Financial News:</p>
<blockquote><p>You may not believe it, but our elected officials are not morons. In fact, they are very smart, calculating businessmen. The measure profits not in dollars but by votes. Unfortunately, the world of politics is far more corrupt than Wall Street.</p>
<p>I do not know why I am surprised by this bailout-bill mess. After all, you do not make it to Capitol Hill by acting charitable, selfless or even ethical. You make it to Washington through back-stabbing political moves, shady campaign contributions, and a me-before-you attitude. The truth is blatantly obvious this week.</p>
<p>After Monday’s political debacle permanently smeared this country’s history, our kind senators thought they would step in and look like the heroes we have been waiting for. In dominating fashion, they passed a revised version of the administration’s bailout bill.</p>
<p>It was the Senate’s way of saying to their rivals in the House, “Ha, ha. We are better than you.”</p>
<p>It was also their way of taking advantage of the American taxpayer. Realizing the House absolutely must pass a bill or face severe political consequences, the Senate added over $150 billion worth of pork.</p>
<p>There are tax relief measures for alternative energy and technology research. There is funding for rural schools. And there is even a measure that forces companies and healthcare providers to increase their mental health treatment standards. The bill is filled with laws that would have failed on their own.</p>
<p>Other than this pork, the new package is almost financially identical to the original failed bill. It still provides $700 billion in bailout relief, the only thing Secretary Paulson ever asked for. It still gives the government non-voting warrants in the companies it is giving the money to. It still creates a channel, not an official limit, to cap executive pay. It still offers mortgage help to trouble homeowners. And it still creates an oversight committee that has the power to cancel the entire bailout anytime it wants.</p>
<p>The only new legislation that is even remotely beneficial to the country and the American taxpayer is a measure that would increase federal deposit guarantees from $100,000 to $250,000, while giving the FDIC unlimited borrowing potential.</p>
<p>When it comes down to it, even the guarantee increase is more political pandering designed to make the average Joe feel like the government is doing something good for him. In reality, how many Americans are going to run out and toss another hundred grand into their checking account? What impact will it have on banks with balance sheets ready to implode?</p>
<p><strong>Wait, it gets better</strong></p>
<p>Oh yeah, our senators are pulling the wool over our eyes with one other new measure. The new bill calls for a “study” of the effects of changing current bookkeeping standards and the impact of mark-to-market accounting on corporate balance sheets. Our leaders must not have gotten the memo on August 28 telling them the SEC voted to switch the nation over to international accounting standards. They would have to jump through a lot of very high hoops to make any serious accounting changes. But they do not expect you to know that.</p>
<p>Really, it is no surprise this kind of legislation came out of the Senate. After all, it is home to both presidential candidates and one vice presidential candidate. They saw the opportunity as a chance to make headlines and pander to the “unintelligent” voter.</p>
<p>Fortunately, you and I know better. We know our elected officials are full of, well, politics.</p>
<p>The new legislation will get voted on late tonight or sometime tomorrow morning. It will pass and our leaders will be clamoring to get their face in front of the cameras so they can read us a canned speech and add some more votes to their coffers.</p>
<p>As investors, this bailout bill will be just another factor in the giant equation that makes Wall Street so complicated. If you pay attention, do your homework, and do not fall for the lies and the hype, you have a very good shot at profiting from Capitol Hills work.</p>
<p>After all, no new law passes unless it will make somebody rich. <a href="http://www.todaysfinancialnews.com/us-stocks-and-markets/bailout-bonus-national-city-ncc-up-by-over-65-4476.html" target="_blank">Might as well be you, right</a><a href="http://www.todaysfinancialnews.com/us-stocks-and-markets/bailout-bonus-national-city-ncc-up-by-over-65-4476.html" target="_blank">?</a></p></blockquote>
<p>Source: <a href="http://www.todaysfinancialnews.com/politics/bailout-bill-corrupt-politicians-steal-your-money-4488.html">Bailout Bill: Corrupt Politicians Steal Your Money</a></p>]]></description>
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