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	<title>Comments on: Bank Executive Compensation and the Bailout</title>
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		<title>By: The Bush Administration&#8217;s Banking Rescue Plan &#171; American Armageddon</title>
		<link>http://www.straightstocks.com/market-commentary/bank-executive-compensation-and-the-bailout/comment-page-1/#comment-5069</link>
		<dc:creator>The Bush Administration&#8217;s Banking Rescue Plan &#171; American Armageddon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Oct 2008 15:45:42 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>[...] However, when some of the original mortgages downstream became delinquent as the housing price bubble burst, in the spring of 2005, and home foreclosures began to rise, more than $1 trillion of the artificial mortgage-backed securities previously created thus became less secure and less liquid. As time went on, the market for such artificial securities de facto dried up. As a consequence, the issuing banks were left with a large inventory of now toxic securities that nobody wanted to buy. Huge permanent losses replaced huge but illusory short-term profits, although banking CEOs kept receiving large (some would say obscene) total corporate compensations.   [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] However, when some of the original mortgages downstream became delinquent as the housing price bubble burst, in the spring of 2005, and home foreclosures began to rise, more than $1 trillion of the artificial mortgage-backed securities previously created thus became less secure and less liquid. As time went on, the market for such artificial securities de facto dried up. As a consequence, the issuing banks were left with a large inventory of now toxic securities that nobody wanted to buy. Huge permanent losses replaced huge but illusory short-term profits, although banking CEOs kept receiving large (some would say obscene) total corporate compensations.   [...]</p>
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